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Abstract 
Despite various arguments which have been advanced in favour of educational 
decentralization, there is no ideal version of decentralization. This explains why success or 
failure in implementation tends to be context based and mostly influenced by a number of 
factors such as the availability of financial resources. By applying the comparative qualitative 
case study approach, this research project analysed how institutional capacity, accountability 
and local autonomy affect the implementation of the decentralization policy in Zambia’s 
education sector.  In particular, two District Education Boards (DEBs), Chongwe and 
Solwezi, are studied and compared. 
Primary qualitative data was on the one hand, collected through the use of semi-structured 
interviews and focus group discussions. On the other hand, official policy documents and 
reports were used as important secondary data sources.  Nearly 8 informants were drawn from 
each of the two education boards in addition to the 8 key informants interviewed at the 
national level.  A total of four focus group discussions (2 in each district) involving teachers 
and parents were organised at the school level in order to solicit views on implementation of 
the policy from the primary beneficiary‘s point of view. 
The adoption of educational decentralization has, in certain instances, led to positive changes, 
especially in participation and transparency both at the district and school level. Yet, the 
manner in which leadership is exercised within the board sets a striking difference between 
these two cases. Lack of coordination between the DEB secretary and the board chairperson is 
particularly worrisome in Chongwe compared to Solwezi. Generally this study revealed that 
implementation is hampered by more serious challenges, with weak institutional capacities 
and accountability mechanisms. Of particular interest is the weak administrative system as 
well as lack of a legal framework - a situation which is creating a conducive environment for 
poor internal and external compact relationships. 
Further, the establishment of the education boards resulted in a shift of workloads from the 
center, but this has been without meaningful transfer of authority to the districts. Contrary to 
policy provisions, decentralization initiatives in both Chongwe and Solwezi have not relaxed 
the tight controls from the top. In the case of teacher recruitment and financial matters, for 
example, the Ministry of Education (MoE) has delegated authority to the DEBs, but in 
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practice this authority is largely reclaimed. These boards have, therefore, not been able to 
efficiently make decisions that could support effective implementation of the policy.  
Therefore, these findings are consistent with the view that as much as institutional capacity, 
accountability and local autonomy are critical success factors, they are merely a means to an 
end, since educational decentralization (where not properly implemented) can, in practice, 
reproduce similar problems as those experienced under centralization. Obviously, further 
investigation based on mixed methods involving more than two education boards would yield 
more robust findings and recommendation for improving implementation. 
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Chapter 1:  The Introduction  
 
“A core idea about decentralization is that it does not simply imply abandonment’ by 
the state but rather a ‘change in the role of the state’. ‘Where its supervision and 
support are weak and its absence is not made up for by strong local autonomy, 
institutional capacity and accountability, the inefficiencies and sluggishness that 
characterises central government can be replicated if not multiplied at the lower 
levels’. Thus, decentralization is neither a panacea nor a shortcut”1 (De Grauwe & 
Lugaz, 2010: 145).  
The current state of educational decentralisation process in Zambia is fraught with a lot of 
implementation under-currencies, ranging from policy rhetoric to the actual transfer of 
educational responsibilities and powers based on attractive claims not backed by tangible 
results at least so far. However, it may be necessary to emphasize from the onset that the 
troubled implementation of educational decentralization in Zambia is, in fact, a common 
problem for most countries in the Sub Saharan African (SSA) region. While educational 
decentralization is appealing and logical, the tendency in the region has often been 
devolution of functions without appropriate mechanisms for improving institutional 
capacity, accountability and local autonomy all of which are crucial in as far as effective 
implementation is concerned.  The principal argument in this thesis, however, is that much 
as institutional capacity, accountability and local autonomy are critical success factors, 
they are merely a means and not ends in themselves since educational decentralization can 
in practice, rather than in theory, lead to the transfer of the same problems experienced at 
the centre to local units.  
The aim of this study, therefore, was to examine the Zambian model of educational 
decentralization by analysing what appears to be a widening  gap between “policy and 
practice” (i.e implementation). This was achieved by analysing the implications of 
institutional capacity, accountability and local autonomy which are crucial towards 
implementation of the educational decentralization in Zambia. Although selected models 
of decentralization from different parts of the world were highlighted, the main focus in 
this study was on the recently established District Education Boards (DEBs) since these are 
the key custodians for implementing the policy in Zambia. Being a comparative case study, 
                                                 
1 The idea put across by Lugaz & De Grauwe in my opinion; underlie the fact that different countries have their peculiar 
contextual differences suggesting that decentralisation cannot be implemented in a “straight-jacket approach”. It is no 
wonder, these researchers argued that some municipalities, districts, and schools have all they need to benefit from more 
autonomy, while others need support, guidance and control because decentralisation requires “flexible implementation” 
which should be based on a balance between autonomy and characteristics beneficiaries 
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two districts were selected (i.e. Chongwe and Solwezi) in order to identify and analyse the 
implications if any, of their comparable differences or similarities in implementation. 
Thematically, the study was centred on basic education since this is the level under the 
jurisdiction of the Boards. Having said that, the three key research questions which this 
study sorts to answer are as follows; 
 How does institutional capacity influence success or constrain effective 
implementation of educational decentralization? 
 How does accountability in a devolved education system affect the implementation 
of decentralization? 
 In which way does the transfer of power and/or authority or lack of these aspects 
affect local autonomy of education boards? 
Other than being the point of departure, these searching questions underline my subjective 
perception that the implementation of educational decentralization is quite often taken for 
granted. Expected benefits can be yielded even when there has been no considerable 
assessment of what might be crucial success factors. Furthermore, there is a grave 
tendency especially in developing countries such as Zambia to view educational 
decentralization as if it is a panacea for improving education service delivery at the local 
level without proper assessment of crucial success related determinants (Stromquist & 
Monkman, 2000). 
1.1 Background Information 
Educational decentralization is not a new concept. Rather, it is an old but complex 
phenomenon with perplexing differences in terms of its implementation and impact. It is 
also arguably one of the policy measures often adopted in order to accelerate access to and 
quality of education in many parts of the world (Fiske, 1996; World Bank, 2007). Yet, 
country settings, political systems and philosophical values about education differ to the 
extent that policy processes and implementation and more so lessons learnt equally vary 
significantly from one country to another (Winkler, 1993; Kalsen, 2000). Questions can be 
asked: Why decentralization? What exactly does it mean? What are its key implications? 
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There are no clear cut answers to these questions but one thing is clear: There are 
considerable differences in terms of ideological views and arguments as to why 
decentralization is regarded not only as a policy objective, but also as a management 
strategy for improving the delivery of public services such as education (World Bank, 
2007). The widespread adoption of educational decentralization reforms in developing 
countries may, for instance, be motivated by the advent of multiparty values in Africa, 
deepening democratization in Latin America and, to a large extent, the perceived failure by 
Central government to provide public services in an efficient, effective and equitable 
manner (Latvack.,et al, 1998). 
Other proponents advocate for decentralization policy reforms purely on efficiency, 
effectiveness and financial grounds.  Understandably, the education sector which is 
particularly prone to reforms has provided a fertile ground for the proliferation of 
decentralization initiatives (UNESCO, 2005). However theoretically sound these 
assumptions may be, they seem to stretch reality beyond breaking point. As the literature 
review will show, there is evidence pointing to a mixture of results emerging from the 
implementation of decentralization policies. Just as much as successes, failures in 
implementation are often attributed to intuitional capacity, accountability and local 
autonomy factors. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Zambia’s National Education Policy highlights a number of benefits regarding 
decentralization. However, its implementation reflects serious discrepancies which are 
likely to render the on-going process of decentralization to nothing much but a white 
elephant. According to the policy, “the establishment of the DEBs is supposed to improve 
effectiveness and efficiency in basic education delivery by bringing decision making closer 
to the people. In addition, decentralization is also seen as a mechanism for enhancing 
community participation through promotion of a deep sense of shared responsibility and 
ownership in basic education (MoE, 1996).  
It has been nearly ten years since the decentralization policy was adopted, yet there is no 
meaningful progress to show that the implementation is moving in the right direction 
towards achieving the set goals. Admittedly, it is highly daunting to precisely pin-point the 
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root cause of the problem due to a myriad of interconnected factors. For the purpose of this 
study, it is sufficient to situate the ‘statement of problem’ around three key factors which 
are institutional capacity, level of accountability and local autonomy.  In fact, these factors 
are cited in the Decentralization Secretariat Annual Report of 2008 as some of the crucial 
challenges that are affecting the implementation of decentralization at the local level. 
One wonders: Why pursue a complex policy like educational decentralization when the 
capacity of your district level institutions is considerably weak? Besides, is implementing 
such a policy amidst low levels of accountability and local autonomy a rational choice? It 
is presumably a futile agenda to undertake decentralization initiatives when your 
institutional capacity is weak and where there is no political will or commitment to 
increase the degree of local autonomy or promote accountability at the district level. Bear 
in mind that these obstacles do not just reflect what may be prevailing in Zambia, but have 
equally triggered inefficiencies which have substantially compromised decision making 
and effective delivery of education services by education boards.  
It has been argued that where local level capacities are weak, the center tends to impose 
substantial administrative controls which, in the end, cartels efficiency and local 
innovation at the local level (USAID, 2009). Others have argued that, “while autonomy 
may be an outcome of the decentralization process, decentralization alone cannot guarantee 
that local level entities can make independent decisions” (Coleman & Early, 2005:73). 
Based on these assertions, one would suggest that  power and authority for decision 
making has not been fully transferred to DEBs in Zambia since MoE top officials still 
exercise arbitrary powers on matters such as annual planning and budgeting at the local 
level (IOB; 2008).  This tendency neither fosters real sense of local ownership nor 
effective management of education services by DEBs. These are not only serious, but 
rather grave concerns reflecting the current situation in the Zambian context. They, to a 
large extent, provide sufficient basis for anchoring the statement of the problem for this 
study. 
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1.3  Justification of the Research Problem 
As highlighted in the Dakar framework of EFA goals of 2000, the objective of educational 
decentralization is to contribute towards increased access to and quality of education. 
While there are various factors which can contribute to the achievement of this objective, 
country specify challenges make processes of decentralization turn out fruitless. In the 
absence of stronger institutional capacities, there can be lapses in implementation process.  
Besides, accountability can equally be dealt a big blow where effective stakeholder 
participation for instance, is compromised since it is an essential success factor for 
implementing decentralization reforms at the district level (De Grauwe & Lugaz, 2007). 
Suffice the view that local autonomy poses striking contradictions in a decentralized 
education system, there is also evidence suggesting that, “it is a necessary luxury for local 
actors” (Dillon, 2011) in any decentralized system such as that of Zambia. Dillon added 
that where autonomy substantially lacks, implementers have no flexibility or freedom for 
innovation on how best to provide education. To some extent, however, this is only 
possible if strong leadership and professional capacity is in place.  
In Zambia, the perceived weak institutional capacities as well as low levels of 
accountability and local autonomy at the district level immensely underline the low levels 
of progress and explain why DEBs are seemingly inhibited in their implementation of the 
policy (MoE & SNV, 2009).  Furthermore, the current level of success attests to the fact 
that the expected benefits of decentralization are still far-fetched. For instance, the Impact 
Evaluation Report by the Dutch Development Agency (IOB, 2008) highlighted undesirable 
educational outcomes around issues of access and quality of basic education especially in 
rural areas. The Report shows, “that poor accountability mechanisms and lack of sufficient 
autonomy at the district level had contributed to the deterioration and stagnation in the 
quality basic education” (p.47). In order to remedy the situation, the IOB 2008 report 
recommended improvements in institutional capacities and accountability mechanisms 
among other related aspects pointing out that government should let go of the necessary 
powers and authority instruments, which the DEBs throughout the country badly needs. In 
view of this discussion, the research questions raised earlier are critical as they offer an 
opportunity to explore the extent of the problem and to shade more light on its 
implications. 
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1.4 Significance of the Study 
Educational decentralization is a highly contentious theme surrounded by principles which 
are not easy to understand (Weiler, 1990). Despite claims that institutional capacity, 
accountability, and autonomy are cornerstones of a well decentralized education system, 
these principles present tough challenges which can be difficult to deal with. For example, 
the study by Dillon in 2011 questioned the perceived significance of local autonomy of sub 
national units in a decentralized education system. Dillon argued that if local autonomy 
influences success or failure in the implementation of educational decentralization, should 
it then be limited to only promising education boards in order to reduce risks associated 
with self-governing? Drawing on Dillon’s study, one wonders how education boards in 
Zambia can use autonomy as well as accountability and institutional capacity to improve 
the implementation of the policy or, indeed, how these factors can stimulate better 
implementation in the absence of country specific lessons to be used as a point of 
reference. 
This study, therefore, is important because of its implications for generating knowledge 
that may be useful for addressing issues raised and for answering the principal research 
questions of this study. Although there are many studies which have contributed in 
understanding the nature and impact of educational decentralization in various parts of the 
world (De Grauwe & Lugaz, 2007; Naidoo, 2002; UNESCO, 2005), the Zambian case is 
characterized by knowledge gaps on how institutional capacity, accountability, and local 
autonomy play out when it comes to transforming policy into practice. On that note, this 
study is not only considered significant, but also timely.  The objectives below are meant 
to set in operation the research questions and as well as to outline the scope of the study 
design. 
1.4.1 Main Objective 
 The main objective of the study is to analyse the implications of institutional 
capacity, accountability and local autonomy in the implementation of the 
decentralisation policy in Zambia. Since these factors are regarded as critical in the 
success of educational decentralization reforms, it was crucial for this study to 
explore how they affect implementation. 
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1.4.2    Specific Objectives  
 To analyse how institutional capacity and accountability affect the functioning of 
Chongwe and Solwezi DEBs 
 To examine how the transfer of responsibilities and authority from national level 
influences the autonomy of education boards and schools. 
 To highlight similarities and differences on how institutional capacity, 
accountability and local autonomy affect the implementation of the educational 
decentralization policy between the two study sites.   
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
Overall, this thesis is divided into nine chapters. The first introduces the aim, research 
questions and objectives of the study. The background information is the foundation on 
which the problem statement, significance and justification of the study are anchored.  On 
the other hand, the contextual framework presented in Chapter II provides an overview of 
Zambia’s education system and shows how educational decentralization has emerged and 
developed over years.  Like in many developing countries, Zambia’s education system has 
evolved over years but given the context, previous educational policy reforms and 
experiences have had an impact in shaping the country’s on-going educational 
decentralization process. 
No one can disagree that globalisation has had a great impact in the spread of 
decentralization reforms around the world. Carnoy (1999) argues in detail about ways in 
which globalization is having a major impact on education. In financial terms, for instance, 
governments are under pressure to reduce increases on education public spending and to 
find other alternatives of funding for expanding their educational systems. Chapter III, 
therefore, discusses the nature and scope of decentralization in terms of its meaning, 
different forms, and how these relate to each other in education. It ends by examining its 
rationale and relating mechanisms which influence the implementation of educational 
decentralization.  
The literature review is presented in Chapter IV. It begins by consolidating on key aspects 
of decentralization discussed in chapter III. Thereafter, literature on educational 
decentralization experiences from selected countries is discussed side by side with the 
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identification not only of success factors but also inconsistencies or gaps which relate to 
the study at hand.  It is this discussion which sets the basis for Chapter V through which 
the study design in terms of theoretical and conceptual frameworks are outlined. While the 
theoretical framework presents the theories applied, the conceptual framework, on the 
other hand, defines the key concepts and shows how they relate to each other within the 
wider context of the study design. 
The objective of any study is to secure answers to those questions raised by the researcher. 
Then, depending on the nature of the research, one has to apply particular scientific 
procedures, or the methodology.  The methodology used in this project is discussed in 
Chapter VI. Essentially, this chapter outlines the research strategy and justifies the 
rationale for the choice of the data collection techniques. Above all, additional information 
is provided regarding the justification for choice of the research setting; target population; 
the sample size and sampling technique employed. Besides highlighting on ethical 
considerations, limitations encountered, as well as selected principles of data quality are 
also analysed. 
Chapter VII builds on the methodology (data collection plan) by describing how the raw data 
from the field was processed and presented in readiness for analysis and discussion. Other than 
explaining the how interviews were transcribed, this chapter also touches demonstrates how 
data organization and coding were done leading into the identification of themes. Without 
proper presentation of data, data analysis can be quite challenging. By applying the technique 
of mind mapping, introduced by Tony Buzan, the processed data was then easily presented, on 
the basis of which, data analysis was done. 
Chapter VIII is devoted towards data analysis and discussing the main findings. It is 
divided into two parts thus; the data analysis and discussion of findings. Guided by the 
study design, these two analytical perspectives are presented based on the evidence from 
the field gathered through semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, and 
analysis of policy documents.    
Last but certainly not the least is chapter IX where the summary, conclusions, 
recommendations and the way forward are presented. The recommendations are twofold. 
Those with implications for possible policy reforms on the one hand, and those for laying a 
foundation for future research on the other.  
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Chapter 2:     The Zambian Context  
This chapter provides the background on the decentralization reform process in Zambia.  
This brings into perspective the historical developments which have since set the stage by 
shaping the subsequent reforms implemented over years to date. However, emphasis is 
placed on contextualizing the history of educational decentralization in Zambia. Given the 
length constraints, this chapter only highlights those salient aspects which are considered 
to be of significant bearing to this study.  
2.1 The Development of Education in Zambia 
Just like in other British colonies, Christian missionaries took a leading role in introducing, 
administering and funding schools in Zambia although this was under the auspices of the 
indigenous citizens, mainly traditional chiefs (Mwanakatwe, 1974). Western models of 
education were dominant in all missionary founded schools. According to Coombe (1967), 
most of these schools had coherent structures and strong religious orientations such that 
during the initial economic and political hardships, many of them remained resilient to the 
inadequacies of the central government. Generally, Zambia’s education system between 
1924 and 1964 was characterized by inequitable and segregationist patterns between 
African and European children, but mainly it was used as a tool for promoting “indirect 
rule” (Mwanakatwe, 1974). What might also be disturbing is the fact that, despite the 
country’s increased economic fortunes from copper export earnings in the early 1920s, the 
British government continued to pay a lip-service towards the plight of African children’s 
education. 
At the time of political independence in 1964, the education sector was faced with serious 
challenges, many of which were transferred to the new administration.  As reported by 
Mwanakatwe in 1974, the education system inherited by the United National Independence 
Party (UNIP) government was accordingly underdeveloped added to the fact that there 
were few Zambians who were educated enough to fill in the administrative positions left 
by the colonialists. Around 1964, for instance, Zambia only had 110, 200 indigenous 
citizens who had completed six years of primary schooling with the total number of 
university graduates as low as 107, of which four were females (Mwanakatwe, 1974). This 
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forced Kaunda
2
  during the inauguration ceremony of the first Chancellor for the 
University of Zambia to launch a scathing attack on the British. He said… 
        “I have to reiterate on this most important occasion what I have said already in the 
past, that as far as education is concerned, Britain’s colonial record in Zambia is 
most criminal. This country has been left by her as the most uneducated and most 
unprepared of all Britain‘s dependencies on the African continent. This record is 
even treasonable to mankind when it is recalled that in the 70 years of British 
occupation, Zambia has never lacked money, save for a year or two, her budget had 
never been subsidized by the British treasury” (Lungu, 1993: 207). 
Later on, in 1966, the Education Act was enacted by the government. This placed all grant-
aided schools under the control of the government. As far as Kelly (1991) is concerned, 
this move progressively curtailed the control of schools by racial and religious bodies, 
though major differences remained among schools founded by different entities. To date, 
all faith-based-founded schools are jointly controlled by faith-based institutions and by the 
government through the Ministry of Education (MoE). 
Consequently, the amended Education Act of 1994 in the 3
rd
 Republic was introduced in 
order to encourage the establishment of private schools in Zambia. Both Mwanakatwe 
(1974) and Snelson (1974) point to the fact that this Act streamlined the requirements and 
procedures for establishing and operating a private school. As a result, a few more 
religious founded schools and a couple of international schools were established. Private 
colleges were also established and today we can even talk of universities. The growth of 
private schools has been slow until after 1991 when education provision was liberalized. 
Free Primary Education (FPE) from grade 1-7 came even later in 2002 when the 
declaration was made by the government (MoE, 2003).  Several factors caused private and 
community based education to grow exponentially towards the late 1990s. Some of these 
factors included economic and political stability—furthering privatization and 
universalizing primary education—which contributed toward increased school enrolments 
and general participation.   
2.2  The Impact of Liberalization Policies 
The liberalization policies introduced in the early 1990s by the Movement for Multi-Party 
Democracy (MMD) brought about the establishment of many schools. Many of these 
                                                 
2
  Kaunda was the first Republic President of Zambia. His rule lasted up to 27 years since 1964. 
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newly established schools are privately owned, while others are run by communities, but 
the quality has gradually been eroded. This initiative of liberalization led to increased 
accessibility. However, sad realities began to emerge in that better equipped private 
schools were filled with well trained teachers but were almost discriminatory in favour of 
children from well-to-do families. But there are as well many impoverished private schools 
for pupils of low socio-economic status and/or with low academic achievement which are 
poorly equipped and staffed with ill-paid teachers in order to keep the tuition cost 
affordable for parents (IOB, 2008).  
 
Data from the Education Statistical Bulletin of 2009 indicates that FPE is making an 
impact in terms of increased pupil enrolments from grades 1 to 9 but until secondary 
education is universalized, chances are that the country will continue to experience a 
steady growth of private secondary schools surviving on meager resources (MoE, 2009).  
Despite the increasing demand, there were very few public secondary schools which were 
built compared to primary schools and, of course, mushrooming community schools. With 
the commercialization of secondary and higher education, private secondary schools, 
colleges and universities emerged which supplemented what used to be exclusively public 
funded tertiary education (MoE, 2007). 
2.3 Statistical Trends in Enrolment & Participation 
The MMD’s liberalization polices of the early 1990s remarkably transformed the education 
sector in many ways, especially in terms of enrolment and pupil participation. Through the 
Basic Education Sub Sector Implementation Programme (BESSIP), considerable gains 
were achieved particularly for lower and middle basic education levels. These include 
higher enrolment rates, construction and rehabilitation of more classrooms and an increase 
in the number of teachers (MoE, 2007). In 2006 for instance, the total number of pupil 
enrolment for Grades 1 to 9 rose to 2,982,718 from 2,852,370. These figures represented 
an increase of 4.6 % for the same level. Increasing statistics were also recorded for the 
Grades 1 to 7 levels, such that enrolments for 2006 stood at 2,678,610, representing an 
increase of 4.3 % from the figure of 2005 that stood at 2,567,353 (GRZ, 2006).  Having 
stagnated for so long, enrolments for Grades 8 to 9 equally increased from 285,017 in 2005 
to 304,108 in 2006 representing a rise of 6.7%.  Despite these gains, BESSIP began to face 
challenges.  For example, it came to light that approximately 30% of children in the 
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school-going age were not enrolled, which translated into nearly 620,000 children. This 
challenge was particularly high in rural areas (MoE, 2003).  
Just as in 2005, the majority of the pupils were enrolled in GRZ schools representing a 
proportion of 77% of all pupils compared to 80% in 2005. Interestingly, community 
schools emerged as the second heighted category of enrolment in 2005 catering for 15% 
compared to that of grant aided and private schools which was around 5% of all pupils 
countrywide. 
Figure 1: Enrolment Distribution in Basic Schools by Running Agency 
 
2.4 The Genesis of Decentralization in Zambia 
“…when adopting decentralisation reforms, governments’ usually present 
major administrative reorganization as the main reason for improving 
administrative performance…. Yet, in many cases, the administrative 
rationale is advanced in order to cover up for unstated political reasons 
behind undertaking decentralisation measures. In such situations, the unstated 
political reasons are more paramount than the concerns for improving 
administrative performance” (Mukwena, 2001:1) 
 
The decentralization policy in Zambia is not a recent phenomenon. It is rather a policy 
reform strategy which dates as far back as 1964 when the country gained its political 
independence from British rule. In fact, the National Decentralization Policy [NDP] of 
2002 shows that the country has since 1964 to date undergone five phases of 
decentralisation. Looking at the experiences however, one gets a sense that there has been 
Source: MoE, 2007:23 
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tedious protractions along the way
3
. Prior to decentralisation, all systems of public service 
delivery were centralized under the national government and district/municipality 
structures. Districts implemented policies that were chosen by the government and carried 
out activities on behalf of central government (Mukwena, 2001). 
 
Note, however, that before independence in 1964, the colonial administration had put in 
place some form of ‘decentralized structures’ through which the education system was 
administered at different levels of the country (Henkel, 1996).  But taking into account the 
racial segregation and discrimination practices by the colonial regime at that time, it is 
questionable whether or not the objectives of their decentralization initiatives were 
genuinely in line with the fundamental tenet of bringing government closer to the people 
by allowing them to directly participate in national matters such as education. As much as 
decentralization is often adopted for various reasons, what would have been more critical 
than involving the indigenous people in decision-making? Critics perceived such initiatives 
as a gimmick aimed at appeasing the masses to believe that the British had their interests in 
education at stake when in actual fact they were fully committed towards pursuing their 
own (Walter, 1972). 
The dual system of administration, which existed at the time of independence, comprised 
both the field and the local government administration which, according to Mukwena 
(2001), was designed for colonial convenience. Native authority structures at the sub-
district level instead, saved to hoodwink indigenous citizens by believing that they were 
part and parcel of the administrative machinery. In reality, however, real authority for 
almost all decisions pertaining to education provision rested in the hands of the Resident 
Commissioner at the national level, the Provincial Commissioner and the Distinct 
Commissioner - all of whom saved to promote colonial interests (GRZ, 2002).  
 
                                                 
3
 According to the national decentralization  policy of 2002, the process of decentralization  in Zambia is divided into the 
following phases; 
   Phase I        -     1964-1970  
   Phase II      -      1971-1979  
   Phase III     -      1980-1990 
   Phase IV     -      1991-2000  
   Phase V      -      2000 to date 
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Having realized that the colonial administrative system was faulty, the UNIP government 
made radical changes which were aimed at meeting the political and economic goals on the 
newly independent nation. One of the UNIP government’s most urgent tasks was to 
transform the inherited structure of provincial administration - the focal point of the 
colonial system of government into a vehicle of economic development (Tordoff, 1980). 
Consequently, the colonial system of provincial and district government was abolished to 
pave the way for a more limited structure at the provincial and district levels.  The mandate 
of these new administrative structures was to coordinate and implement government 
policies and provide a link between government and the new sub-national units which also 
accommodated party politics (Mukwena, 2001). As a result, even though rural councils 
participated in managing primary education, their role was, to a large extent, minimal 
compared to those officials who exercised power within the party structures. 
Generally, the period between early 1960s to mid-1970s was remarkable in the sense that 
district administration and councils played a pivotal role in providing public services such 
as housing and education. The fact that the national economy performed buoyantly 
explains why these institutions did not falter in performing their responsibilities since there 
financial muscles were strong (Tordoff, 1980). Unfortunately, the success enjoyed by 
councils could not be sustained due to external and internal factors. By the year 1975 up to 
late 1990s, the provision of public services began to deteriorate due to weak regulatory 
framework and poor implementation of the local government system. Education in 
particular was one of the key public services which were badly affected particularly in 
rural areas (GRZ, 2009).   
Expectedly but also within the context of the national decentralization framework, the 
transition from one party state rule to multi-party democracy in 1991, fuelled renewed 
attempts to restructure the local government system in order to address the perceived ills in 
service delivery (GRZ, 2009).  Besides the clear articulation of the country’s governance 
framework, the introduction of the Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP), as well as 
the legislative amendments of the Local Government Act are some of the key policy 
instruments adopted by the MMD government.  
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Despite the above measures, the country did not record meaningful changes as far as 
improvements in service delivery were concerned. For example, the Provincial 
Development Coordinating Committees (PDCCs) and the District Development 
Coordinating Committees (DDCCs) remained largely ineffective (GRZ, 2008). 
Government reports (GRZ, 2002 & 2009) indicate that the progress was considerably 
curtailed because government merely de-concentrated its responsibilities. In practice, 
authority and the much needed resources did not go far enough in addressing challenges of 
service provision such as basic education, which in any case, had already suffered huge 
setbacks towards the end of the one party state rule. Contrary to the ‘policy measures’ put 
in place in 1991
4
, poor accountability, weak institutional capacity and worsening fiscal 
bottlenecks at the district level compromised the vision of transforming the local 
government system. In addition, the nonexistence of sub-district level structures negated 
active community participation towards the development programs such as primary 
education at the local level.  
 
Against this background, the MMD government under the leadership of President Levy 
Patrick Mwanawasa ushered the country into the fifth or rather current phase of the 
decentralization program effectively through the adoption of the policy in November 2002.   
Therefore, the current process is a recent one and meaningful transfer of authority from the 
centre to lower level units is expected to be gradual. Nevertheless, the fact that the policy 
was launched two years after its adoption gives an indication of how complex 
decentralization policy reforms can be. For example, a study on national education policies 
and practices from 5 Latin American countries revealed that decentralization is a long term 
social, political, economic and technical process associated with tensions, conflicts and 
sometimes adverse effects which, nonetheless, have to be well managed throughout the 
successive stages of implementation (UNESCO, 2005). 
                                                 
4
  Emanating from the political dispensation of 1991 which led to the transition from  one party state rule to multiparty 
democracy,  the following policy instruments (Refer to the NDP 2002:4-5) were legislated;  
a. At national level, the Ministry of Local Government and Housing was created and was responsible for local 
government administration while Cabinet office was responsible for provincial and district administration.  
b. At the province, the position of Deputy Minister was created and the office bearer headed the provincial 
administration with the assistance of the Permanent Secretary. However, Provincial heads of departments continued 
to be answerable to their respective ministry headquarters 
c. The position of head of district administration was not established the district level but instead the Town Clerk or 
Council District Secretary coordinated all sector ministry activities.  
Further, the MMD government in 1995, established the National, Provincial and District Development Coordinating 
Committees to coordinate development activities such as basic education at different levels  
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Invariably, the major reason for embracing decentralization in Zambia can be seen as a 
response to the wave of decentralization reforms which swept across SSA (Naidoo, 2002). 
Hence, the decision to adopt the decentralization policy in Zambia ought to be seen within 
the contextual series of other initiatives that preceded it whose rationale was to address 
public service delivery shortcomings, particularly at the local level. Essentially, the 
decentralization policy of 2002 forms an integral part of GRZ’s national development 
agenda articulated in the PSRP of 1993, whose aim was to improve the quality, delivery, 
efficiency and cost effectiveness of public services.  For this reason, the decentralization 
policy was mainstreamed across key sector ministries, such as agriculture and education 
(GRZ, 2009).  It appears, therefore, that the adoption of the policy was politically driven. 
That is often the case in many countries, but one wonders whether the high hopes of the 
policy in this case were based on realistic assessment of the effects of decentralization or 
political and administrative convenience. 
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Figure 2: Presidential Foreword on Decentralization Policy in 2003
5
 
 
 
                                                 
5
  An excerpt from the national decentralization policy of 2002 
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2.5 Objectives of the Decentralization Policy  
 The Zambian government perceived many benefits of decentralizing the national 
governance system. As reflected in the NDP of 2009, it was anticipated that the 
implementation of decentralization would lead to improved efficiency in decision-making, 
better co-ordination of development activities at the local level, enhanced community 
participation in development, and improved transparency and accountability to mention but 
a few. But the fact that decentralization was part of a wider political and economic reform 
makes it unlikely that careful thought about its far-reaching implications was accorded 
time. On this basis, one can argue that the current process of decentralization was hurriedly 
adopted without proper reflections on models which have proved workable elsewhere. That 
aside, the vision and objectives of the national decentralization policy which guided 
reforms in the education sector are presented below. 
 
Box 1: The Vision and Objectives of the National Decentralization Policy in Zambia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Vision 
[.....]   2.1 Government’s long term vision is; 
to achieve a fully decentralized and democratically elected system of governance 
characterized by open, predictable and transparent policy making and 
implementation processes, effective community participation in decision-making, 
development and administration of their local affairs while maintaining sufficient 
linkages between the center and the periphery.  
 
2.1 […] the achievement of the above vision rests on the following objectives; 
 
(a)  Empower local communities by devolving decision-making authority, functions and 
resources from the center to the lowest level with matching financial resources in order to 
improve efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of services; 
(b)  Design and implement mechanisms to ensure a “bottom-up” flow of integrated 
development planning and budgeting from the District to the Central Government;  
(c) Enhance political and administrative authority in order to effectively and efficiently 
deliver services to the lowest level;  
(d) Promote accountability and transparency in the management and utilization of resources 
(e) Develop the capacity of Councils and communities in development planning, financing, 
coordinating and managing the delivery of services in their areas;  
(f) Build capacity for development and maintenance of infrastructure at local level;  
(g) Introduce an integrated budget for district development and management; and  
(h) Provide a legal and institutional framework to promote autonomy in decision-making at 
local level. 
 
Source: (GRZ, 2009:9) 
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2.6 Decentralizing Zambian’s Educational System  
As stated earlier, the current form of educational decentralization in Zambia is closely 
associated with the 1996 PRSP process which coincided with the national policy on 
education of 1996. The objective of the policy was to re-structure MoE as way of 
remedying the ills of a centralized system that was characterized by high levels of 
inefficiencies and marginalization of communities in planning and decision-making (MoE, 
2010). Note that educational decentralization in Zambia is not, per see, an isolated sector 
reform as it was in some other countries such as Sri Lanka and Australia.  Policy makers 
never submitted a proposal on educational decentralization to cabinet or parliament as 
such. Rather, the Zambian process of decentralization emerged with a national character by 
integrating all sectors of national development (GRZ, 2009). 
 
Zambia seems to be more cautious in its implementation of educational decentralization, in 
that the country has since the adoption of the policy in 2002, it has avoided a total overhaul 
of the education system. For countries such as Uganda, the approach was somewhat radical 
with far-reaching changes. Contrary to good lessons in education, “the Ugandan approach 
sought to monopolize power and entrench the ruling party at the expense of its competitors 
in ways that mirror the conduct of its political predecessors whose politics of exclusion led 
the country into decades of political instability” (Namukas & Buye, 2009:23).  It can be 
contended, therefore, that the Zambian approach to educational decentralization relates to 
Lindblom’s  ‘incremental model’ of policy making in which the existing policy serves as 
the building blocks for initiating change rather than crafting a totally new policy or system 
from scratch under high levels of uncertainties and fluid experiences (Haddad & Demsky, 
1995).   Despite new fiscal measures for instance, MoE headquarters retained a great a deal 
of authority on financial matters due to limitations and risks associated decentralisation at 
the local level. 
 
This conservative approach is founded on the following assumptions: (i) “policymakers 
usually accept programs or policies already in place and may be more likely to support 
improvements of them rather than looking at something brand new and having to judge its 
legitimacy; (ii) No correct solution can be found, or technically derived from a diagnosis of 
the situation” (Haddad & Demsky, 1995:20). Furthermore, “no sweeping or drastic reforms 
should be attempted, (iii) but only incremental and limited policy adjustments can be 
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made, and (iv) policy adjustments are expected to remedy an experienced dissatisfaction 
with past policies, improving the existing situation or relieving an urgent problem” 
(Haddad & Demsky, 1995:20).  Given what appears to be an elusive decentralization 
process Zambia went through in the past, one gets a feeling that all policy changes initiated 
since 2002, were merely tentative, or at best, temporary if not symbolic, but not necessarily 
final. 
2.6.1 Foundation for Educational Decentralization 
The foundation for the current phase of decentralization in the Zambian education sector is 
BESSIP of 1999 under MoE. Guided by the National Education Policy of 1996, BESSIP 
saved as foundation for the establishment of DEBs in 2003, whose rationale was to create 
synergy between central government and local communities, as far as education delivery 
was concerned.  Further, it was through BESSIP that government outlined the operational 
structure, funding modalities
6
 and guidelines on how these boards were to function in 
implementing the decentralization policy in the sector.  These mechanisms were 
consolidated by the development of the MoE Strategic Plan (MoESP), which ran from 2003 
to 2007. 
 
Clearly, both BESSIP and MoESP were critical because they provided a strategic direction 
for the implementation of educational decentralization. If we consider the low level of 
success, these two programs can be said to have fallen short of meeting certain 
fundamentals of educational planning, which are crucial to ensure successful 
implementation of a policy. For example, the statements such as, “major capacity-building 
activities will be initiated alongside the deployment of qualified personnel to ensure 
successful delegation of planning, financial management and procurement responsibilities 
to all education boards,” (MoE, 2003: 19) implies that the policy was inconceivably ill-
timed with no adequate capacity to implement it.  The point here is that policy makers took 
a quick-fix kind of approach in reforming the system, without taking into account critical 
fundamentals of educational planning (Carnoy, 1999; Haddad & Demsky, 1995).  
 
                                                 
6
  …funding modalities operated through a quarterly cycle of grants disbursement and accounting procedures.  Grants 
were made based on “resource allocation criteria’ that (presumably in theory) took account of the particular needs of 
remote rural areas, (refer to the MoE Strategic Plan, 2003- 2007).  
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2.6.2 Educational Decentralization efforts under the FNDP 
Given the importance of education in promoting national development, the Fifth National 
Development Plan (FNDP) of 2006, reinforced the need for decentralization in the 
education sector by laying emphasis on the need for a multifaceted participatory approach 
to planning and decision-making as a way of improving education delivery, particularly at 
the local level (GRZ, 2008). In line with the NDP, MoE outlined measures which were 
aimed at strengthening educational decentralization.  For example, the Provincial 
Education Management Committees (PEMCs) and District Education Management 
Committees (DEMCs) at provincial and district levels were respectively created in order to 
facilitate the deconcentration and devolution of educational responsibilities (GRZ, 2006).  
 
During 2008, GRZ developed a comprehensive National Implementation Framework (NIF) 
which guided MoE in implementing the education component of the FNDP. In cognisant 
of the fact that both the FNDP and NIF were almost ending, the government constituted in 
2010, a national indaba,
7
 whose outcome provided input for the education sector 
component of the Sixth National Development Plan [SNDP] (MoE, 2010). Renewed 
impetus to refocus the educational decentralization was generated. In fact, the recent MoE 
Sector Devolution Plan was effectively born out of this process. Yet, however well the idea 
of devolving education delivery might have been conceived, it appears to be more of a 
fallacy going by councils’ weak institutional capacity, poor financial standing and 
relatively low degree of autonomy. 
 
Of particular interest is the marginal progress in implementation of the educational 
decentralization policy.  This in any case, does not match-up with the committed efforts 
and resources thus far. Thorny issues such as the legal and fiscal decentralization 
frameworks, among others, have remained unresolved in moving towards meaningful 
devolution (MoE, 2010). While the government has repeatedly retained its commitment on 
the national decentralization process, the implementation status, particularly in the 
education sector, remained pretty much the same (GRZ, 2008).  Presumably, it might be 
that it is not only the education sector environment which has stood in the way for 
                                                 
7
 The national indaba or consultative process was meant to review the education policy. It is hoped that this Policy 
Review Consultation process will deal with the most important challenges facing the Education Sector today so that the 
education system is targeted towards achieving higher levels aspirations for the country such as the quest to be the middle 
income country by 2030.  
22 
 
successful implementation of decentralization. The content of the policy and its related 
measures in themselves, the interests and abilities of those expected to implement them, 
including the uncoordinated efforts of stakeholders, all seem to have profound effects on 
implementation.  
2.6.3 New District Governance Structure 
Decentralization comes with its dynamic forces which inevitably transform the existing 
system so that it is re-aligned with the objectives of deconcentrating or devolving 
responsibilities to lower levels (Gershberg & Winkler, 2003).  This occurred in Zambia, 
and as expected the structure of MoE was restructured beginning from national, to 
provincial and down to the district level. In this section, however, only key features of the 
new governance structure at the district level are highlighted since it is the administrative 
epicentre for transforming policy into practice. 
The Local Administration Act of 1980 entrusted councils with the responsibilities of 
administering education provision at college, school and nursery level, although, in effect, 
councils did very little to implement this act (Kelly, 1996). Inadequate funding, 
cumbersome and quite often radical inefficiencies in decision-making were some of the 
inherent impediments. Under the current form of educational decentralization, key 
institutional positions, functions and relationships at the district level have been re-
designed to constitute the DEB. The DEB comprises of the ‘Management Team Members’ 
(MoE employees by virtue of the institutional line of command) and those who are 
appointed or co-opted, but dully appointed to ‘the board’ by the Minister of Education8.  
Key district personnel as shown in the Governance Manual are: (1) the District Education 
Board (DEB) secretary, who is accountable to the Provincial Education Officer (PEO). The 
DEB secretary is the head of the district education department to whom all junior officials 
of the management team, such as the planning, accounts and human resource officers 
report to. The District Education Standards Officer (DESO) second in command from the 
DEB secretary is the senior inspector of standards in basic schools (MoE & SNV, 2008).   
                                                 
8
 Although the management team and the governance body are separate entities of the DEB, they are according to the 
policy, expected to work together in carrying out the responsibilities delegated to them by MoE at headquarters. 
According to the MoE policy guidelines of 2008, the dully appointed board members form the governance team whose 
mandate is to formulate policies of the DEB whilst the management team forms the administrative wing and are expected 
to carry out the day to day management functions.  
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On the other hand, the governance body which comprises of appointed officials from the 
district council, community based organizations, private sector and traditional leaders is 
headed by the board chair who serves as an ex-officio of the entire DEB. The jointly 
developed 2008 Handbook for planning and decision making by MoE & Netherlands 
Development Organization (SNV) stipulates the role of the governance body. Other than 
being the policy making body of the DEB, the governance body also saves as a community 
mouthpiece aimed at influencing management decisions within the board.  
Due to inadequate funding from government, governance members are also expected to 
mobilize local resources towards the operations of the board. Collective action between 
these two teams is not only exhibited during quarterly full boards meetings but also 
through participatory planning and monitoring of schools. As much as the education 
boards’ operational guidelines can be said to be clear and capacity building initiatives in 
certain districts undertaken, the reality seems to point to the contrary, as far as 
implementation of the policy is concerned. However, detailed comments on this issue are 
presented under the data analysis and discussion chapter. 
As earlier stated, the adoption of the education decentralization policy entailed re-
structuring the education system in order to allow the established education boards to 
operate effectively and efficiently.  The figure below shows the new governance structure 
and how DEBs are linked not only to the national level, but also actors at the school level. 
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Figure 3: Governance structure showing different actors at the district level
9
 
 
Source: Author 2011 (A construction based on information contained in: Education Board 
Governance Manual (MOE/SNV, 2008) and National Policy on Education (MOE, 1996). 
                                                 
9
 This governance structure shows a clear distinction between the management team members as well as the 
governance body.  In terms of functions, the management team members are the administrative organ, while 
the governance team members save as the policy making body of the board.  Despite their distinctive roles, 
both the board secretary and the chairperson are in practice support to work hand in hand in providing 
leadership for the board. 
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2.6.4 Fiscal Decentralization of Basic Education 
Although fiscal decentralization of the education system is not the main focus in this study, 
it does not necessarily mean it should not be discussed at all. While not intending to dwell 
so much on this aspect of educational decentralization, it is important to underscore that 
both administrative (main focus for this study) and fiscal decentralization are like two sides 
of the same coin. You cannot successfully implement any one of the two without yielding 
significant implications on the other. For instance, in many Latin American and Caribbean 
countries where education administration has been decentralized (UNESCO, 2005), 
educational finance, although to a lesser extent, has equally been decentralized along the 
same administrative framework. Even in Uganda where fiscal decentralization is said to be 
in the lead (Namukas & Buye, 2009), administrative decentralization has also been 
integrated in the national policy framework. Henceforth, the notion of fiscal 
decentralization fits well with the hard line position for educational decentralization on 
account of improved efficiency, accountability and widening of resource mobilization at 
the lowest level. 
The background to fiscal decentralization in Zambia’s education sector hinges on limited 
financial resources at the disposal of central government, coupled with significant national 
imbalances in the revenue and tax regime (GRZ, 2009).  Fiscal decentralization involves 
the devolution of financial functions to the provincial and district education offices which 
is consistency with the idea that “finance follows functions” (Florestal and Cooper’s, 
1997).  This is the reason why fiscal decentralization in Zambia was integrated into the 
educational decentralization process.   
The rationale for fiscal decentralization, which includes revenue collection, is to establish 
and operationalize a comprehensive local government financing system and enhance the 
capacity of local authorities to effectively mobilize the required resources for effective 
delivery of public services (GRZ, 2009).  Therefore, financing mechanisms in education 
had to be re-worked to ensure financial autonomy at the local level, as well as to promote 
effective transfer of financial resources from MoE HQ to provincial, districts offices and 
schools. Compared to Uganda where financial decentralization education grants are 
calculated centrally and then released to the districts as conditional grants
10
 (Namukas & 
                                                 
10
 Conditional grants are budgeted for as capitation grants distributed to the schools in accordance with their enrolments. 
Capitation grants are spent on instructional and scholastic materials, co-curricular activities, school management and 
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Buye, 2009), Zambia developed a national intergovernmental fiscal framework with a wide 
range of fiscal measures such as the "special equalization fund" and the "revenue allocation 
formula"
11
 to address fiscal challenges and to guide the planning and financial 
management processes at all levels (GRZ, 2009). Through the NIF, funds for the 
implementation of decentralization initiatives (i.e. basic education provision) are disbursed 
monthly to DEBs through the PEO’s office, based on the stated allocation criteria and 
formula (MoE, 2007).   
 
Notwithstanding the significance of these fiscal measures, challenges appear at the level of 
operationalising them. The sheer complexity of these measures is coupled with weak 
institutional capacities and poor accountability arrangements. Hence, the huge allowance 
that has to be made for the widespread appreciation of their serious implications stand out. 
Perhaps another key weakness at the national level but of course, extending to DEBs 
owing to their high dependence on government grants, is the weak link between plans and 
budgets
12
 (Saasa, Steffensen et al, 1999). This scenario has tended to cloud up 
implementation of educational decentralization with uncertainties which quite often result 
in over-blowing of risks associated with the process. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                    
administration. Among conditional grants are a variety of special expenditures aimed at supporting the curriculum. The 
ministry sends funds for secondary school teachers’ salaries through the district whereas salaries for elementary teachers 
are part of conditional grants that the district receives from the central government (USAID) 
11
  The idea of these fiscal measures to ensure that available financial resources are shared equitably across sub sectors, 
level and programs. Two major fiscal variables namely: the Foundation and Factored Amount are used when allocating 
resources. Through the Foundation Amount, a fixed amount is equitably allocated to each operational level such as 
District Education Offices. With the  Factored variable, an amount of money is allocated to sub-sectors or operational 
levels based on gender parity index, coverage area, pupil enrolments excetera....(Education Sector [NIF:2008-2010] 
MoE,2007) 
12 For a long time until quite recently, and more so during the pre-1991 period, Zambia’s planning and budgeting systems 
remained largely separate and uncoordinated activities. These systems were essentially a mix of institutionalized and ad 
hoc procedures 
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Chapter 3:  The Nature and Scope of Decentralization   
The objective of this chapter is to clear up the nature of decentralization in the context of 
education. The chapter is divided into three sections: The first provides a historical 
overview of decentralization and its dynamic trends, while the second presents the 
meaning and scope of decentralization. It goes further to clarify the relationship between 
its different but overlapping forms. The third section discuses the rationale behind 
decentralization reforms. It ends with an additional analysis of selected mechanisms which 
have a bearing on educational decentralization as it relates to this study. 
 
3.1 Historical Trends   
  
Available literature shows that decentralization is an old phenomenon which has played a 
pivotal role in the development of many societies around the world. For instance, the 
gradual political and organizational changes that occurred in the European history (i.e. rise 
& fall of the Roman Empire) are a clear testimony of how decentralization shaped the 
developmental paths of many developed nation states in the Western world (Sharma, 
2005). The drive for political self-governance on the part of certain lower level entities 
equally dates far back in time.   
 
As of the early 1980s, a paradigm shift in public sector governance emerged mostly across 
Asia and Latin America to the extent that the understanding of the dynamics of 
decentralization processes and its rationale became considerably transformed. Similarly, 
the legitimacy of government actions has changed as has its participatory approach, 
especially in national and international forums. These forums largely transformed many 
economies and subsequently the delivery of public services (UNESCO, 2005). This 
background is critical for understanding decentralization as part of educational reforms.  It 
is presumably in this context that educational policy makers in many developing countries 
have to contend with the challenges arising from the restructuring of education systems in 
trying to figure out how they should be managed, including in other countries with more or 
less decentralized structures. These trends are, nonetheless, in some countries such as 
Spain, may have been motivated by the desire to consolidate on democratization efforts 
and not so much about devolving functions to regional public institutions on efficiency 
grounds (McGinn  & Welsh, 1999).  Perhaps such trends in Spain might have had to do 
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with meeting demands for political self-government in regions with historical secessionist 
movements, rather than administrative efficiency. This distinction had to do with ‘whose 
right it is to decide, as opposed to what the most efficient way of providing public services 
is? This distinction is an internationally common trend.  
 
Findings from the regional survey (Rideout, 2000) indicate that many countries in SSA are 
either experimenting with new models of educational decentralization, or engaged in the 
process of planning some kind of decentralization
13
.  In a region where most countries are 
desperately poor, participatory bottom-up planning is rare. The recognition of bottom-up 
planning by political leaders in developing countries often puts their failure to provide 
committed resources into spotlight.  Surprisingly, they often and almost inaccurately claim 
credit where some level of achievement may have occurred, yet without their direct 
involvement (Rideout, 2000).  Other scholars have argued that this tension is due to 
illusions about what decentralization can realistically offer in terms of narrowing the gap 
between educational policy and practice (Winkler & Yeo, 2007).  For the past 20 years, 
experiences in SSA demonstrate how pervasive this decentralization is, and chances are 
that it is going to be just as persuasive in years to come. 
   
3.2 The Concept of Decentralization  
Given the above highlights, the notion of decentralization and its different forms as they 
relate to this study will now be explored alongside their implications on national 
educational policy and implementation.  
3.2.1 Meaning & Scope of Decentralization 
Decentralization is an ambiguous concept which is used commonly, yet defined and 
interpreted variously (McGinn & Welsh, 1999). Some scholars have defined 
decentralization from a spatial perspective of transferring authority to geographically 
dispersed public institutions (Lauglo, 1995). From the education sector point of view, the 
most appealing aspect of local level financing therefore lies in the extent to which it is 
possible to relieve central government of its burden in financing public education.  In this 
study decentralization is defined as, “the transfer or devolution of power to independent, 
                                                 
13
  The analysis of decentralization here is mainly focusing on selected Sub Saharan countries; these are the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Senegal, Cameroon and Lesotho. 
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sub-national governments that are given the responsibilities to plan the level and quality of 
services to be provided, including the sources and types of funding necessary to deliver 
those services” (Saasa, Steffensen et al., 1999:7).   
The definition by Saasa and Steffensen is narrow in scope, since devolution is not only 
about the transfer of authority, but encompasses other aspects not ideologically typical of 
decentralization. Whatever different usage of the term decentralization may be:  
decentralization by provision can be contrasted from decentralization of authority, for 
which further differentiation is unavoidable.  All in all, decentralization is a complex and 
multi-dimensional phenomena whose meaning can be understood by distinguishing it from 
centralization (Bray, 1996).  In any education system, such a distinction can, for example, 
be looked at in terms of the differences in decision making approach for education delivery 
- i.e. bottom up vs. top down approach. 
Figure 4: Decentralization versus Centralisation Approaches
14
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Author, 2011) 
 
The study by De Grauwe and Lugaz (2010) in West Africa indicates that educational 
decentralization has achieved moderate success in some countries, moderate failure in 
                                                 
14
  Figure shows two different scenarios of educational management systems. It depicts levels where decision-making 
power resides in a given education system.  In essence, decision-making is about authority. However, a key question is 
whether authority should rest with top MoE officials at national level (centralised), or whether it should be delegated 
further down the hierarchy, away from the centre (decentralised). Arguably, the choice between centralised or 
decentralised in a given country is not an either/or choice.  It all depends on the context. The model of centralisation 
which may work in one country may not in the other and that applies to educational decentralisation. 
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others, and a striking combination of both in many other countries. Reasons for these 
different success rates seem to be poorly understood, if not overly stressed and, in certain 
cases, not backed by conclusive evidence.  Since the workings of decentralization remain 
largely a mystery, one finds it hard to evaluate whether or not specific decentralization 
programs succeed or fail due to strengths or weakness in design or implementation, and 
more difficult still to recommend improvements. The point here is that decentralization as 
a phenomenon is diverse and one can even differentiate the concept into different forms, 
for which the conditions for success or failure are context dependent.   
Generally the lessons learned, particularly in SSA, suggest that decentralization can be 
successful if the central government is politically stable, solvent, and above all, committed 
to transferring clear responsibilities matched with sufficient financial resources when local 
authorities are not able but willing to assume those responsibilities. It can also be 
successful where there are well organized and vibrant civil society organizations and last 
but not the least where there are mechanisms for promoting effective community 
involvement (Naidoo, 2002; Rondenelli & Cheema, 1983).  However, these scholars may 
not be an all wise oracle in all respects, since there can be exceptions to that too. 
Decentralization, in the form of initiatives and efforts from below, may occur not only 
when government is non-effective, but also when government is not committed to service 
provision. For instance, community schools in rural parts of Zambia began way before 
decentralization was adopted in 2002, simply because government did not have enough 
resources to build classrooms where they never existed but were badly needed.  
3.2.2 Forms of Decentralization 
Since inception, the notion of decentralization has increasingly evolved with on-going 
disagreements and debates regarding its different forms. Decentralization is a 
“multifaceted concept
15
”, and its different forms should therefore be distinguished as 
having different characteristics, policy implications and success conditions (Karlsen, 
2000).   In theory, the different forms of decentralization differ, depending on what sort of 
values are of significance. Rather than dwelling on the meaning of decentralization, 
                                                 
15 The term “decentralization” embraces a variety of terminologies which needs to be carefully analyzed in any given 
setting before determining whether program interventions should focus on reorganization of financial, administrative, or 
service delivery mechanisms. Types of decentralization include political, administrative, fiscal, and market 
decentralization. Drawing distinctions between these various concepts is useful for highlighting the many dimensions to 
successful decentralization and the need for coordination among them. 
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emphasis should be placed on how its forms relate to each other and the significance of 
their differences in service delivery. Using Rondinelli & Cheema’s typology of 1983, the 
three main degrees of authority, often categorized as deconcentration, delegation and 
devolution, will be discussed. 
3.2.2.1 Deconcentration 
Deconcentration is the process through which a central authority establishes field units 
which are staffed with its own officers. According to Namukas & Buye (2009), 
deconcentration is regarded as the weakest form of decentralization. It is considered the 
weakest because the central governments merely shift responsibilities to officials at the 
regional, provincial, district and local level without addressing issues of administrative and 
technical capacities. The measures are critical in ensuring effective service delivery. It is 
for this reason that some education experts from the center tend to disfavor 
deconcentration, on grounds that it is unlikely to lead to potential benefits in education 
because authority is hardly transferred to sub national structures (Bray & Mukundan, 
2004). Perhaps Bray and Mukundani are too negative about deconcentration as their 
assertions paint a poor picture about it.  The fact, however, is that deconcentration can be 
equally beneficial for centralized state bureaucracies, provided that certain issues are left to 
be decided upon by officials closer to the ground than those sitting in MoE headquarters.      
3.2.2.2 Delegation 
Compared to deconcentration, where authority is more limited to the top, delegation can be 
seen as a wider form of decentralization. Nevertheless, delegation can apply in everyday 
life to all kinds of easily revocable transfer, of authority to positions or persons who remain 
accountable to whoever has the authority to delegate.  However, it is not entirely about 
formal or informal organizational functioning. Through delegation, central governments 
transfer responsibilities and authority for decision-making and administration of public 
functions to semi-autonomous institutions not wholly controlled by central government, 
but ultimately accountable to it (Florestal & Cooper, 1997). The Examination Council of 
Zambia, which independently coordinates all national examinations on behalf of the MoE, 
is one such an example. According to Hanson (1997), a key feature of delegation is the 
idea that authority transferred to lower hierarchical structures can be withdrawn at the 
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discretion of the delegating unit. The problem, however, is that the established usage of 
this concept is much wider than what Florestal, Cooper and Hanson have in mind. 
Arguably, delegation can succeed where precise instructions and clear procedures are 
given on how responsibilities should be executed. Often, however, this is not the case, 
particularly among modern decentralization advocates in developing countries such as 
Zambia or Malawi. 
3.2.2.3 Devolution 
Devolution can be understood as the distribution of authority to local governments or 
communities to enable them make decisions and take actions independently from central 
government. As opposed to deconcentration and delegation, devolution enables local 
government institutions to operate without government interference in dealing with matters 
such as personnel management and utilization of allocated funding (Rondinelli & Cheema, 
1983). On the other hand, local authorities in a devolved system have clearly and legally 
recognized geographical spheres, over which they exercise their power and authority, and 
within which they deliver public services. It has also been reiterated that, because of the 
nature of the administrative and legal setup in a devolved system, units do not often seek 
for permission from central government when making decisions regarding public service 
provision (Hanson, 1997 & 1998). 
 
Although devolution can be perceived as the best form of decentralization (Florestal & 
Cooper, 1997), it is not risk free since problems such as arbitrary abuse of power and 
authority can be detrimental to equitable service delivery at the local level.  The question 
therefore is: Are there no such risks regardless of whether authority is concentrated or 
decentralized?  This question is hard to answer, but one possible answer might be that this 
problematic issue is strongly influenced by country specific ideologies about the political 
rationale for decentralization, but again, this raises another critical question. Who should 
have the right to make decisions, regardless of whether such decisions are right or wrong?  
No straight jacket approach applies, here but probably the best option lies in striking a 
tricotomy balance between or among these three forms, but also taking into account 
challenges that are associated with each one of them. 
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3.3 Why Educational Decentralization? 
In order to fully understand the rationale and scope of decentralization in education, one 
needs to examine not only the arguments for decentralization, but also factors behind it and 
how these play a role in education. As much as educational decentralization might be 
regarded as a fashionable reform adopted by many countries with different characteristics, 
some proponents are skeptical about the motives for decentralization (Naidoo & Kong, 
2003).  Such skepticisms are based on what appears to be “unrealistic beliefs” about 
decentralization reforms. Considering the complexities of decentralization, it is clear that 
different actors of decentralization reforms in education may be driven by a mix of motives 
and actions. For example, the Ministry of Finance as the chief financier may reason 
differently from MoE on devolved fiscal issues.  But then, how do we know the real 
motives of their actions? Besides, whether or not these actors know the real motives is a 
different matter altogether. 
 
In education, for example, there are sometimes doubts about whether the publicly declared 
rationale for decentralization reflects the real motives behind the decision to decentralize.   
Questions can be asked; were the real motives about the desire to improve learning 
achievement, or was the motive the need to share the financial burden? Does educational 
decentralization not increases disparities among localities as well as workloads for officials 
at the district level and in the schools? Does political expediency inspire the need to 
redistribute authority more widely to local level education actors or defend the status quo?  
These questions are merely hypothetical and not based on empirical evidence of a specific 
case. Neither is this study trying to answer them other than using them as a basis for 
analytical reflection on the motives behind educational decentralization. Rather than 
focusing on questionable assumptions or ideological motives about educational 
decentralization, the key message is that practical implementation realities differ across 
contexts as such one has to have these questions at the back of the mind, even though the 
study may not necessarily be about answering them. 
3.3.1 Arguments for Educational Decentralization 
Underlying different rationale for educational decentralization are various arguments 
which prominently feature in policy debates as to how best planning and governance 
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systems can be reformed. For instance, where government is top heavy and faces 
difficulties in tackling problems of pupil retention or teacher deployment, then educational 
decentralization may be an option. Decentralization may also be an option where citizens 
demand to have their voices heard in decisions which directly affect them. It may also be 
an option, “where broadening the base for resource mobilization is the objective, and when 
it becomes imperative to clarify lines of accountability” (McGinn & Welsh, 1999:9). 
The discussion by McGinn & Welsh is based on other typologies, in which the rationale of 
decentralization has been categorized in three different ways: (i) “the redistribution 
rationale, which justifies power sharing, (ii) the efficiency rationale which has got to do 
with improving cost-effectiveness and, (iii) the culture of learning rationale which 
emphasizes on the need to decentralize educational curriculum” (Weiler, 1990, 434- 441). 
Despite theoretical differences among them, these arguments are interlinked at least at the 
level of policy rhetoric (Hanson, 1997; Rondinelli, 1999).  
3.3.1.1 Power Sharing Rationale 
Proponents of the Power Sharing Argument argue that decentralization enhances effective 
exercise of authority and decision making regarding the allocation of human resource, 
material and financial (McGinn & Welsh, 1999). While they appreciate centralization on 
grounds that it enhances equity in the distribution of resources, they are quick in attacking 
its rationale on the basis of its deeply rooted bureaucratic bottlenecks which, in the case of 
education, negatively affect the delivery of services. While others disagree that 
centralization may not serve equity, it has done this in other countries since doing so 
depends on the priorities set, which ultimately reflects on who controls the government.  
However, this rationale can be difficult to substantiate, especially if one reflects on the 
mixed results which are evident both in highly centralized and decentralized education 
systems across the globe. West African countries with strongly centralized systems have 
historically spent nearly as much on tertiary education for the very few as they did on 
primary schooling for the majority (De Grauwe & Lugaz, 2010).  France and Malaysia are 
also good examples where the needs and financial resources of the education systems are 
controlled and regulated by the state, yet with positive results (Weiler, 1990). On the other 
hand, experience on the “democratic wish” reform in the United States shows that, 
“decentralization tends to make public schooling a preserve of few and quite often corrupt 
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local constituencies become less concerned about the overall improvement of education 
but focus more on serving their own interests” (Elmore 1983:38).  These experiences on 
the Power Sharing Argument entirely depend on the eyes that see it. 
3.3.1.2 Efficiency Based Rationale 
Advocates of the efficiency rationale present a strong view that introducing decentralized 
structures of governance leads to improved efficiencies of the management and in 
equitable delivery of education services (Winkler, 1994). Besides, multilateral agencies 
such as the World Bank and UNDP claim that besides cost reduction, greater 
decentralization leads to the mobilization of resources which otherwise might not be 
generated under centralization. As usual, various reasons are put across to explain why 
educational costs under centralized administrative structures are perceived as high, and 
why educational decentralization initiatives are seen as more economically robust. For 
instance, there is an assumption that decision-making in an education system where micro 
educational issues are handled by geographically and culturally distant bureaucrats at the 
center, leads to high costs. Another angle to this argument is that where countrywide 
educational standards are implemented by central government, cost-saving measures on 
educational inputs related to regional or local price differences are usually unattainable 
(Winkler & Yeo, 2007).   
However, these arguments are as much contentious as they are debatable. Contrary to high 
profile assertions by the World Bank and UNDP, decentralization does not always or 
automatically lead to increased efficiency. As a matter of fact, the absence of knowledge 
about the level of aggregation on how available resources can be allocated and more 
efficiently utilized in the education sector can render efforts for decentralization futile 
(McGinn & Welsh, 1999).  Quite often, policy rhetoric tends to overshadow what 
otherwise might be sound financial decentralization measures. As observed by Elmore 
(1983), the replication in New York of educational organization by the model of 
“community districts”, for example, proved an extremely inefficient decentralization 
initiative due to political control which according to Elmore made schools in New York, 
and indeed in other big states, vulnerable to corrupt local politics and political patronage.   
Effectiveness is also critical in educational decentralization since like efficiency, the two 
are like two sides of the same coin. Research evidence from Argentina, Mexico, and 
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Venezuela, suggests that decentralization enhances effectiveness which consequently 
promotes accountability and transparency at district and school levels (UNESCO, 2005).  
Some scholars have argued that management and accountability of schools can be 
improved if school managers are made more locally accountable (McGinn & Welsh, 
1999). Since accountability can influence effectiveness, the question of whom to be 
accountable to needs to be thoroughly pondered, particularly in settings where 
accountability mechanisms are weak or nonexistent. But the usage of the term 
accountability in the devolved education system is controversial because of ambiguities in 
a statement such as, “schools are to be accountable to the public for the results they 
produce with students”. According to Elmore (1983), such statements are a portrayal of 
surface and sometimes misleading meaning of commonly used phrases about 
decentralization which have nothing to do with effectiveness as such. 
3.3.1.3 Culture and Learning Rationale 
The culture and learning argument for decentralization is centered on the teaching and 
learning process of a given education system. Those in support of decentralization along 
this line of thought are of the view that, “decentralization enhances the responsiveness and 
sensitivity of education to differences and local needs” (Weiler, 1990:47). The thrust of 
this argument in education is that regions and communities have different cultural and 
economic characteristics which influence their respective pedagogical needs. It is no 
wonder, the universal application of education standards under centralization have been 
denounced since such a policy results in discrepancies between curricula and learning 
needs (Weiler, 1990). 
However, this rationale is only valid to the extent that the outcomes of contextually and 
diversely applied curriculum or learning processes generate knowledge and skills narrowly 
relevant to specify localities.  Such processes and outcomes may not, however, be 
applicable at the international level where the use of global languages such as English is an 
increasingly more popular medium of instruction and learning. The other side to this 
although, is that rather than closing educational decentralization in a globalizing world, it 
should open a window of opportunity for learning new culture and professional 
development that transcends cultural barriers and national boundaries.  
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3.4 Other Mechanisms for Educational Decentralization 
Beyond the arguments discussed above, there are other known mechanisms which are 
equally in favour of educational decentralization. These include School Based 
Management (SBM) and market efficiency. 
3.4.1 The Rationale for SBM 
In an effort to improve financing and delivery of education services, many governments 
have increasingly been decentralizing decision-making authority by way of increasing 
parental and community involvement in running schools—a strategy popularly known as 
School Based Management (SBM).  It has been noted that where the SBM approach is 
adopted, authority is often devolved from central government to the school level (Haug, 
2009; Hanson, 1990).  From a conceptual perspective, SBM transforms the governance 
structure in which individual schools become the focal points for the decision-making 
processes, through which improvements at the school level can be stimulated and 
sustained. The general view underlying SBM is that decentralizing decision making 
authority to parents and communities fosters demands and ensues that schools provide 
social and economic benefits that adequately reflect the needs and values of such localities 
(Haug, 2009; World Bank, 2008).  
However, whether or not SMB can offer greater possibilities for improving teaching and 
learning, the central government’s role toward education provision cannot be totally done 
away with.  According to Abu-Duhow (1999), there are diverse typologies of SBM whose 
differences depend on the degree of autonomy and decision making powers within a given 
decentralized education system, thus rendering almost each SBM model unique. The 2004 
World Development Report presents a framework which defines four distinct 
accountability mechanisms for analyzing the provision of education services through SBM. 
These mechanisms are; voice, compact management and client power (see Box 2). 
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Box 2: Concepts for Analysis of Education Provision through School Based 
Management (SBM)  
 
Source: (Di Grapello, 2004) 
Note that there are complex relationships between and among actors which determine the 
effectiveness of SBM in any setting. Furthermore, the diverse environments under which 
SBM emerges equally widen the degree of heterogeneity between schools in many 
countries (De Grauwe, 2005). Yet,  overwhelming evidence seems to suggest that failure or 
success of a given SMB model can either be influenced by what is referred to as “long 
route” or “short route” accountability mechanisms both of which prove to be challenging 
when it comes to improving education service delivery at school level
16
 (World Bank, 
2007).  Going by this analysis, one can argue that there are limits to the level of success 
SBM can achieve under administrative decentralization because there is no justification 
whatsoever to imagine that devolving educational system by itself can lead to either 
efficiency or effectiveness in teaching and learning in schools. 
3.4.2 Market Efficiency 
Education provision is a complex endeavor as such educational decentralization allows for 
various approaches such as market efficiency to come into play. Today, in the declining 
                                                 
16
  Quite often school level improvements on the “long route” dimension can prove too long and highly unattainable 
process. “Short route” accountability mechanisms under such circumstances seem to offer realistic possibilities in that 
beneficiaries have an opportunity to hold to education service providers accountable. Thus voice and monitoring 
mechanisms help to tease-out improvements in service provision particularly in a scenario where long route school based 
improvements prove somewhat futile. 
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years of centralized planning, great promise and reliance are placed on the role of the 
market to release creative energies while minimizing inefficiencies (Stromquist & 
Monkman, 2000).  The politics of market forces (privatization) in education underline the 
notion of “school choice” which has increased competition between schools (Myron, 
1989).  The argument behind such competition is to improve efficiency and quality of 
education, but also to ensure that educational needs and demands of parents are effectively 
met. Some scholars have claimed that: 
“Pupils and parents are the majority group of consumers, say market efficiency 
proponents. Parents pay for the education of their children …hence they have a 
stake in the education on how their children should be educated since they 
know better their abilities and interests as opposed to teachers and other 
education actors who are distracted by excessive demands of how education 
should be provided” (McGinn & Welsh, 1999:43). 
This position is accepted by several others. Lauglo (1995), for instance, highlighted the 
implications of competition on education provision. He noted that those who support 
market mechanisms perceive that good quality and efficient use of educational resources 
are best attained in an environment where competition thrives. On the other hand, the 
market is claimed to be the best option in terms of publicity on what kind of education 
services (public or private) clients need and what satisfies them (Hanson, 1997). On the 
basis of the available providers, parents are at liberty to decide where to take their children 
in order to get maximum value for their money or investment. 
The principal assumption regarding the argument about market efficiency in the context of 
educational decentralization is that pupils and their parents are well placed to determine the 
value of educational services provided, and it is incumbent upon them to exercise their 
freedom of choice among competing schools in a given locality (Haug, 2009).  Haug took 
note of the fact that market mechanisms influence schools to operate as if they are business 
entities by providing their services competitively. In essence, competition makes schools 
work harder to do well with the students they get. The arguments raised here are 
nonetheless problematic.  What if government schools are of the same quality across the 
country, be it high or low, while those in the private sector follow the national curriculum 
and teaching system with the same teachers or are equally handled by incompetent teachers 
as those in public schools? Can competition still be pronounced if parents are not 
adequately informed on how to make rational choices amidst a wide range of quality 
teaching and learning?  Arguably not, but then competition is not just about public vs. 
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private ownership because it is possible to have competition among publicly owned 
schools too. Besides, if public schools not exposed to competition, they may most likely 
make less of an effort than private, or indeed, state schools that compete. 
There is arguably no market where the available schools fetch prohibitively high fees to 
pupils who are located far away (Myron, 1989; McGinn & Welsh, 1999).  Whether or not 
actual competition or actual free choice of school is beneficial for all is also a contentious 
issue.  Studies in the UK and New Zealand provide evidence suggesting that competition 
has not led to or will not result into social justice in education (Hanson, 1997).  In fact, it 
only saves to perpetuate educational and social inequalities in society although this is 
context dependent given as well that private is not always for the rich but may serve the 
poor too, depending on cost to parents and available social privileges from the government.  
One can liken the efficiency rationale in a devolved education system as a game which 
produces winners. To the extent that education becomes a “zero-sum game” of unintended 
consequences in which for every winner, there must be a loser. In such instances, the 
across-the-board public education improvements fought for across decades, or the popular 
EFA goals, become a pipedream. 
In all this what can be the role of government? Despite the shrinking political space, the 
government still has a major role to play toward education provision. When market 
complexities are put aside, the government’s role cannot be limited to policy formulation 
alone. It may be acceptable therefore, for the government to engage either in a limited way 
or in policy implementation and monitoring of activities as well.  Evidence shows that 
while policy makers advocate for market efficiency, they backtrack because of the 
necessity to control national examination to make sure that the centrally determined 
educational norms are achieved (Hannaway & Carnoy, 1993).  
On the other hand, as much as it is acceptable for parents to work for the good of their 
school children, it is also not a bad idea for them to select best schools for them.  There is 
absolutely no obstacle in doing so and as a matter of fact, this is the case in many 
countries.  Governments have the responsibility to ensure that every child has access to 
quality education. However, there are unfortunate tendencies regarding the abrogation of 
this responsibility in certain countries under the guise that market efficiency mechanisms 
will fix things up (Belfield & Livin, 2000). 
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Chapter 4:  Literature Review  
 
             “Decentralization is a word that has been used by different people to mean a good 
many different things. But what do we see in practice? Experiments with local 
government that end in chaos and bankruptcy; ‘decentralized’ structures of 
administration that only act as a more effective tool for centralizing power; regional 
and district committees in which government officials make decisions while the local 
representatives sit silent; village councils where local people participate but have no 
resources to allocate”....(Mawhood,1993:9)  
Indeed, decentralization is a concept that cannot be easily understood based on its explicit 
assumptions but as many commentators have observed, it is generally orientation that 
signifies the distribution of state functions and authority from the center to the local level 
agencies (De Grauwe & Lugaz, 2010).  However, the difficulty in understanding 
decentralization is visible in many ways. For instance, literature based on certain research 
findings is quite often marred with inconsistencies attributed to flaws in methodological 
designs and data analysis processes among other aspects.  
This chapter is, therefore, devoted towards discussing the literature review. It begins with a 
synthesis of policy gaps between decentralization policy and practice. This is followed by a 
detailed discussion of the literature on educational decentralization experiences from 
selected international and regional settings.  Emphasis is placed on examining how 
institutional capacity, accountability and local autonomy play out as key factors. The 
chapter concludes with comments on the relevancy of the literature reviewed to the study.  
Guided by the statement of the problem and research questions, it can be argued here that 
accountability, institutional capacity and local autonomy are critical factors if devolved 
powers are to effectively serve educational needs of the local people.  This argument is 
linked to the assumption that the establishment of DEBs in Zambia can lead to 
improvements in the management and delivery of basic education services at the local 
level (MoE, 1996). Some researchers claim that policy intents on decentralization do not 
always, for whatever reasons, reflect actual objectives for implementation (Naidoo, 2002).   
Naidoo’s assertion seems to provide sufficient grounds for one to be skeptical as to 
whether or not the Zambian model of educational decentralization can yield expected 
results going by the current level of capacity, accountability and the autonomy of DEBs 
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4.1 Decentralization: Confusing Benefits? 
It seems easy to theoretically conceive the benefits of decentralization, but national level 
experiences, particularly in developing countries, suggest that such benefits cannot be 
achieved in a “quick fix” approach.   The Zambian case also shows how hard it can be to 
pin-point its meaningful policy outcomes.  Given this ambivalence, why then does 
decentralization continue to be perceived as key policy reform in education?  
 
Theoretically, educational decentralization promises many benefits, such as, increased 
effectiveness and efficiency in the management of education, reduction in the 
administrative burden at the top, delineating the lines of accountability and above all the 
broadening of the base for resource mobilization (McGinn & Welsh, 1999). Others 
consider equity as a key rationale, but since educational decentralization makes localities 
more dependent on their local resources, it means that certain aspects of equity could suffer 
in the absence of adequate compensatory mechanisms (Gershberg & Winkler, 2003). Even 
in countries such as Brazil and Columbia where positive aspects of educational 
decentralization have been recorded, deep-seated regional inequalities in sharing of 
resources and tension in the distribution of functions between the state and provinces or 
districts still render expected benefits a pipedream (McGinn & Welsh, 1999:20-54). 
 
Looking at the SSA region, save perhaps for Uganda where there has been some 
reasonable level of progress towards improved governance and accountability system, the 
implementation of educational decentralization generally represents a blurred or hybrid of 
efforts. Such effort varies from delegation of functions to mere devolution of power devoid 
of appropriate institutional capacities and accountability measures to support good 
implementation (Saito, 2001; Naidoo, 2002; Mukandala, 1998). Indeed, when it comes to 
educational decentralization policy and that practice, it could be true that: 
            “There is no silver bullet with decentralization: what is equitable may not be efficient, 
what is efficient may not be democratic, what is democratic may not be equitable. In 
practice, reform policies must attempt to optimize the sometimes inevitable trade-offs 
between efficiency, equity, and democracy while seeking to improve on all 
three…The actual design and implementation of decentralization reforms are 
inherently political processes; hence, the decisions about making these trade-offs 
rightly occur in the political arena” (Gershberg & Winkler, 2003:1). 
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4.2 International Experiences on Education Decentralization 
The debate whether educational decentralization is good or bad is counterproductive and a 
waste of time (Litvack et al., 1998). It is essential, however, to analyze a wide range of 
factors which influence success and those which account for failures in implementation. 
From an international perspective, there are certain countries where education 
decentralization has yielded good and sustainable results, while in others, not so much 
good progress is there to talk about. Below is an analysis of international experiences from 
three selected countries, namely Brazil, New Zealand and Norway. Attention here is on 
institutional capacity, accountability and local autonomy since these are the factors which 
are central in this thesis.  
4.2.1 Educational Decentralization in Brazil 
Educational decentralization efforts in Brazil can be traced as far back as the 19
th
 century 
when the country went through constitutional changes that established a federal system of 
the government many are familiar with today. The decentralization reforms of the 1930s 
led to the transfer of power and responsibilities for basic education to federal units in order 
to improve efficiency and participation (UNESCO, 2005). Besides transforming the active 
role of the federal government in matters pertaining to operations of schools in all the 
federal units, the legal provisions of 1996 also gave impetus for school autonomy in which 
school officials could spend transferred funds nearly at their own discretion.  
In the state of Sao Paulo, for example, the process of increasing school autonomy included 
the transfer of institutional policy decisions to local schools as a way of enhancing 
accountability and wider stakeholder participation (Maideira, 2007). As much as this 
process might have been broader in scope by encompassing pedagogic, administrative and 
financial aspects of decentralization, it was engraved with contradictory practices of 
centralization planning at the federal level, and to a lesser extent at the state and municipal 
level (Derqui, 2010). While the use of funds was decentralized, bureaucratic barriers, 
inequalities in resource distribution and lack of financial capacity at the local level 
remained a major challenge.  
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Based on the aforementioned, a question can be asked: Does school autonomy guarantee 
success towards improved efficiency? Decentralization reforms in Brazil certainly need not 
be seen as a smooth political transformation. In fact, it was largely a political process 
influenced by various factors. For instance, the financial crisis of the 1970s and 80s did not 
only trigger the need for reduction in public expenditure but also necessitated the need for 
broadening the resource base, which is one of the objectives for decentralization (Derqui, 
2010).  It seems that educational decentralization in Brazil laid much emphasis on financial 
matters as opposed to improving the quality of education. Compared to Argentina where 
the objective of decentralization was to improve efficiency and quality of education, Brazil 
focused more on addressing issues of democratic participation by creating school councils. 
However, “this initiative proved inept due to lack of active participation and authoritarian 
tendencies, although the current process of school deconcetration is believed to be 
improving the situation” (Derqui, 2010:57). 
Coming back to the question of efficiency, one can argue that school autonomy is a vague 
concept and whether or not it leads to greater efficiency, is merely an argument which is 
dependent on the prevailing factors such as school leadership capacity. It has been argued 
that, “although school autonomy has potential rewards, its far-reaching implications might 
be undesirable in certain contexts” (Dillon, 2011:7). Further, there is also evidence 
suggesting that increased school autonomy does not necessarily lead to greater efficiency 
nor does it always go hand in hand with increased responsibilities (Mcnerney, 2003).  
Given these assertions, the benefits of educational decentralization in Brazil may be said to 
have been attractive. But as can be deduced from box below, it is hard to figure out 
precisely what has been the actual degree of autonomy, level of participation and the 
impact of decentralization at the school level. Apparently, educational decentralization, 
albeit posing challenges, will continue to be at the center of educational reforms in that 
country for years to come. 
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Box 3: Lessons on Educational Decentralization Leaned from Brazil 
 
Legal Framework of Educational Decentralization 
 
1891 Constitution: Federal system and administrative decentralization. Continuity with the military dictatorship of 1964 1980-
1995. Promulgation of the Federal Constitution (1988) 1995-2002. Amendment of the Constitution (n° 14/96) and directives and 
Bases for Education Act 
 
Goal and Expected Results 
Greater Autonym, accountability, responsibilities and efficiency in education delivery. The Union has a normative and 
redistributive function. Technical and financial assistance to States and municipalities. A minimum of 18 percent of the Union’s 
revenue and 25% of that of the federated entities must be devoted to education. Educational programmes are decentralized. 
Reduction of regional inequalities (access to resources and enrolment).Strengthening of democratic participation in school 
management and establishment of a fund to upgrade the teaching profession (definition of an average salary. 
 
Major Experiences 
Disparities persist between regions and between social groups. Need for clear accountability and stronger institutional mechanisms 
and also clear criteria for financial cooperation between the federated entities. Many of the municipalities do not have sufficient 
revenue to assume new responsibilities, and as such, it needs to be supplemented. 50% of children in fourth grade cannot read or 
carry out basic mathematical operations Resources have been assigned to basic education, to the detriment of other levels of 
education. 
 
 
 
Source: UNESCO: 2005: 52 
 
 
4.2.2 Experiences from New Zealand 
The objective for reviewing the New Zealand model of decentralization is to explore the 
accountability mechanisms and their implications for education delivery. Historically, 
education provision in New Zealand has been characterized by spells of stagnation during 
which the administrative system was highly centralized, such that around the 1960s, 
community demands for improving the system began to increase (LaRocque & Boyer, 
1997).  Further discontents in the neglected communities around the 1980s necessitated the 
restructuring of the education system.  Local government institutions in New Zealand had 
in the past played an insignificant role in public service provision. However, the sweeping 
decentralization reforms of the late 1980s demonstrate that while educational 
decentralization can be a gradual political reform, it can also be completed quickly, as was 
the case in New Zealand even though desired results pertaining to local control and 
accountability remained somewhat elusive than earlier envisioned (World Bank, 1997). 
In order to appreciate the experiences in New Zealand, one has to pay attention to the 
“tomorrow’s school” reforms of 1988 which were an outcome of wider public 
consultations by the “picot committee”, which examined how best the education system 
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was to be administered under a more decentralized system
17
 (Jacobs, 1997; LaRocque & 
Boyer, 1997). This committee recommended among other things, “a system that was more 
accountable and efficient and one that was as much as possible based on an equitable and 
fair distribution of available resources” (Jacobs,1997:340). 
According to LaRocque & Boyer (1997), the tomorrow’s schools and subsequent reforms 
led to self-managing schools which resulted from the creation of a competitive platform 
and elimination of the substantial degree of education bureaucracy. This environment 
enabled the communities to have a say on how well schools had to be run based on schools 
freedom and autonomy for addressing local needs.
18
  These measures were backed by a 
new set of accountability initiatives which included the establishment of charter schools 
and an independent body for reporting purposes. Understandably, these initiatives were by 
no means perfectly designed or flawlessly implemented, but research evidence through all 
these years suggests that New Zealand’s urban middle class families have always sought 
and have been in many instances successful in finding ways to educate their children in 
socially advantaged schools having, based on the policy done so in different ways
19
.  The 
Study by Jacobs (1997) revealed significant demands for educational choices – particularly 
among students from low-income families previously underserved by the centralized 
education system.  
The key factors underlying these experiences lie on the vexing link between 
‘accountability’ and ‘local control’ on the one hand and ‘self-managing schools’ and 
accountability on the other.  Indeed, effective accountability can lead to improved 
efficiency in terms of enrolment granted that all enabling factors for local control or self-
managing schools are in place (LaRocque & Boyer, 1997). But in the absence of adequate 
capacities, no educational institutions or actors can achieve this. It is no wonder Astle, 
Bryants and Hotham (2011) emphasized that; 
             “Education is too important to be delivered without scrutiny. Yet we have, in our 
determination to measure school efficiency and effectiveness and drive for school 
improvement, allowed the accountability ‘tail’ to wag the education ‘dog’; our 
                                                 
17    Educational reforms in New Zealand seem to have begun in 1988 as a result of sound political and education 
leadership that carefully developed abroad based consensus at every stage of the decentralization process. As a matter of 
fact, the highly publicized MoE document entitled “tomorrow schools” helped to popularize the major campaign through 
which the majority of the New Zealanders provided their views. 
18 This system is in fact; still in operation to date such that all state and state- integrated schools are administered by 
elected board of trustees composed of parents and community volunteers under what is known as the ‘Bulk Grant’ 
funding modalities. 
19
  For further details, see online article on the study: http://usj.sagepub.com/content/44/7/1393.refs.html 
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high stakes system of consequential accountability now dominates almost every 
aspect of state-funded education, with hugely damaging consequences” (p.4). 
 
Clearly, we can lean a lot from decentralization reforms in New Zealand. The deep concern 
however, is that it can be a mistake to assume that increasing community ownership, or 
scaling up school autonomy for that matter, makes obvious the need for effective 
accountability system. If anything, the challenge of assessing the strengths and weaknesses 
of different schools exponentially grows as school autonomy or local control increase. In a 
decentralized system such as that of New Zealand, information needs to increasingly flow 
up and down between parents and government to ensure effective local control and to put 
pressure on schools where accountability is weak or non-existent. 
4.2.3 Educational Decentralization in Norway 
The Norwegian model of decentralization provides an interesting empirical case for 
literature review due to the profound achievements which have been attained over what 
one may call, “decades of sound educational policy reforms”. My focus was to analyse 
how local [school] autonomy and accountability played out as success factors. Historically, 
education provision in Norway can be said to have been administered from the center 
under strong ‘democratic and egalitarian values’20, with the exception of certain curricular 
issues that were locally decided over (Smehaugen, 2007). According to Kalsen (2000), the 
arguments in favour of decentralization in Norway emerged in the late 1960s and went on 
to be popularized towards the late 1970s. He stated that, “the educational decentralization 
process in Norway went on beyond the 1980s up until 1990s adding however, that the 
rationale for decentralization and how it was to be implemented in education remained 
under vigorous investigations” (p.1). 
The available evidence indicates that educational decentralization reforms in Norway were 
initially introduced at the national level, although there are indications that the reforms 
might have encountered some sort of passivity and political resistance at the local level 
(Kalsen, 2000). Using this experience one can argue that educational decentralization 
                                                 
20
 The history of education in Norway originates from continuous tension between “geo-political and cultural peripheries 
and the center”, with gradual power concentration at the center.  Over decades, educational ownership, leadership and 
control shifted from strong local control and self-definition to a fully centralized state system under the Education Act of 
the 1970s.   In principle, education in Norway is regarded as profound human rights issue and the country is seen as one 
of the first to introduce universal participation in a unified education system. 
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reforms initiated from the center can under ideal circumstances, succeed in order to sustain 
national level legitimacy which, in a way, consolidates on political power at national level. 
This might be the reason why educational decentralization reforms in certain countries 
including Norway have tended to generate a new set of centrally administered regulatory 
laws.  
In the context of educational decentralization, local autonomy, accountability and 
institutional capacity can be said to be key principles which have influenced the delivery of 
education in Norway (Helgøy & Homme, 2007). Nonetheless, two recent decentralization 
reforms have significantly shaped the way education is currently funded and delivered at 
the local level. Having been initiated from the top, the new Local Governing Act gives 
increased local flexibility and authority to municipalities and schools. Under the new 
funding system, popularly known as the “lump-sum system”, the government provides 
funding to municipalities to cover administrative costs for schools, but it is the school 
Principal who is responsible for executing the budget (Kalsen, 2000). Despite being widely 
supported in Parliament, these reforms still encounter resistance at the local level. For 
instance, critics of the “lump sum system” argue that this initiative tends to create 
disparities among schools, thus weakening the principle of equality of educational 
opportunity – a principle which has been a force in driving the Norwegian educational 
policy (Helgøy & Homme, 2007).  
Arguably, Norway represents what might be regarded by many as a successful model of 
educational decentralization, but the study by Smehaugen (2007) shows that its 
implementation varies across decentralized units across the country. Further, Smehaugen’s 
study revealed (across all sampled schools) that the Principal has the right to initiate 
decisions on a wide range of issues subject to the agreement from the participatory 
councilors at the school but in cases of disagreements, he can nonetheless, make decisions 
that are contrary to teachers and parents’ views (Smehaugen, 2007:67). Obviously it is at 
this point where effective accountability is compromised. The question then is; can 
accountability and local (school) autonomy be enhanced in the absence of the right to 
negotiate within the teachers and parents’ representative body? If this is working in 
Norway, one can argue that such bodies at least provide a platform for discontents which, 
if not checked, can be a recipe for bad governance. 
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Figure 5: Experiences of Educational Decentralization Reforms in Norway at 
Elementary School Level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Regional Experiences across Sub-Saharan Africa 
In the same way globalization is becoming an increasingly permeating phenomenon, “so 
too is educational decentralization being acknowledged as one of its major and pervasive 
affiliates across SSA region” (Redeout, 2000:67).  Many countries in the region have gone 
through a robust transformation from high levels of centralization to diverse models of 
A Case from a Rural Municipality in a Mountain Area 
This municipality has been economically weakened after the increased administrative and economic co-ordination between various 
sectors was introduced to the municipalities in 1993. The small neighbourhood schools (grendeskoler) with the exception of one have 
been closed down in this municipality. However, the relationship between the municipality and the case school has until present 
followed a somewhat traditional model, with no specific accreditation to the school. Appointment of teachers and decision on teacher 
salaries are maintained at the municipality level. The principals report to the municipality chief education officer. Accumulated 
finances are made available to the schools, based on schools’ documentation of number of classes and special education needs. The 
relative number of teaching hours is under the pressure of cost cutting. 
Elementary School (Grades 1-7) 
Budget:  
The principal presents a budget proposal to the liaison committee (which is a counselling body). It is also presented to the elected 
representatives of the teacher organizations, who then discuss the proposal with all the members. The representatives take part in 
discussions in the representative board. The principal makes the final decision on the budget. 
 
Contents of Teaching/Learning: 
The school arranges staff meetings in order to discuss areas and contents of innovative and development work. It is in this forum that 
teachers enjoy the greatest informal – but real – influence. Furthermore, each team of teachers, organized for each class level, has 
autonomy to decide on matters concerning methods, co-ordination of projects, etc. in areas which are not regulated by the binding 
framework (L97); development work initiated by the ministry (mathematics, reading/writing and information technology), or regional 
or intra-municipality projects coordinated by the municipality chief education officers (e.g. to strengthen pupils’ social competence). It 
should be noted that the school has freedom to define such projects on its own, provided that these are in line with the suggestions of 
the local education authorities, since the chief education officer controls a certain amount of money for such activities 
At this school, the parents participated in a survey in order to decide upon the specific topics most urgent to improve as regards their 
own children’s social behaviour. 88 per cent of the parents participated. Apart from the collective projects mentioned above, the 
school has almost no time left for local adaptation of the curriculum at school or class level to complement the fixed national 
prescriptions of L97, which are found to be very detailed and demanding. 
Methods of Teaching/Learning:  
Additional decisions on methods to be obligatory for the whole school (apart from those in L 97) are made at this school. These are 
based on discussions at staff meetings on how to reach the overall objectives of the school (e.g. in social competence, 
reading/writing). Every teacher must make a written proposal on how to implement the teaching in the classroom and how to evaluate 
and document the results. 
 
Source: (Smehaugen, 2007:67-68) 
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decentralization. Interestingly, it seems as though many political leaders ‘turned a blind 
eye’ to the positive factors which gave impetus for centralization after colonialism in 
favour of the promises offered by decentralization, such as improved democratization and 
civic participation (Gershberg & Winkler, 2003). However, the study by Naidoo (2002) on 
decentralization across SSA reviewed that too much centralization or absolute local 
autonomy can be harmful.  For instance, Uganda may be a shining example in the region 
given that country’s successes (Namukas & Buye, 2009), but the implementation process is 
still characterised by political and financial risks, suggesting that decentralization is not 
just complex, but also a process which cannot bear fruits in the absence of sustained 
political will and a shared vision among stakeholders.  
Similarly, field experiences from Tanzania and Nigeria indicate that educational 
decentralization is a process of trial and error, whose implementation is often politically 
driven with very little input from local level stakeholders (Naidoo, 2002).  Quite often only 
lip-services are paid which does nothing to improve accountability and the institutional 
capacities as far as the sub national level is concerned. The situation in Lesotho, in fact, 
attests to the fact that successful implementation of educational decentralization requires 
not just well functioning administrative structure, but more explicitly defined roles and 
responsibilities for local level actors which, unfortunately, have been lacking in that 
country (Redeout, 2000).  The similar political history among many countries in the region 
explains why Zambia is not an exception. If anything, the country has an opportunity to 
learn lessons from countries such as Uganda or South Africa where results are reportedly 
somewhat impressive. 
While there are variations in the administrative and legal arrangements within the region, 
the central challenge to almost all countries is that there is, “tension between the attempt to 
dismantle highly centralized educational bureaucracies and efforts to create a well 
devolved system with varying levels of autonomy, accountability and institutional 
capacities” (Hanson, 1997:19).  Below is a discussion of these three principles in terms of 
how they account for the experiences in the region to date. 
4.3.1 Incentives for Autonomy 
Stronger autonomy is crucial to the success of educational decentralization reforms in any 
given setting. Autonomy however, needs to be counterbalanced with accountability, 
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without which it can be difficult to achieve success in a decentralized system (De Grauwe, 
2005).  Yet, having a decentralized education system does not necessarily foster increased 
autonomy just as autonomy is not an outcome of decentralization as such. Just like 
authority, “increasing autonomy at one level may result in reduction at another” (Coleman 
& Earley, 2005:75). In their 2007 study of education boards in West Africa, De Grauwe 
and Lugaz explored this issue in detail. They found out that top officials at the district level 
can exercise their autonomy successfully if it enhances their professionalism but on the 
other hand, this constrains technical personnel that directly perform monotonous or less 
demanding duties.
21
  
There are also relevant lessons from elsewhere. In Canada and the United Kingdom, for 
example, educational decentralization can be said to be robust.  Policy is conceived 
centrally but implementation is effectively done locally with sufficient levels of autonomy 
(Coleman & Earley, 2005). The key question when it comes to Zambia, therefore, may not 
just be what autonomy or freedom DEBs need, but rather, “what balance to strike with 
accountability and autonomy under appropriate  institutional structures” (Dillon, 2011:32). 
4.3.2 Rationale for Accountability 
Many countries across SSA have adopted educational decentralization for one simple 
reason. That reason is to increase efficiency by bringing decision making closer to the 
people (Hanson, 1997). Nevertheless, this raised high demands for improved 
accountability in order to counterbalance factors that constraint transparency, efficiency 
and effectiveness in the delivery of education. But having a good accountability system 
regardless of how well outlined, is not enough. Rather, for any decentralized education 
system to yield success, those with decision making authority must be open for scrutiny 
and should exercise power within the scope of their responsibilities (Coleman & Earley, 
2005). There are risks however, associated with too much power concentrated at one level 
or thinly divided authority at different decision making points. For example, a study on 
local level educational governance in Senegal, Guinea, Mali and Benin indicated that the 
absence of well delineated power relations, responsibilities and transparency mechanisms 
(weak accountability system), resulted into difficulties in identifying who was accountable 
                                                 
21
 Refer to pages139-45 for further details regarding the findings of their 2007 study which has been cited in 
the thesis. 
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for poor pupil performance between District Education officials (DEO) and School 
Management Committees (SMC) (De Grauwe & Lugaz, 2007).  Lessons from Tanzania 
and Uganda, however, demonstrate that where there is transparency and participatory 
budgeting at the district level, a critical link between government and DEOs and SMCs can 
be established which in can lead to improved accountability (Litvack et., al.1998). 
4.3.3 Building Institutional Capacities 
Besides autonomy and accountability, the issue of institutional capacity is equally critical 
in as far as educational decentralization across SSA is concerned. In the same way the 
setting up of accountability mechanisms in a decentralized education system is a daunting 
task, so too is the objective of building institutional capacities for better implementation. 
However, the rationale for strengthening institutional capacity whether at the regional or 
the district level, equally demands resources and clear responsibilities. This then raises the 
questions: Do central governments have the administrative capacity to provide technical 
and financial assistance where and when it is needed?  Do regional or district institutions 
have the capacity to deliver expected services in an efficient and effective manner?  
Evidence on these questions is scant. Given the institutional capacity constraints in Ghana, 
it is not clear whether or not improvements in the quality of basic education in that country 
can be attributed to educational decentralization alone or other factors (Naidoo, 2002). 
Despite substantial efforts around the 1980s and 90s, Naidoo observed, as well in Nigeria 
that educational decentralization process remained politically and administratively weak as 
it is fraught with institutional and structural challenges. He added that DEOs, SMCs and 
community based organizations in in these two countries  still encounter multiple and 
overwhelming demands, and their role vis-à-vis that of other stakeholders in administering 
basic education is constrained by not so well developed institutional setup. Contradictory 
effects of educational decentralization in Tanzania are equally interesting to comment on. 
Tanzania has enjoyed impressive gains in community participation, yet there are 
discrepancies between centralized planning and local level participation and autonomy. 
This situation is likely to be perpetuated, since formal institutional arrangements of the 
education system at sub the regional national level, still by default, locates decision making 
authority at the center (Therkildsen, 2000). 
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In light of the different experiences, it is difficult to identify an exemplary model of 
decentralization in the region but more or less positive measures which are context based. 
The above experiences also point to what has been referred to as, “deep-rooted but ongoing 
tension between downwards (government to communities) and upwards (the reverse) 
articulations of responsibilities” (Naidoo, 2002:37). Therefore, this demonstrates how 
extraordinarily complex the implementation of educational decentralization has been in the 
region. In fact, there is wider evidence in support of Naidoo’s assertions.  For example, 
UNESCO’s 2005 report of national decentralization experiences from Latin America and 
Asia highlighted general complexities of educational decentralization processes in which 
the macro-level economic and political contexts impinge on implementation.  Arguably, 
the challenges of decentralization in education for countries such as Peru and Pakistan are 
probably just as much politically as technically driven (UNESCO, 2005).  In the same 
vein, country specific experiences in the table basically show that educational 
decentralization is primarily a political process, which, in most instances, serves as a tool 
for political expediency by the powers that be.   
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Table 1: Summary of Experiences from Selected SSA Countries 
 
Country Environment & Context Rationale for Educational 
Decentralization 
Form of Educational 
Decentralization 
Results/Outcomes 
Ghana Some historical tradition of 
decentralization, focus on 
centralization in the first 30 
years of independence. 
Ongoing decentralization 
since 1988 
Shift locus of decision making 
to local level as a means to 
decentralize state institutions. 
Cost reduction by cutting state 
expenditure. Efficient use of 
and allocation of resources 
Regions (10) coordinate 
districts (110). Common 
Fund, property, fuel and 
minor taxes and fees at 
local level. Districts 
responsible for urban 
services primary 
education, and health 
Mostly 
deconcentration of 
administrative 
authority with little 
decentralization of 
institutional decision 
making authority. 
Ministries continue to 
operate in a 
centralized way 
Nigeria Previous military 
administrations enhanced 
power of center and main 
source of revenue. 
Centralization of power and 
deconcentration of structures 
Increase local participation in 
governance.  
Means to fight corruption in 
state structures.  
To promote social equity 
Federal system with states 
(36) and municipalities 
(774). 
Government involved in 
education, health and 
welfare provision. 
Federal control of 
national policy 
Partial devolution-
more administrative 
deconcentration. 
Existence of a variety 
of local government 
structures for 
mobilizing local 
resources. 
Tanzania New vision focusing on 
national issues and programs 
conducive to  the operation of 
a market economy 
Local development more 
effectively managed by 
institutions closer to the 
people. Ensures that 
development is effectively 
planned and controlled. 
To promote efficiency and 
effectiveness 
Two layered system of 
urban and rural 
authorities (1984). 
Strengthening of local 
government (1996-2000). 
Local government 
responsible for primary 
schools, health, and 
planning 
Mostly 
deconcentration of 
administrative 
functions. 
National standards set 
for local services 
delivery. 
 
Uganda Political and economic 
turmoil in the 70s created a 
strong impetus to rehabilitate 
all aspects Uganda national 
development. 
Strong legal framework to 
support decentralization 
introduced 
 
To reduce workload of central 
officials. 
To improve accountability 
and effectiveness. 
To develop organizational 
structures suited to local 
circumstances.  
To improve service delivery 
at the local level 
Districts (43), counties 
(150) and sub counties. 
Unconditional and 
equalization grants. 
Districts responsible for 
education, health and 
basic urban services 
Some devolution of 
administrative and 
political decision –
making have taken 
place. 
Higher levels of 
government pushing 
resources burden to 
lower levels 
 
Source: (Naidoo, 2002:31-37) 
4.4 Other Relevant Case Studies 
4.4.1 Patterns & Policy Implications in West Africa 
The main objective of this study was to identify the major challenges facing DEBs and 
SMCs and to assess how the decentralization policy transformed the educational landscape 
at the local level.  By design, this study was rooted in qualitative methodology. It was 
framed along the argument that, “although decentralization is seen as a fashionable reform, 
little is known about its implementation at the local level or its impact on the functioning 
of DEBs and PTAs” (De Grauwe & Ludaz 2010:21). Their research covered four West 
African countries [i.e. Benin, Mali, Guinea & Senegal] and, in terms of data collection, 
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national diagnoses and field surveys were used while the selection of sites in each country 
was based on location, size and number of non-civil servant teachers. 
Although a synthesis of their key findings shows rays of hope, an unimpressive picture is 
painted regarding the pattern and policy implications of the boards’ operations (De 
Grauwe; 2010). Taking into account the initiatives that were undertaken in these countries, 
the study concluded that lack of transparency, weak local capacity and unequal distribution 
of power, including scarcity of resources explain why decentralization policy processes did 
not improved education service delivery (De Grauwe & Lugaz, 2010).  De Grauwe and 
Lugaz added that although educational decentralization has a number of incentives, 
country specific contexts tend to account for mixed results
22
. The fact that this study was 
nonetheless, undertaken in four countries, paved the way for some cross-country 
inconsistencies in the methodology. Given its scope
23
, it is difficult to appreciate how the 
study in practice explored the comparative dimensions on the aspects explored considering 
the contextual differences across countries. For this reason, this study seeks to explore this 
limitation by applying a comparative case study of two different education boards, but at 
the same time focusing only on one country thus, Zambia. 
4.4.2 Education Decentralization in Kerala State of India. 
The above case relates to the 2004 study by Bray and Mukundan, in which the main 
objective was to examine complex challenges pertaining to the implementation of 
educational decentralization policy in Kerala. Primary schools were the basis for which 
responsibility was transferred to districts and villages. Of interest is also the recent study 
by Bjork (2003) which paralleled that of Kerala and whose focus was on educational 
decentralization reforms launched in Indonesia, in 1994. Policy rhetoric in Indonesia was 
strong at the central level, but Bjork’s investigation revealed a striking degree of 
stagnation, as opposed to transformation in schools. He concluded that, “what had been 
slatted as a major reconfiguration of the education system had yet to induce any significant 
changes at the local level” (Bjork, 2003:184). Although factors for the situation in 
Indonesia were country specific, the experiences have implications elsewhere, like in 
Kerala or Zambia for that matter. 
                                                 
22
 Ibid :139-144 
23
 Ibid: 26-31 
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Policy rhetoric in educational policy research may be related to what others coined as 
“political symbolism” - a concept used to explain why the literature on education policy 
and practice in developing countries is characterized by narratives of ‘failure’ attributed to 
the lack of resources, weak implementation strategy, and the problems of policy coherence 
(Jansen, 2003).  By building on Jansen’s view, it can be argued that the construction of 
political symbolism might be the first step in developing a more elaborate theory to explain 
major challenges in educational research – the gap between policy ideals and practical 
outcomes. 
In articulating the gap between rhetoric and reality in Kerala, Bray and Mukundan (2004) 
stated that, “even in a society with high levels of education and strong traditions of 
participation, educational decentralization is not easy to achieve” (p.47). It is no wonder, 
Bray and Mukandan (2004) stated that, “the multifaceted big-bang educational 
decentralization model in Kerala, despite its strengths, encountered peculiar limitations 
such as lack of technical competence by implementers at the district and school levels” 
(p.47). On the other hand, Bjork (2003) raised the obvious question whether time would 
make a difference. He challenged himself whether he was too hasty in drawing conclusions 
based on his findings about the fate of the reform only four years after it had been enacted, 
and whether ten or more years were required to achieve results. This question is applicable 
not only to Kerala alone, but also in countries with similar settings. 
My impression of the two cases is that there are comparable forces at play in both Kerala 
and Indonesia, which ultimately affect implementation. It can be argued, therefore, that 
educational policy and practice seem to be a series of movement - two steps forward and 
one backward and by so doing, practical lessons are learned (Sutton & Lenvisson, 2001). 
Other researchers see this differently, “if decentralization is seen as a process and 
implemented according to policy recommendations, then at some stage it would be 
justifiable to stop since a decentralized system would have been established,  and there 
would be no need to continue”  (Di Gropello, 2004:97). Nonetheless, the experiences 
discussed in these cases appear to point in one direction, and this is that the benefits of 
educational decentralization are less straightforward than often claimed. The Kerala and 
Indonesian cases, in particular, raise fundamental questions about the objectives and 
practicalities of educational decentralization reforms whether at regional, provincial or 
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district level.  Thus, despite contextual differences, the experiences highlighted in this 
chapter are of relevance to the Zambian model of educational decentralization in general 
and to this study in particular. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 
 
Chapter 5:   Theoretical & Conceptual    Framework 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline of how the study was organized at the theoretical 
and conceptual level. It has two main parts. The theoretical framework, analyses those 
perspectives which are relevant to the study. The conceptual framework, on the other hand, 
outlines the main concepts of the study and goes further to highlight how they are 
connected to the key research questions. All in all, this chapter informs the methodology 
and above all saves as the reference point for data analysis and discussion of findings.   
5.1 Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework is a critical component in social science research in the sense 
that it saves as a guidepost for the theoretical perspectives, which underpin a given theme 
under investigation such as educational decentralization. Building on the rationale 
presented below, the discussion examines theories or ideologies underlying 
decentralization in the education sector. 
5.1.1 Rationale for the Theoretical Framework  
In a case study design, theories can be applied in order to explain, predict, and understand 
a particular social phenomena but also, “to challenge or build on the existing knowledge 
within the context of what is termed as critical bounding assumptions” (Denzin & Linclon, 
1994:223). As such, the theoretical framework gives an opportunity to demonstrate how 
one understands the theories underlying the research topic (Patton, 2002). In this regard, 
the statements of the problem as well as the research questions serve as the building blocks 
on which the theoretical framework is anchored. 
5.1.2 Overview of Theories on Decentralization 
Understanding a phenomenon, such as decentralization, is a daunting endeavor which is 
not as simple as the concept is perceived (Litvack et al., 1998).  Taking into account the 
complexities of a decentralized education system, such as that of Zambia, one cannot 
entirely rely on a given set of theoretical assumptions due to potential risks associated with 
distorting the accuracy and objectivity of social reality in a given setting.  Nonetheless, it is 
imperative to underscore the fact that decentralization, like any other social phenomena 
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may be understood in relation to diverse perspectives. According to Lauglo (1995), these 
perspectives justify other options as opposed to bureaucratic centralism which is perceived 
to be on the decline, although certain tensions between centralization on the one hand and 
decentralization on the other, still persist. It appears however, that there is no dominant 
theoretical tradition on which the concept of decentralization is founded. This sentiment 
seems valid in as far as the theoretical warfare concerning the demise of socialist state 
planning following the collapse of the Soviet Union  is concerned, and given also that 
modern societies are often driven by competitive politics combined with  varyingly 
successful market economics  (Lauglo, 1995). It is also claimed that decentralization serves 
as a buffer against political de-legitimisation where central control is widely perceived as 
inneffective.  
There are theoretical underpinnings which profoundly motivate the advocacy for 
decentralization, but then again these can help explain why decentralisation still remains 
questionable. Attractive claims made in support of decentralization range from its capacity 
to enhance economic efficiency to strengthening democracy and promoting good 
governance (Weiler, 1990; Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983). Besides the different forms of 
decentralization, there are various political and economic ideological traditions such as 
participatory democracy, liberalism, and federalism, all of which provide theoretical 
insights about decentralization. In the following sections, an account of each of these 
rationales and its respective relevance to this study is provided. 
5.1.2.1 Participatory Democracy 
To the extent that it expands our theoretical horizon in understanding the practice of 
decentralization, participatory democracy in the 1970s became an active force in education 
policy debates in many Western countries (Lauglo, 1995). Theoretically, participatory 
democracy attaches greater importance to stronger local autonomy and accountability in 
decision making as a way of enhancing ‘collective responsibility’ at the local level. This is 
so especially where decision making authority demands wider consultation. However, 
according to Held’s (2006) model of democracy, the usage of this concept goes beyond 
conventional politics to encompass certain institutional aspects. Therefore from an 
institutional perspective, participation becomes more than just mere voting for 
representatives for instance, to ‘active involvement’ in decisions that concerns a given 
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community.  It is also widely accepted that ‘democratic participation’ is a “good thing” 
while non-participation is a bad for citizens. A distinction between the two alternatives is 
often entertained in political science debates – “either we have social inclusion (good) or 
social exclusion (bad)” (Chandler, 2001:1).  From a point of view of a decentralized 
education system, one can argue that participatory democracy results in the increased 
involvement of those who are most directly affected by the decisions made. In this regard, 
it is logical for them to participate.   
Although it is widely popularized in the political discourse, the real and practical 
application of participatory democracy often fails to meet expectations. Usually, 
participatory democracy tend  to  be reduced to a simple rhetorical manoeuvre by the 
powers that be if not an exercise for mere consultation, leaving power relations and 
authority between leaders and subjects at  the lower level intact as ever before (Sintomer & 
Maillard, 2007).  Thus, participatory democracy in education becomes an open-ended 
notion subject to trial and error. Given these assertions, certain democratic ideals within 
the confines of the DEBs and PTAs may ‘seem robust’ but still it is difficult to know what 
might work and what might not in education, considering the low levels of experience and 
awareness  for democratic participation.  
As a theory that explains decentralization, participatory democracy has its ideological roots 
in democracy, although its desired benefits are hard to achieve.  The general perception 
among scholars (Rondinelli, 1999; Lauglo, 1995) who have commented on this theoretical 
concept is that the state and its bureaucratic machinery are suppressive, in so far as 
authority for control and decision making are concentrated at the top. Whenever authority 
is concentrated at the centre, greater parental and community involvement becomes 
problematic, since these actors are not accorded a platform to express views on how 
schools should be run for the benefit of their children.  
Essentially, the exercise of power by MoE top officials in Lusaka may be seen by 
definition, as counter to the will of those who are opposed to it at the district level. But 
“suppressive” is, in a way, another and pejorative concept, implying lack of legitimacy for 
the exercise of power. In this case, the adoption of the educational decentralization policy 
in Zambia might be in favour of those who advocate of participatory democracy. The 
argument might have been in favour of relaxing the control of education from the centre 
through devolution of more powers to lower level on grounds that this would enhance 
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participatory decision-making. Thus, the establishment of DEBs implicitly entails 
promoting participatory democracy since it has allowed all stakeholders both at district and 
school level to have a say in decisions regarding the delivery basic education. 
5.1.2.2 Liberalism 
Political assertions in favour of the decentralization policy hinge on a liberal democratic 
tradition in which the ideals of ‘freedom from repressive tendencies of the state’ and 
‘individual liberties’ are central. According to Lauglo (1995), those who subscribe to 
liberal values see the pursuit of “individual freedoms” and of broader ‘dispersal of power 
and authority’ from the centre to local authorities as an imperative undertaking. Liberal 
democrats claim that decentralization is a mechanism through which the state can increase 
its responsiveness to citizens’ demands such as education and health (Smith, 1985).   Smith 
added that the most compelling motivation in favour of decentralization is the strong 
linkage with liberal philosophies save what Lauglo (1995) emphasized that, “liberalism has 
become a ‘broad creed’ that justifies diverse and sometimes conflicting, objectives of 
decentralization” (p.11). In that sense, decentralization can be seen to promote such values 
as; responsiveness, accountability and autonomy are dear to liberalists, although in a 
stricter sense “accountability” is not really a mainstream liberal mantra, although it may be 
associated with more populist concepts of democracy which support the view that experts 
should be held to account for their decisions and actions and that power corrupts.  
Economics as a discourse equally features a strong link between liberalism and 
decentralization. Grossman (1989) stated that the concept of decentralization is rooted in 
the theory of ‘public choice’ and ‘political economy’ in which humans are regarded as 
rational beings.  Since humans are rational beings, it then follows that they know best how 
to decide on their economic welfare (thus efficient production vs. individual freedom) 
based on their rational choices that yield maximum satisfaction for their individual needs 
(Lauglo, 1995).  However, the theory of ‘public choice’ does not necessarily negate the 
existence of public goods. In fact, “choice” advocates do not argue that central government 
should only restrict itself to the provision of public goods.  It should also control and 
regulate the market at all levels, especially when the actors in the market lack information 
for making the choices that can maximize the achievement of their goals. 
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Grossman (1989) touched upon the idea of public choice which provides a case for 
restricting the role of the state.  Grossman’s analysis of the emergence of a political 
economy school of thought highlights an alternative for addressing the allegedly 
retrogressive role government in its curtailing of individual choices. It seems therefore, that 
since governments are rent seeking as perceived by public choice theorists, 
decentralization then becomes a means of facilitating opportunities aimed at maximizing 
individual preferences. By implication, educational decentralization in this case at the 
district and school level, may entail more sensitivity to parents and pupils’ choices for 
example, on basic education services rather than decisions made at provincial or national 
level for that matter.   
If we consider one of the objectives of the educational decentralization policy in Zambia 
which is to empower local communities by devolving decision-making authority, then that 
brings in the question of local autonomy for DEBs. This is particularly so since autonomy 
accords DEBs with the flexibility for making independent decisions on how best 
educational needs at the communities can be met. Again, a closer look at the notion of 
autonomy as it relates to the functioning of Chongwe and Solwezi boards indicates that 
autonomy is an integral part of the ideals and values of liberalism. In that sense, liberalism 
provides useful theoretical insights which are relevant to the research question regarding 
the transfer of responsibilities and authority- which in a sense influences local autonomy of 
DEBs. 
5.1.2.3 Populist Localism 
                 “Populist localism, understood as an appeal to `the people' against both the 
established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values, should not be 
dismissed as a pathological form of politics of no interest to the political theorists, 
for its democratic pretensions raise important issues” (Canovan,1999: 2-4). 
If we look far back into the history of the United States and Norway, we can find certain 
ideological identities which show how populist localism relates to decentralization 
(Canovan, 1999). Theoretically, populist localism embraces the principle of “rule by the 
people” which, in practical terms implies a direct form of democracy. The key assumption 
is that “if the representatives of the people are allowed to “absolutely” govern at all levels, 
chances are that they might rule to perpetuate their own interests rather than that of ‘the 
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people’ they supposedly serve24. Thus, the existence of Chongwe and Solwezi boards 
should be seen to provide a direct link between DBOs and the ‘silent majority’ at the local 
level. This is necessary as it fosters representative democracy, without which democracy 
becomes troubled. 
On face value, populist localism is democratically appealing in any governance system 
since concepts of ‘popular power’ and ‘popular decision’ are at the core of democratic 
ideals. However, globalization seems to have reduced populist claims to a mere 
conservative tradition, far beyond, from being regarded as a vibrant force it once was. 
According to Lauglo (1995) the ideological foundation for populists has been weakened by 
the very development which they popularly opposed or sought to contain or modify- 
modernization. In the context of educational decentralisation, populists feature prominently 
because of their appeal for stronger community and parental control of schools. It has been 
stated: 
“For populists perceive schools to be neither extensions of state bureaucratic 
authority, nor the property of the professional establishment; they are supposed to 
be governed as directly as locally as possible by ‘the people’ whose good sense of 
judgment and rights of direct self-government populism upholds” (Lauglo, 1995:7) 
Besides the concept of representative democracy, which has just been talked about, it 
should be born in mind as well as that populist localism as the ideology hinges on the 
unified assumption of ‘the people’ in which it is assumed that a shared culture underpin 
their common identity (Canovan, 1999; Lauglo, 1995). The people are understood as a 
collective entity thriving on the basis of common culture, ethnicity or race. Rather than 
being inferior, populists consider a cultural entity as more superior than a political one. 
Thus, traditional local ‘self-help’ educational initiatives in certain Islamic states, mosques 
schools are justifiable since they are founded on cultural populism ideology aimed at 
deepening the sense of collectivism and local betterment (Lauglo, 1995:7-10). Thus far, the 
mushrooming of community schools in Zambia might also be partaking of the blessings of 
populism tradition 
Although the assumption for populism appears to have been eroded from the modern 
political discourse, this ideology is, in certain instances, still applicable. In Zambia for 
instance, the principle for educational policy on which decentralization rests is for 
purposes of giving the people an opportunity to provide basic education services (MoE, 
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1996). In fact, under the current decentralized education sector, “the involvement of the 
people is now a rule not an exception it was before” (MoE, 1996:135). It can be argued 
that when the people or communities participate effectively, accountability can improve. 
But this can happen at different levels as well. For example, direct accountability to the 
people in the local community is in itself an aspect of populism since, to a larger extent, 
teachers may not really be public civil servants but local civil servants who are directly 
accountable to “the people” served (Lauglo, 1995). To the extent that community 
involvement or people’s voice (i.e. Chongwe and Solwezi districts) leads to improved 
accountability in the delivery of basic education, then populist localism is relevant to this 
study. 
5.2 Overview of the Conceptual Framework  
The process of reviewing the literature quite often leads to the delineation of the 
conceptual framework in terms of how it relates to the background of the study (Berger 
and Patchener, 1988). In their endeavour to understand how the conceptual framework 
guides the entire research process, Berger and Patchier raised an important question which 
one has to consider: Is there a clear and explicit connection between the theory and the aim 
of the study? The researcher has to ask himself this question as well: Has the conceptual 
framework of the study clearly described the key concepts of the study as they relate to the 
statement of the problem and the literature review? In line with these questions, Rudestam 
and Newton (1992) reiterated the following: 
        “A conceptual framework, which is simply a less developed form of a theory, consists 
of statements that link abstract concepts to empirical data. Theories and conceptual 
frameworks are developed to account for or describe abstract phenomena that occur 
under similar conditions” (p. 6). 
          Therefore, the rationale for the conceptual framework in this study is to outline key 
concepts and to explain how they are linked to the other components of the study. In 
research such as this, concepts are critical because they among other things serve as guild 
in making research conclusions, making meanings of reality and besides serve as a tool for 
understanding the phenomena being studied (Cohen.,et al, 2000). Cohen and others added 
that concepts have a significant relevance for researchers, given that “the more we have 
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them, the more sense data we can pick up and the surer will be our cognitive meanings of 
whatever is out there”25. But Robson (1993) noted that: 
        “Developing a conceptual framework forces you to be explicit about what you think 
you are doing. It also helps you to be selective; to decide which are the important 
features; which relationships are likely to be of importance or meaning; and hence, 
what data you are going to collect and analyse”. (pp. 150–151) 
In the preamble, the perceived gap between policy and practice, as it pertains to 
educational decentralization in Chongwe and Solwezi, was highlighted. Using that as a 
point of departure, the concepts of ‘policy’ and ‘practice’ are thus defined below in 
accordance to how they are applied in this study. Note that the concepts of institutional 
capacity, accountability and autonomy have already been analysed in the previous chapter, 
therefore their presentation here is merely to redefine them by highlighted those aspects 
not touched upon earlier.  This is done in order to show how they are interlinked in this 
study. Due to its significance in this project, the concept of power will also be defined.  
5.2.1 Conceptualising  the term “Policy” 
Policy as a concept is an integral part of public policy analysis which influences decision 
making in policy making processes. Hence, educational decentralization in Zambia can be 
seen as a by-product of public policy analysis since it encompasses the entire process of 
policy making beginning from the conception, adoption and formulation stage up to 
implementation (practice) by DEBs. However, the scope of policy and the manner in 
which it is appropriated in education is open to debate. And sometimes the literature for 
understanding this concept is diverse, divided and somewhat inclusive (Sutton & Levinson, 
2001). 
In this study, the term policy is defined as, “an explicit or implicit single decision or group 
of decisions which set out directives for guiding future decisions, initiate or retard actions 
or guide implementation of previous decisions” (Haddad & Demsky,1995:18). Other 
scholars view policy as, “a normative decision making terminology in which rational 
decision making process comprises crucial elements of educational planning” (Sutton & 
Levinson, 2001:23). Essentially, policies are driven by implicit or explicit ideologies and 
motives which are deeply rooted in politics. This therefore, draws attention to the 
significance of power and control in policy formulation and implementation processes 
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(Hoppers, 2009). There are also other factors such as resource availability for basic 
education and range of policy choices or options among others which ultimately dictate the 
nature and scope of a given policy. This, in the end, adds to the complexity of the policy 
making as a process in education. Therefore, one can argue that the narrower the scope of a 
given policy, the less challenging it becomes during implementation and vice versa. 
5.2.2 Practice of Policy Making 
Just as policy, the concept of ‘practice’ has assumed greater significance in policy making 
processes. This is due to the manner in which it (practice) influences implementation and 
the nature of policy outcomes. Note however that policy and practice are interlinked. 
Hence, they are an integral part of the policy making process in educational planning. In 
theory, practice may be synonymous to policy implementation. The concept of practice is 
nonetheless, understood as, “a way by which individuals and groups engage in situated 
behaviours which are both constrained and enabled by existing structures but essentially 
those which allow individuals to exercise agency given the circumstances” (Sutton & 
Levinson, 2001:23). Yet, one can argue that although “policy influences the practice”, a 
good policy does not necessarily guarantee ‘good practice’ and neither can impromptu 
policy decisions trigger meaningful policy outcomes although, this may not be always the 
case.  Considering the complexities of these terms, it is understandable why even though 
educational decentralisation policy in Zambia is said to be well articulated, the manner it is 
practiced is at best problematic, at least, based on the general impression on 
implementation so far.  
Although policy and practice are distinct concepts in the field of comparative and 
international education, the two are, as already stated, closely interconnected. Rather than 
separating them entirely, some scholars prefer to examine policy and practice (referred to 
as appropriation) as a dynamic interrelated process that extends over time (Sutton & 
Levinson, 2001).   In fact, education experts seem to share a common understanding of 
educational policy as a “practice of power”, although they tend interrogate the meaning of 
educational “policy in practice” to account for the situated logic of planned activities 
across wide range of contexts (Haddad & Demseky, 1995). Conceptually, practice is a 
critical aspect of any educational policy such that depending of the desirability of a given 
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policy decision, expected results or otherwise lessons can be drawn to generate necessary 
feedback which makes the whole process cyclic in nature (Haddad & Demsky, 1995). 
5.2.3 The Concept of Accountability 
It is often taken for granted that educational services can be provided more efficiently by 
sub-ministerial structures since officials at that local level are closer to the people and have 
a better understanding of local context better than those at national level (De Grauwe, 
2005). Decentralizing decision making autonomy and strengthening institutional capacity 
are however, by themselves not sufficient to guarantee effective delivery of education 
services. Unless officials at sub-national levels are explicitly given the leeway to be able to 
take advantage of their superior status, education service delivery would always be 
compromised (Di Gropello, 2004). This is where the concept of accountability comes in.   
Accountability is one of the key factors which can determine success or failure of a given 
policy. It is generally claimed that, a decentralized education system can function more 
effectively if sub-national units are made accountable for their actions to both central 
government - the principal duty bearer and to the community - the primary beneficiary of 
the educational services (USAID, 2007). Note, however, that accountability can also be a 
constraint on local autonomy especially if it is over emphasised. But that does not mean it 
is not necessary since without it, it can be hard in to improve effectiveness and efficiency.  
For this reason, accountability “for results” as well as “for resources” used becomes a 
vehicle for ensuring that local autonomy is applied for purposes valued by those to whom 
they are accountable for. 
It seems therefore, that accountability demands maintaining an optimal balance between 
upward and downward accountability relationships. And depending, of course, on a given 
model of educational decentralization, various interconnected accountability relationships 
can exist. In this study nevertheless, focus is on the “client power” and the “management” 
accountability relationships because these are the most critical elements in the Zambian 
context of educational decentralisation. In a decentralized education sector, a distinction 
between client power and management accountability relationships exists. The difference 
is that, “client power links clients to service providers while management, connects 
education providers and frontline professionals at ministerial level” (Di Gropello, 
2004:57). Di Gropello’s accountability framework is similar to that of USAID both of 
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which are applicable to the Zambian model of educational decentralisation and more so 
relevant to this research project since ‘clients’ imply beneficiaries (citizens/parents/pupils) 
who through “voice” mechanisms are linked to politicians at constituency up to national 
level. Educational providers on the other hand, are basically the District Board Officials 
(DBOs) and ‘frontline officials’ being top MoE officials at headquarters. The extent, to 
which these relationships foster accountability or constrain education service delivery by 
DBOs in the case of Chongwe and Solwezi, largely depends on the nature of the demand 
(from beneficiaries) and supply (DEBs) side mechanisms.   
Figure 6: Public Education Accountability Framework  
 
 
                 Source: (USAID/Equip2, 2007:3) 
 
 
In simple terms, this figure represents the sphere of influence between different actors. The 
accountability and power/voice relationships are conceptually interconnected. Ideally, each 
actor group can influence actions of the other (inner arrows = accountability; outer = 
authority/power vs.voice). For instance, politicians use their authority by giving the 
mandate to policy makers in the MoE to initiate policies. In return, policy makers are 
69 
 
accountable to politicians who are equally accountable to the electorates- citizens/parents. 
In practice however, things tend to deteriorate. For instance, even if there is a direct 
relationship between politicians and citizens, politicians quite often choose not to be 
accountable to parents who even though have the power (voice), may not despite having 
the voice be in a position to hold politicians answerable  unless during elections - in which 
case the environment changes.  
5.2.4 Conceptualizing Autonomy 
In a decentralised education system, autonomy can be seen as a mechanism for increasing 
efficiency and effectiveness in education service delivery (Dillon, 2011). However, 
striking variations exits across different contexts on how autonomy is applied at sub-
national level. In SSA for example, such variations are characterised by fiscal, 
administrative and pedagogical autonomy mostly at regional and district levels where such 
portfolios do not directly run schools (Naidoo, 2002).  But in developed countries such as 
the US, charter schools and other autonomous schools are said to have been able to 
promote innovation in school management and increased access to high-performing 
schools. But then, not all charter schools have had the capacity to occupy the space created 
by autonomy with actions that enhance learning achievement (Dillon, 2011). 
The concept of autonomy in this thesis is defined as “freedom” of sub-national units 
(provincial/regional, district and schools) in terms of being able to make independent 
decisions without interference from top officials at national level. Proponents of autonomy 
advance a number of freedoms such as, freedom over the control of financial and 
educational planning matters, control over staffing and teacher training and development, 
control over curriculum, and control over education planning (Dillon, 2011). However, the 
analysis of autonomy in this study is only confined to matters that directly pertain to the 
implementation of decentralisation at the district level and down to schools. In analysing 
autonomy, two principal actors have to be distinguished: central government which gives 
the mandate to decentralize, and the clients/parents who in this case, are the primary 
beneficiaries of the services provided. But if by this distinction autonomy is given, to what 
extent can Chongwe and Solwezi education boards be independent?  This question is 
important and certainly, food for thought for educational planners and policy makers. 
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5.2.5 Conceptualizing the term “Power” 
Considering its prominence in the research questions, power is a central concept in this 
study. Generally, many people seem to have an idea of what ‘power’ means. Dahl (1957), 
however, claims there is no statement in social sciences which guides how this concept can 
be rigorously applied  for a systematic study of a given social phenomena. Dahl added that 
as ancient the concept of power may be, “it is also ambiguous such that no theorists in 
history can boast of having coined an explicit definition” (p.201).  However, Max Weber   
[1864 –1920] is a major source of a traditional definition of power. Based on weber’s 
conception, power may simply be the possibility that an individual acting within a social 
relationship can exert his or her own will even against the resistance of others (Eisenstaedt, 
1968:xxv). If for example, DBOs accept the decision made by senior education planners at 
MoE headquarters in Lusaka as legitimate, on the basis that planners have “the right to 
decide”, then we have to look beyond power to consider that as authority. Thus, in Weber’s 
traditional sense, authority is defined as legitimate power.  
The concept of power in education features prominently particularly when talking about 
decentralization which has led to the diversification of ‘authority’ from national level to 
sub-national units (McGinn & Welsh, 1999; Lauglo, 1995; Rondinelli & Cheema, 1983). 
Understandably, education boards in Zambia have been granted powers to make decisions 
over financial and administrative matters at district and school levels, although indirect 
supervision and control from the top still exist (MoE, 1996). This is an indication that 
DEBs still do not possess full authority in the practical sense of it.  Since most of the 
decisions made are questionable from the top, one would argue that Chongwe and Solwezi 
DEBs do not have the legitimate power for controlling the administration of education at 
the local level. Therefore, the use “power” in this study is limited to DEBS’s managerial 
and administrative responsibilities including the control they are able to exert on key 
decision regarding the implementation of the decentralization policy. 
5.2.6 Conceptualizing  “Institutional Capacity” 
So much has already been talked about institutional capacity in the preceding chapter. 
However, just as accountability and local autonomy, institutional capacity is equally an 
integral component of the conceptual framework in this thesis.  Generally, there seems to 
be a discrepancy across SSA between efforts and resources committed towards the 
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implementation of educational decentralisation initiatives and the results yielded (De 
Grauwe & De Lugaz, 2010). Besides the commonly cited factors (thus poor accountability 
and lack of autonomy), critics also point to weak institutional capacity as one of the 
contributing factors for poor implementation (Naido, 2002).  As much as the financial and 
weak accountability mechanisms may be critical challenges in the Zambia sector, it is as 
well the institutional bottlenecks sounding the establishment education boards which 
compromise success. The question of how institutional capacity influences success or 
failure in the implementation of decentralisation, is an issue this study is trying to answer. 
But what in the first place is institutional capacity? 
Literature regarding a commonly known definition of institutional capacity is scant. 
However, one can distinguish between an institution in terms of the organisational 
structure and system (e.g. rules and regulations, frameworks, operational procedures) and 
its capacity in terms of the means (e.g financial and human resource needs etc.) required to 
achieving the intended organisational goals. Therefore, institutional capacity in this study 
is examined by focusing on formal organizational aspects within the institutional setup of 
Chongwe and Solwezi boards. Capacity being specifically seen as what these boards are 
able to do relative to the set educational decentralization policy objects.  
In rounding off this chapter, it should be empathised that in the same way the theoretical 
dimensions of this framework are interrelated, so are its conceptual elements connected to 
each other.  For instance, both participatory democracy and populist localism seem to rest 
on the assumption that people have the freedoms to decide on matters that affect their lives 
such as education. Of course, this is the ideal way of thinking but in reality each of these 
principles can deteriorate into something undesirable. Just as the case with policy and 
practice, autonomy may also be linked to institutional capacity. One can argue for instance, 
that without adequate institutional capacity, it can be hard for local units in a devolved 
education system to exercise their flexibility (autonomy) in planning and decision-making. 
The fact that Chongwe and Solwezi DEBs are faced with institutional challenges, might 
explain why MoE headquarters interferes in almost all issues under their jurisdiction. But 
this is an aspect this study attempts to explore in more detail in chapter eight.  
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Chapter 6:   The   Methodology 
          “The practice of social research does not exist in a bubble, hermetically sealed off 
from the social sciences and the various intellectual principles which their 
practitioners hold. Research designs and methods of social research are closely 
linked to different visions of how social reality should be examined. Methods are not 
neutral tools but are linked to ways in which social scientists envision the connection 
between different perspectives about the nature of social reality and how it should be 
studied. Thus, research data are collected in relation to the problem which can either 
be a burning social issue or, usually, a theory” (Bryman, 2008:4). 
6.1 General Overview 
Taking into account Bryman’s assertion and in addition to the nature of the research 
problem under investigation, this chapter presents the methods applied during fieldwork. It 
begins with a reflection on the theoretical foundation as well as the underlying assumptions 
of research methodology which entails the process of knowledge generation in social 
sciences. This sets the stage for the delineation of the research strategy applied and the 
rationale for the selection of the targeted population including an analysis the process of 
fieldwork itself. This is followed by a detailed explanation of the methods applied and the 
limitations for the study. The final section highlights the approach for ensuring data 
quality. 
6.1.1 Philosophical Perspectives 
Social scientists continue to engage in a philosophical debate about what constitutes 
knowledge and the methodology for generating facts. The methodology helps to know and 
understand reality better through application of scientific methods (Kvale & Brinkmann, 
2008). This debate is however, multifaceted. One can, for instance, look at controversies 
between explaining and understanding facts, and the differences between positivism and 
post-positivism or between rationalism and reflectivism. In the following sections, an 
attempt is made to zero-in on the debate between positivists and post-positivists. 
According to Chalmers (1999:1), “science is highly esteemed and theorists who believe 
that it is special, point to its methodological approach”. But what is special about science? 
What is about scientific methods that lead to reliable results? Underlying the idea of 
science is the notion of positivism, in which science is rooted in the empirical 
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epistemology
26
 (Chalmers, 1999). However, not all empiricists subscribe to this position 
since the validity of empirical data can still be maintained even without applying the ethos 
of positivism.  Epistemologically, the argument by positivists is that, “genuine knowledge 
is obtained through observation, adding that anything that cannot be experienced is not 
scientifically valid” (Bryman, 2008:14). Given the significance of their scientific tradition, 
positivists seem to misdirect themselves from dealing with ‘unobservable’ social realities 
which are nonetheless, important when it comes to constructing knowledge from the 
ontological perspective. 
Post positivists disagree with certain aspects of positivism in as far as the philosophy of 
science is concerned. They do so by accepting the importance of meanings, beliefs, 
emotions and feelings. As such, post positivists incline themselves to interpretivism which 
considers meanings, human beliefs, feelings and values as important factors in the study of 
a social phenomenon (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2008). This perspective can arguably, “play a 
crucial role in unearthing deep-seated meanings that exists beneath the surface appearance 
of empirical data, measurements or observed reality for that matter” (Chalmers, 1999:9). 
Since human emotions, perceptions and values are fundamentally not quantifiable, one can 
argue that they cannot be studied using the positivist approach which heavily relies of 
statistical data. 
Given that quantitative research methodology is associated with positivism in so far as it 
embraces natural science principles, one can argue that limiting social science research to 
positivism alone can result into incomplete understanding of social reality. According to 
Bryman (2008), this shortcoming can be avoided when other perspectives of 
methodological approaches such as qualitative, are taken in to account since by nature, 
social science is subject to variations on how methodology makes the best fit.  
By and large, one’s choice of a given research methodology purely depends on the context 
and research questions of the topic being investigated. Yet, different academic disciplines 
tend to be inclined to certain philosophical perspectives which in the final analysis, 
influence the choice of the methodology in general, and how data are collected in 
particular. With these limitations in mind, the qualitative methodology is applied in this 
                                                 
26
 As opposed to ontology which focuses on the what, how and why of social reality, epistemology is used to 
imply issues concerning the questions of what is or what should be regarded as acceptable knowledge in a given field of 
study such as Comparative and International Education (CIE). A central position to epistemology, a position which 
positivists subscribe to, is whether or not the social phenomena should be examined according to scientific ethos or 
methods.  
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study in order to collect data which best answers the research questions in the introductory 
chapter. 
6.1.2 Justification of the Methodology 
“Unlike the objects of nature, the layers of experience are not rigidly ordered, nor are 
its moving contents related according to mathematical patterns. Methods designed to 
study physical objects are not a good fit for study of human experiences. Therefore, 
data collection methods are specifically constructed to take account of particular 
characteristics of human experience and to facilitate the deeper investigation of the 
lived experiences within a particular context” (Polkinghorne, 2005:138).  
This study is rooted in the qualitative epistemological position which recognizes the 
significance of locating qualitative research within a particular social, cultural, and 
historical context.  However, a researcher needs to be cognisant of the limitations of this 
approach.  Clearly, qualitative researchers still encounter challenges in securing a common 
research orientation, a situation which makes the very essence of qualitative methodology 
problematic (Bryman, 2008). Since qualitative methodology puts emphasis on the process, 
it was necessarily to reflect on how the design for this study was influenced by the 
contextual factors in the field. It was equally important to reflect (during fieldwork) on the 
experiences regarding the implementation of the policy as well as on the explanations 
people constructed.   
The purpose of the study and research questions influenced the choice of methodology. 
Three qualitative data collection methods were employed namely: Semi-Structured 
Interviews (SSI), Focus Group Discussions (FGD), and analysis of official documents. As 
noted by Patton (2002), qualitative research methods facilitate the study of issues in depth 
and detail. Contrary to being constrained by predetermined categories of analysis as it is 
the case with quantitative methodology, “approaching fieldwork with a sense of flexibility, 
contributes to the depth, openness and detail of qualitative inquiry which are key aspects of 
data quality” (Patton, 2002:5).   
However, in selecting this approach it was necessary not to overstate or exaggerate the 
significance of qualitative methodology. This is why some scholars prefer to minimize the 
conflict between behavior and meaning in social research by applying mixed methods as a 
way of maximizing the strengths of both methodologies (qualitative vs. quantitative) while 
minimizing their weaknesses (Polkinghorne, 2005). Since the intention was to explore the 
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complex assumptions and experiences underlining the gap between policy and practice in 
the selected districts, qualitative approach was seen as appropriate. One of the reasons for 
choosing this approach is that it allows a researcher to see through the eyes of the people 
being studied’ within a limited setting of the large context (Bryman, 2008). 
6.1.3 Case Study Design: A Comparative Dimension 
Case studies’ remains an important approach of qualitative research methodology. But 
what is a case study? A case study can be defined as, “the detailed and intensive analysis of 
a single or multiple cases - which deals with the complexities and specific nature of a given 
case” (Bryman, 2008:52).  It can also be understood as a method for investigating a 
particular social phenomena within the context of its ‘lived-life’ (experienced) as 
contrasted with ‘unlived’ (un experienced) in which multiples techniques of gathering 
evidence are used (Yin, 1984). Critics nevertheless, argue that studying of a smaller 
number of cases hardly provides the basis for grounded reliability or generality of findings 
due to an individual’s exposure to biases. Nevertheless, case study approach can work 
provided a researcher engages in careful planning and systematic application of guiding 
principles in a real life setting. Indeed, case studies can illuminate on the investigation of 
the relationship between the subjects under study and their context (Bryman, 2008; Yin, 
1984). 
If one’s research topic demands to determine the uniqueness of two comparable cases as 
was the case in this study, then a two-pronged design in which each case has similar 
questions is necessary, so that it is possible to make comparison about the findings 
(Maxwell, 2005). Since DEBs are the focal point in the implementation process it was 
thus, logical to select at least two comparable cases; i.e. Chongwe and Solwezi. These 
districts were not just of interest in their own right. Ultimately, the aim was to provide 
comparable explanations pertaining to the realities on accountability, institutional capacity 
and autonomy – three key factors which impinge on implementation. The reason for 
adopting a comparative approach was to find out whether or not there were comparable 
differences and similarities in implementation and the extent to which these factors are 
attributed to that.  
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6.1.4 Practical Considerations  
What if we neglect the significance of practical issues in our resolve on how research 
should be conducted, or in our choice of the data collection methods? Researchers need to 
pay attention to these questions since social phenomena and research problems researchers 
often investigate are dynamic and complex (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). This dynamism 
demands awareness of social reality which changes with time depending on context. The 
way a research problem is envisaged at the design state can differ from way it is viewed 
during in the field (Bryman, 2008). Therefore, the researcher should accommodate 
flexibility with the design and the data collecting plan depending on the reality on the 
ground. 
Practical considerations
27
 can involve confronting and resolving a wide range of other 
factors right in the field or shortly before which therefore, influences the direction of the 
study. In this research, a number of competing demands were faced. For instance, the 
budget directly influenced the choice of the methods and consequently adjustments had to 
be made to ensure that data would be collected in a cost-effective way. For instance, time 
consuming methods such as observations were avoided in order to reduce the cost. 
6.2 Location & Rationale for the choice of the sites 
The need to situate qualitative research in a well-defined location is critical as it sets the 
boundary on the subject being studied. It has been stated that qualitative study should be 
carried out in a particular social setting where something actually happens (Maxwell, 
2005).  This study was carried out in Chongwe and Solwezi, which are two of Zambia’s 72 
districts. Although they are geographically different, the two districts are also similar as far 
as the scope of responsibilities and authority of education boards are concerned. Compared 
to Chongwe which is a rural district in Lusaka province, Solwezi is fairly urban. And 
besides, it serves as a provincial headquarters for North-western province which makes it 
an administrative epicenter for government activities in the province. In terms of 
geographical distance from the Lusaka, the capital city, Chongwe is the closest (45km) of 
the two while Solwezi (429.61km) is the furthest. 
                                                 
27
  Note: such considerations may entail factors such as timing for fieldwork, funding and accessibility to 
     respondents 
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Demographically, Chongwe district represents a sparsely distribution at 1.4% of the total 
national population with an annual growth rate estimated at 4.2%. Agriculture is the main 
economic activity with over 75% of household income derived from agricultural relates 
ventures. Solwezi district on the other hand, is densely populated with an estimation of 
205,797 people with more than 70% living in the rural outskirts of the district (MoE, 
2008). The population in Solwezi is expected to grow faster than in Chongwe due to great 
potential in mining which has stimulated economic activities—a situation which is likely to 
increase demand for public services such as health and education (MoE, 2008).  High 
incidences of diseases such as HIV/AIDS with its combined effects of poverty and its off-
shorts have had a negative impact on the implementation of the educational 
decentralization in both districts.  
 Figure 7: Map of Zambia showing Sites for the Study 
                                                     Why precisely these two districts? One important 
aspect of a qualitative case study design is the 
freedom enjoyed by the researcher in selecting easily 
accessible sites which best suits the budget and time 
schedule and of whose context one has an idea of 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 1994:243). Further, as a Quota 
student
28
 from Zambia, it was important to comply 
with the requirement that any international student 
under quota has to conduct his or her research in the 
country of origin. However, Chongwe and Solwezi 
districts were also chosen because it is at the district 
level where educational decentralization is being 
implemented from. Given the different distance of 
these districts from Lusaka, it was also interesting to 
assess, although it was not a key aspect of this study, 
whether proximity to the capital in any way 
influenced implementation of the policy. 
  
                                                 
28
 Quota is a financial support scholarship offered by the Norwegian Government to deserving international 
students from developing countries in Africa, Central and Eastern Europe including Central Asia. 
 
Solwezi DEBs 
Chongwe DEBs Capital City - Lusaka 
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6.2.1 The Process of Fieldwork 
Compared to scientific methodology where standardized research methods are applied, 
qualitative research tends to view social reality in terms of dynamic processes which 
cannot be investigated by a rigidly pre-determined approach. Patton (1990) argued: 
“Qualitative research designs need not to be viewed as completely specified in 
advance of fieldwork … since “qualitative design unfolds as fieldwork unfolds” 
(p.61). 
Since qualitative research is a process, one is expected to be very personally involved in 
every phase of the process due to the fact that each decision made has to be based on 
personal experience (Fink, 2000).  But depending on the research design, the process of 
fieldwork can be very complex and tedious. Besides, qualitative research has its own 
distinguishable stages, although researchers rarely follow its pre-determined progression. 
In this study, going back and forth from the design stage to the time of fieldwork was 
unavoidable. Thus, flexibility in implementing the data collection plan had to be secured 
which made it possible to make changes to the questions during fieldwork, whenever it 
was necessary. Therefore, the complexity of the process of fieldwork is centered on a given 
study design whose scope includes methodology and its interrelated steps (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 1994).  Such steps obviously, affect how one can plan and implement a particular 
research project.  Given the research questions, a decision was made to ensure that the 
study design was based as much as possible on qualitative interviews. This meant that 
choices had to be made on what types of interviews were to be applied (e.g. personal 
interviews) and how.   
6.2.2 The Targeted Population 
Even if one had the means, it is not worthwhile to collect data from every individual in a 
given location since valid findings can still be secured even from a sample of a given 
population (Fink, 2000).  However, this demands the application of appropriate sampling 
techniques such as convenient sampling which was used here. According to Bryman 
(2008), a convenient sample is one that is simply available to the researcher by virtue its 
accessibility. Although there are limitations regarding the generalization of findings, 
“convenient sampling does play a critical role in qualitative research. Its strength lies in 
providing for the selection of ‘information rich’ cases of interest for in-depth analysis” 
(Bryman, 2008: 183). Guided by the research questions, it was possible to figure out which 
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and how many respondents were to be interviewed from the targeted population.  This 
process helped in saving time, money and energy. Since the samples were drawn from 
three different respondent groups (national, district and schools), it was possible to 
triangulate certain responses on common questions which in the end improved the validity 
of the findings. 
6.2.2.1 National Level Informants 
Since the aim of this study was to analyse the gap between policy and practice in the 
implementation educational decentralization in Zambia, there was no way one was going 
overlook key informants at national level since that is where policies are formulated. In 
addition, policymakers are expected to know what is going on in the field.  Dealing with 
national level experts can pose challenges to the researcher since the interview session 
risks being dominated by the interviewee. However key informants according to Kvale and 
Brinkman (2008), remain a reliable source of rich data in qualitative research.  As a result, 
a cross- section of 10 key informs from MoE headquarters, Donor agencies, CSOs, and 
academicians from the University of Zambia were conveniently sampled although only 8 
were interviewed. 
6.2.2.2 District Level Informants 
According to the national education policy, education boards were established in order to 
implement educational decentralization activities (MoE, 1996). DBOs were the primary 
informants by virtue of the fact that they were the principle implementers of the policy. 
Since this study took a comparative dimension, Chongwe and Solwezi DEBs were 
considered as the main comparable ‘unit of analyses.   As the figure below shows, these 
boards are linked to other geographical units (national & school level) from which other 
potential respondents were drawn.  
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  Figure 8: Linkages between Different Levels of Informants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author (2011) 
 
Using Bray and Thomas’ model of ‘the cube’ as the basis for comparison of places, it is 
logical to perceive the geographical units as being distinct from each other. Yet, these units 
are not disjointed but rather “conceived as set of nested structures, each hermetically inside 
the next…mutually influencing and shaping each other as in dialectic of the global and 
local” (Bray, et.,al, 2007:370). This is the reason why the sampling framework did not just 
focus on the district but also on national and school levels.  Given the composition of the 
of the boards, a representative sample of approximately 10 (i.e. 66%) out of 15 board 
members was targeted in each district although it turned out that fewer then that were 
interviewed as certain members were not active in the boards, which may indicate low 
level participation  in matters of their respective boards. 
6.2.2.3 School Level Informants  
FGDs were held at the school level. A sample in the range of 6-8 (i.e. above 70%) PTA 
members were drawn to participate in the discussion.   This sample comprised the school 
head teacher, senior and junior teachers, pupil representative, parents and other members 
of the community. Through PTAs, parents have an opportunity to contribute not only 
through donations, but also by influencing decisions that affect the education of their 
children. The inclusion of PTA members in the sampling frame is therefore justifiable 
since they are much closer to the primary beneficiaries at the grass root level. Besides, they 
Study Site B: 
Solwezi DEBs 
Study Site A: 
Chongwe DEBs 
Informants at 
School/PTA level 
Key Informants at 
National level 
Central focus for comparison 
(Primary unit of analysis)  
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may be the best judge of whatever benefits educational decentralization could have yielded 
so far. 
 
In order to validate data from this level, two focus group discussions were conducted in 
each of the two districts bringing the total number to four.  Although these groups were 
held at the same level as per Bray and Thomas ‘cube model’ (Bray et., al, 2007:369), 
selected schools had distinct characteristics by virtue of being in different locations (urban 
vs. rural). This implied that informants from each school might have had different views on 
the impact of educational decentralization in general, or the effectiveness of education 
boards in particular.  Using the rural-urban criteria, Basic schools A (peri-urban) and Basic 
school B (rural) were selected in Chongwe. While in Solwezi district, Basic school C 
(urban) and Basic school D (rural) were selected. Note that this labeling was just for data 
identification purposes.   
6.2.3 Accessibility to Respondents 
There is a tendency in social science research to select samples from the targeted 
population without thorough assessment of whether or not the sample is easily accessible. 
Maybe not so much for an insider who may know the context well, but for a researcher not 
familiar with the setting, this can be a great challenge which can only be solved by making 
adjustments to the sample right there in the field. This can unfortunately consume the 
allocated time and resources.  Thus, gaining access to informants is always a matter of 
‘negotiating’ and ‘planning’ ahead of time, which turns out to be a political process in 
itself involving what Bryman (2008) referred to as “gatekeepers interested in the 
researchers’ motives” (p.131). 
The collection of rich data in qualitative research depends on gaining access to the 
potential respondents, who should be motivated to answers questions frankly. However, 
getting access to the right people can be challenging as it depends on a combination of 
factors such as location, time, and budget (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2008). Some people can 
also be more willing to participate in an interview, if the research topic is within the scope 
of their professional experience and interest. While in certain cases, the opposite may be 
the case.  
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With that in mind, I made sure that some of the key informants at national level were 
contacted on time. Where possible, appointments for interviews were secured way before 
leaving Oslo.  Some of the informants requested to have questions sent to them before 
hand which made certain interview sessions less time consuming. However, this initiative 
can lead to biased data since informants can cook up certain responses in order to cover up 
unfavourable impressions about the reality. Since qualitative interviewing is like 
“interpersonal conversations” this limitation can be minimized if the researcher is so 
engaging during the interview sessions (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994).  There are many ways 
of doing that but the easiest is ensuring that respondents are at ease so that they are able to 
give objective information based on their real experiences and true feelings on an issue. 
 
Through assistance, fieldwork was conducted for a period of six weeks from the beginning 
of September to mid-October, 2010. Although all appointments with national level 
informants were confirmed beforehand, a few setbacks were encountered pertaining to the 
interview schedule as some respondents were very busy, but flexible enough to reschedule 
the interview.  MoE officials in Lusaka were the first to be interviewed which made it 
possible to get a general picture about decentralization, and also to know whether there 
were other key stakeholder informants who might have been initially omitted. Besides, it 
was also important to get an introductory letter from headquarters, without which it would 
have been difficult to gain access to the respondents at the district and school level. Almost 
all interview sessions were held in the respondents’ offices. 
 
The interview schedule at national level was planned in such a way that time was set aside 
to reflect upon each interview session which improved the quality of subsequent sessions. 
Coupled with the fact that some sessions had to be rescheduled, it was possible to use that 
spare time to make appointments for interviews with DEOs in Chongwe and Solwezi 
districts, through which logistics for conducting FGDs were organized. Having been based 
in Lusaka, it was easier to conduct fieldwork in Chongwe first before travelling to Solwezi 
where the last two and half weeks were spent before returning to Oslo. Although gaining 
access to national level informants proved challenging, the level of cooperation with 
informants at district and at school level was impressive. But cooperation does not 
necessarily imply frankness. In all instances however, informants were guaranteed 
anonymity, which gave them an opportunity to air their views freely. 
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6.2.4 My Role as a Researcher 
My role as a researcher is an important aspect of the methodology applied. In qualitative 
research, the researcher is an instrument of data collection (Bryman, 2008). Nonetheless, 
this demands careful reflection in dealing with and reporting on potential sources of bias 
and error in order to produce qualitative data that is credible, trustworthy, authentic, and 
balanced concerning the phenomenon under study, but data which is also fair to the 
respondents (Hammersley & Alkinson 1995). But a question can be raised: if a researcher 
is an instrument of data collection, how then can objectivity be guaranteed, and how could 
this procedure fulfill the criteria of scientific research?  
 
In dealing with this valid question, it is critical to draw inspiration from the claim that, “it 
is dubious and naive to assume that a perfect criteria for data collection will ever 
emergebut until then, humility should be exercised in asserting that the ‘new’ and ‘truer’ 
passage (purely objective?) to scientific knowledge has been secured will be wise” 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985:331).  This did not only entailed being aware of my role as a 
researcher, but also of my presence as an insider, in the sense of being a Zambian carrying 
out research within my country. 
 
Being an insider-researcher has the potential to impair one’s objectivity; but if high levels 
of impartiality are exercised, a researcher can still gather rich qualitative data that is 
objective (Denzi & Lincoln, 1994). As opposed to being an outsider, I had an advantage of 
understanding the context, having worked in the sector before and having established good 
contacts with officials from different stakeholder organizations. The temptation of 
depending entirely on known informants was high, but this potential source of bias was 
dealt with by selecting districts and schools which I was not familiar with. Of the 8 
informants interviewed at national level, one was my former workmate. This person was 
selected because of her position and considerable experience in educational 
decentralization. Understandably, our relationship may have affected the interview session. 
Upon listening to the recorded conversation, I noticed that rather than providing her 
objective opinions, she merely portrayed her artificial aggressiveness as she might have 
regarded me as an insider. 
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6.2.5 Ethical Considerations 
Research that is likely to harm participants is often regarded by many people as 
unacceptable. Ethical considerations imply upholding good values while avoiding harm as 
much as possible. Harm can be prevented or reduced through the application of appropriate 
ethical principles. In qualitative studies, harm can vary depending on the nature and 
sensitivity of the research topic and quite often, tension is created between the purpose of 
the research to make conclusions or generalizations for the good of society and the rights 
of participants to maintain privacy (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). 
Compared to quantitative research where statistical tools are applied, the nature of ethical 
problems in qualitative research can be subtle because of heavy dependence on feelings, 
opinions, and experiences of human beings as the primary source of data.  Potential ethical 
conflict can arise depending on how one gains access to targeted informants and the impact 
the one may have on them.  Since confidentiality can be difficult to attain in qualitative 
research, certain ethics must be upheld by those who seek to use this design by for 
instance, honoring informed consent of informants while at the same time avoiding the 
invasion of privacy and deception (Bryman, 2008). 
The assumption that many informants were most likely going to accept to be recorded 
during the interview was not taken for granted.   This meant seeking their informed consent 
by explaining the purpose of the study and why it was important to solicit for their 
opinions. Because of the possession of the official documents from UiO and MoE 
headquarters indicating the purpose of the study, no resistance was encountered. In 
negotiating for trust and consent, informants were reminded that they had the right to either 
accept or refuse to participate in the study.  Due to the political sensitivity surrounding the 
implementation of the educational decentralization policy in Zambia, confidentiality and 
anonymity at all levels were upheld by not recording introductory remarks such as names 
and leaving out those comments that were off record or strictly personal.  
6.3 Data Collection Methods 
As earlier stated, the data collection methods used were semi-structured interviews, focus 
group discussions and review of policy documents. Below is a detailed account of how 
each method was applied. 
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6.3.1 Semi-Structured Interviews (SSI) 
The use of SSIs was based on Patton’s (2002) view that qualitative interviewing provides 
the researcher with an opportunity to assess the respondents’ perspectives of their 
experiences, thoughts, knowledge, expectations and in some cases perceived changes as a 
result of their involvement or influence on a given program
29
. Thus, SSIs provided the 
opportunity to probe further issues that needed clarification, but at the same time creating 
space for flexibility for myself and informants. Although an interview guide was used, 
informants had the freedom to respond in any way they were comfortable with. As much as 
possible, SSIs of this kind demand substantial freedom on the part of respondents so that 
they are able to express themselves freely (Bryman, 2008:438). Besides the flexibility to 
ask questions about issues raised by informants, questions were adjusted depending on the 
respondent’s knowledge and experience with the educational decentralization policy in 
Zambia. As much as possible, interview questions were open-ended, simple and direct, 
which ensured clarity. Three separate sets of interview questions were used to elicit views 
and experiences that were appropriate for the different respondent categories. Yet, some of 
the questions were cross-cutting based on the perception that certain views and experiences 
had implications across common issues.  
Interviewing in qualitative research is not to be manipulative and neither should it be 
instrumental dialogue. Rather, a well conducted research interview should foster positive 
experience between the researcher and respondent because it is a rare experience that is 
enriching (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Since face to face interviews were conducted, 
questions did not only solicit the respondents views and feelings, but also sought to 
established a positive experience which gave room to interpret respondent expressions and 
words that were connected to non-observable meanings. A positive experience was 
manifested in many ways. For instance, some respondents continued with the conversation 
beyond the limited time, possibly because the interview gave them an opportunity to 
explore insights about their experiences and views which otherwise they would not have 
expressed.  
                                                 
29
 See also page 341 of Patton 2002. Note: Qualitative researchers interview people to find out from them those 
things they cannot directly observe. This is based on the fact that no individual can observe everything. Indeed, no 
individual can observe feelings, thoughts, knowledge and intentions. Similarly, no individual can observe people’s 
behavior about things that happened way back in the past….. “To the contrary, people can be asked questions about those 
things. 
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With the help of the research assistant, key points were jotted down during the interview 
process and all interviews sessions were recorded through the Olympus Digital Voice 
Recorder
30
, which minimized the degree of distraction on my part. At the end of each 
interview session, an interview audit was conducted to see if key points that came out 
during the interview session were effectively recorded. All in all, this procedure yielded a 
variety of perspectives ranging from dissatisfaction to contentment on issues of the 
educational decentralization policy and practice.   
6.3.2 Focus Group Discussion (FGD) 
Two FGDs were conducted in each of the two districts.   These groups were composed of 
six to nine members of the PTA
31
.  As mentioned earlier, one PTA group was selected 
within the center of the district, while another in the rural outskirt. 
 
Different factors influence the application of FGDs in qualitative research, and that is why 
the use of this data collection procedure tends to vary across different settings. There is no 
rule as to what number should constitute a focus group. Generally, “a group of this nature 
should comprise about 6 to 10 individuals sharing common background” (Patton, 
2002:385). The strength of this technique lies in its diversity of perspectives created 
through participants’ interaction. Beyond that, participants can provide checks and 
balances on each other which weeds out erroneous and extreme views (Krueger & Casey, 
2000). Despite these advantages, there are limitations as well. For instance, it was learned 
in this study that although consensus is not the ultimate objective, it is difficult to attain it 
in a FGD. Once certain participants feel that their views are inferior or parallel to those of 
the majority, they may be inclined to withdraw in order to avoid negative reaction from 
other opponents. Drawing from human tendencies as ‘social animals’, FGDs can be 
enjoyable. This is due to the group effects of the real world given that, “a social actor does 
not exist in a vacuum, but with other people in society” (Patton, 2002:386).  For this 
                                                 
30
 Olympus Digital Recorder is a device commonly used to record speech so that it can be played back later or typed into 
print. The device provides superior sound, convenient file management and longer recording time with many models 
having the ability to quickly transfer audio files to a computer via USB, PC connection or removable media. 
31 PTA (Parent Teacher Association) is a formal structure at basic school level compromising of teachers, parents and 
members of various community based organizations working in that particular community.  Quite often, this body is 
chaired by either the head teacher of the basic school or any renowned individual versed with issues of education. Thus, 
the chair and vice are quire influential in administering the operation of the PTA and the school. 
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reason, participants were comfortable not only to discuss the questions asked, but also 
went as far as challenging each other. 
 
Conducting FGDs demands considerable group process and interpersonal skills.  Hence it 
was important to moderate group discussions so that no participant dominated the 
discussion to the extent that others felt they had nothing to say. By adopting a “non-
directional style”, a variety of perceptions and viewpoints from all participants were 
encouraged.  Further, a wide range of questions were discussed with a view to assess 
whether the views of national and district level respondents were different from those of 
the PTA members as far as the implementation of decentralization was concerned. Despite 
a few challenges encountered, this procedure seemed useful and cost-effective. It also gave 
an opportunity to check and siphon-out extreme or invalid claims. For instance, some 
informants seemed dominated by others in the group discussion. When I approached them 
separately afterwards, they expressed themselves more freely and pointed to issues which 
they had not talked about during the discussion. 
6.3.3 Analysis of Official Documents 
Documentary analysis is one of the most frequently used procedures for collecting both 
primary and secondary data in qualitative research
32
. Understandably, government 
ministries are a reliable source for both primary and secondary data usually kept in written 
form  (narrative & statistics) or other recorded materials which may be at the disposal of 
any researcher (Bryman, 2008).  In order to understand the historical background 
underlying the formulation of the educational decentralization policy in Zambia, key policy 
documents such as the national decentralization policy of 2002, the 2008 Operational 
Manual on Governance in Education Boards and a wide range of MoE sector policy 
documents were examined.  As much as this method might be cheaper than conducting 
interviews, it also costs money in terms of photocopying documents. Besides, one has to 
seek authority to access certain documents which can be time consuming. However, 
various documents from the MoE and its cooperating partners were accessed either as 
online copies or in hard copy form. 
                                                 
32
   Primary data is that which is obtained from original or official documents which in my case were 
government policy documents and reports on educational decentralization policy from MoE. Secondary data 
on the other hand, refer to that which is collected from materials such as books, research articles in journals, 
newspapers, pamphlets but do not necessarily need to have a direct link to the study at hand. 
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6.4 Major Limitations 
There are no such things as perfect research designs, but instead there are always trade-offs 
(Patton, 1990).  Therefore, the following sections present some of the constraints which 
were encountered based on the usage of the selected methods.  
6.4.1 Time Constraints 
Time was one of the major limiting factors in this study. Given the scope of the research 
topic, five weeks was too short to be able to interview all the targeted respondents, let 
alone pre-test my data collection tools.  There were also time constraints in terms of 
meeting some respondents, as they were presumably too busy to fit into my tight schedule. 
Had I not taken advantage of my professional network and the internet in accessing the 
main government policy documents beforehand, and also making prior appointments with 
key informants, I would have ended up having to extend the fieldwork period.  This would 
have negatively affected my already limited budget. 
6.4.2 Ethical Constraints 
During my second focus group discussion, one of the participants who joined the 
discussion shortly after it had already started, asked…  
          “What is that ‘small’ microphone on the table for? I hope you are not trying to 
record what we are going to say here. Some of us fear being quoted in people’s 
reports.”33  
In response, anonymity was guaranteed by re-stating that the study was for academic 
purposes adding that no one was going to mention who said what and why. This question 
drew attention to the fact that dealing with politically sensitive research topics can 
sometimes render unavoidable challenges which the researcher has to fix.  It might have 
been taken for granted that discussants would be open and not necessarily be on their 
guard, which turned out to be true.  Therefore, depending on how one handles ethical 
issues in research, there can be implications for participants who have to decide what 
information to divulge or withhold.  Since interviewee’s voices are the data in qualitative 
research, the challenge for the researcher is to maintain ethical standards while sustaining 
the integrity towards the production of quality research (Kanukisya, 2008). 
                                                 
33
 PTA#4/09/10/Edu/dec 
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6.4.3 Power Asymmetry 
When the researcher is not sensitive to “power relations” between and among informants, 
limitations in accessing information can arise because of participants exposing their 
dominance or inferior status in relation to others. According to Kvale and Brinkmann 
(2009), “such tendencies emerge during group interviews because of deep-rooted societal 
and cultural values which delineate participants’ power relations on the basis of status, 
position held, gender, ethnicity or indeed level of education” (p.33).  
 
Although all four focus groups were fairly balanced in terms of gender and 
representation
34
, power imbalances among discussants rendered them not as fruitful as they 
would have been under the ideal circumstances. For instance, some PTA members 
demonstrated their inferior status by simply agreeing with whatever the Chairperson or 
other superior PTA members said, although it was clear that they would give a different 
view under certain circumstances. When group discussions like these go without 
participants openly challenging each other, the researcher loses out on the opportunity of 
obtaining realistic accounts of what people think or feel about certain issues (Bryman, 
2008:475). In short, power asymmetry is a serious limitation in qualitative studies with 
epistemological implications about the knowledge produced. 
6.5 Data Quality Strategy 
A common practice in qualitative research is heavy reliance on humans as instruments of 
data since researchers heavily influence all aspects of the research process. Therefore 
questions can be asked: can qualitative researchers be relied upon?  And how can quality 
be secured for that matter? However, this heavy reliance on human subjects by qualitative 
researchers can also be seen as a strength that leads to unearthing the existing truth. But 
still, others argue that “there is no way of establishing the truth of scientific nature in 
qualitative studies since qualitative research merely prompts thoughts which are relatively 
attached to the truth” (Merrick, 1999:25).  Given the debate, how then can one ensure “data 
quality” in qualitative research? It is hardly surprising that considerable effort has been 
devoted towards developing a criteria and guidelines for promoting quality research. Data 
                                                 
34
 On average, the gender proportion across all groups was around 40:60, with  male respondents having been the 
    Majority in all cases. 
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quality is an aspect constructed during fieldwork and must be maintained throughout the 
entire process of data analysis and discussion of findings. Without that, one can have 
problems in drawing solid interpretations and conclusions from the views of informants. 
The following sections therefore demonstrate how data quality was promoted based on the 
principles of validity and reliability, which are increasingly becoming common in case 
study designs. 
6.5.1 Constructing Validity   
The debate on what valid knowledge is, raises a philosophical question of what the truth is. 
Kvale & Brinkmann (2009) argued that the truth can be discerned based on a number of 
principles such as coherence and pragmatic utility of knowledge, which are not 
exclusively detached from each other. Nevertheless, validity is not just an issue of 
choosing among the competing criteria of ensuring data quality. Rather, “it also involves 
falsifying certain interpretations based on the examination of provisions and arguments of 
relative credibility” (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009:247).  
The principle of validity features more prominently in the positivist than in the subjectivist 
tradition and this is why its usage in qualitative research needs to be reconstructed 
(Golafshani, 2003). Failure to do so makes it difficult for qualitative researchers to 
convince others or indeed themselves that their own research findings can be trusted. But 
what sort of arguments can be mounted or what criteria can be invoked on this issue in 
order to persuade the audience?  Explicitly, validity has got to do with “testing of 
hypotheses and the extent to which the research ‘measures’ that which it set out to or the 
degree of truth contained in the findings” (Golafshani, 2003:599). But given the 
inadequacies that come with applying validity in qualitative research, qualitative 
researchers apply other terms such as credibility, triangulation, transferability and 
trustworthiness which serve as a criterion for ensuring validity. 
The use of different techniques of data collection gives an opportunity to triangulate 
different pieces of information, which implies reconstructing validity. Since there is no 
exclusive reliance on one method, it means that biases which pertained, for example, to 
SSIs were minimized by the data gathered through FGD, as well as the use of official 
policy documents and reports. The strength of triangulation in this study lies in the 
coherent contradictions and also on common sentiments by subjects interviewed.  
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Essentially, it is contradictory responses themselves which highlight the beauty of 
employing a variety of methods to ensure consistency and coherence of the data collected 
(Bryman, 2008; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). 
Another argument for validity is that of “investigator triangular”.  It has been claimed that 
using multiple investigators minimizes potential biases in collecting, reporting, and data 
analysis which contribute to internal validity (Kimchi et al., 1991). On the other hand, 
where there is more than one investigator, the degree of honesty and transparency is higher 
which increases the credibility of the findings (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The opportunity to 
work with an experienced assistant therefore enhanced the credibility of the data since it 
was possible to cross-check the notes as well as to figure out what they meant. 
Validity (internal) can also be increased, when key informants are given an opportunity to 
review the researcher’s transcribed data files or comment on the report findings (Bryman, 
2008; Kirk & Miller, 1986). Where this technique is used, the researcher benefits from 
having his or her reported statements scrutinized in order to assess the degree of accuracy 
and correctness.  Although time constraints made it difficult send all transcribed interview 
notes to respective key informants in Lusaka, at least four informants were contacted via 
email. Their feedback on the notes was critical as they corrected editing errors and other 
erroneous statements which they felt were not accurately captured. Fortunately, some even 
went as far as adding useful information which they had omitted during the interview or 
which they noticed I had deleted based on my assumption that their views were too 
extreme and not objective. All in all, this initiative contributed towards constructing the 
internal validity and credibility of the data collected. 
6.5.2 Constructing Reliability 
The criteria of reliability in qualitative research is often interchangeably used to denote the 
dependability of one‘s research findings.  One question begs an answer here: how 
consistent or trustworthy are your research findings?  On the surface, this question seems 
easy, but underneath it points to the difficulty of maintaining reliability in qualitative 
studies since human behavior changes with time and circumstances. This raises the 
question of whether or not respondents can maintain the same responses on similar 
research questions if asked at different times by different researchers (Kvale & Brinkmann, 
2009). As qualitative researchers, we cannot totally dismiss the criteria of reliability in our 
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work on the pretext that it would be more of a concern to those analyzing statistical data. 
By ignoring the issue of reliability, one is merely entertaining haphazard subjectivity 
which leads not only to questionable findings, but also to unreliable and unscientific 
conclusions.  
There are many techniques for increasing reliability. But a common practice among 
qualitative researchers is the compilation of materials used such as field notes, official 
documents and other narratives of the data collection and analysis procedure (Kirk & 
Miller, 1986). In cases where the same design and procedure of data collection have been 
consistently re-applied elsewhere, chances are that similar conclusions can be arrived at. 
This, however, is mainly the tradition of those who employ statistical tools of data 
collection and analysis. Materials used in this study are comprised of interview guides, 
field notes jotted down during interviews, education policy documents and other relevant 
reports, narratives of transcribed interviews and one digitally recorded FGD video 
including a copy of the Zambian Education Act of 2011. To some extent, the compilation 
of all these materials reflect how the criterion of reliability was adhered to in this study. 
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Chapter 7:  Data Processing and Presentation  
Building on the discussion from the methodology, this Chapter presents a synthesis of how 
raw data from taped interviews, FGD and analysis policy documents were organized and 
processed into ‘thematic narratives’, which later served as the basis for data analysis and 
discussion of findings. This procedure was undertaken in order to take stock of how the 
conclusions were finally drawn. The process of data analysis and discussion of findings 
ought to be seen as an integral part of the research design beginning from data collection 
itself to the analysis. Therefore, this is already an analytical endeavor which can simply be 
described as “writing theoretical memos”35. 
This chapter is divided into five parts. The first three parts provide theoretical and practical 
details about how transcribing, data organization and coding were conducted before finally 
winding it up. The last two deal with the identification of themes and data presentation 
through the use of the mind map.   
7.1 Data Processing Procedure 
Although qualitative research design offers researchers the flexibility in data collection, 
there is no quick fix approach in data collection. Experience suggests that qualitative data 
collection techniques often degenerate into a messy business due to a mass of words 
gathered which need to be described and summarized accordingly.  In the same way, 
statistical packages such as Stata, SAS, and SPSS are not an end in themselves. There are 
many ways of analyzing qualitative data, but whichever one applies, raw qualitative data   
must be systematically processed in a particular way. Due to the subjective and interpretive 
nature of qualitative research, researchers tend to favour a certain way of processing data 
although one can never be aloof from the process (Pope & May, 2000).   In fact, by 
undertaking this processing, one is already involved in it. Nevertheless, there are certain 
universal steps for processing qualitative data. The main ones are transcribing, data 
organization and coding, identifying themes and data presentation. 
 
                                                 
35
   See Pidgeon and Henwood’s Chapter on Grounded Theory, in Handbook of Data Analysis edited by Bryman, Alan et 
al Chapter 28, pp.625-648. 
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7.2 Transcribing Interviews 
Generally speaking, the use of qualitative methods involves transcribing raw data, which 
involves listening to recorded interviews and converting them into text.  By neglecting 
issues of transcription, “the researcher’s road to hell becomes paved with transcripts […] 
but once these have been made, they tend to be the solid rock-bottom empirical data of an 
interview project” (Bernard & Ryan, 2010:177). Arguably, one of the most laborious and 
daunting phases of this study was transcribing recorded interview conversations.  The fact 
that there were 22 hours of recorded interviews along with the fact that I am not a very 
skilled typist, made transcribing extremely intimidating. Bernard and Ryan (2010) were 
spot on when they pointed out that; 
“If you have 40 hours of recorded interviews, plan on working 8 hours a day, every 
day for 30 days to convert them into text files. But the real time may be several 
months [.....] And if you have 100 hours of recorded interviews…… you can 
imagine the problem” (p.49). 
Transcribing interviews helped me to become familiar with the data through review of the 
field notes and also listening to the recorded interviews many times before finally writing 
up the notes.  This was an enriching process which took me almost two and half months.  
The challenge was the demand of striving for objectivity while at the same time 
maintaining the authenticity of the data.  Lacey and Luff (2001) argued that having a 
summary of recorded interview notes alone is not sufficient, unless conversations (words) 
are transcribed verbatim, without which a researcher is likely to bias the transcription by 
only including those statements that seem relevant or interesting to him or her.  
In certain instances what respondents say and what they communicate through their body 
language and laughter are two totally different things. Therefore, when faced with these 
mixed signals, the interviewer (listener) has to decide whether or not to believe in those 
contradictory verbal or nonverbal messages. Given the significance of non-verbal cues 
which characterize the recorded interviews, wherever possible, signals like “well….er…..I 
suppose”, which many respondents unconsciously made, were jotted down considering 
that there was a message behind them.  
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7.3 Data Organization 
Considering that transcribing is a means and not an end itself, qualitative data needs to be 
organized so that it is easily accessible when coding. Presentation and analysis begin at a 
later stage. This procedure, however, varies considerably among qualitative researchers 
depending on the scope and nature of the data collected and the practical considerations at 
play. Although advancements in information technology have made it much easier to 
organise and analyse qualitative data using software packages such as CAQDAS, many 
researchers still apply the traditional way of working with qualitative data. This is due to 
potential risks associated with such tools replacing the human capacity to organize and 
think through the data themselves (Baugh et al., 2010).  
Data collected at different levels (national, district, school) were systematically organized 
and coded in such a way that each transcribed interview file was given a number and date 
for identification purposes. Given the importance of  linking ‘pseudonyms’ and code 
numbers to actual respondents, a confidential file was created having resolved not to 
disclose at any given point which informant said what during interviews.  This file had to 
be kept secure but earmarked for deleting upon the official approval of the thesis.  Bryman 
(2008) puts emphasis on the principle of protecting the anonymity of participants, which 
implies that confidentiality must be safeguarded in all instances of research 
communication, i.e. electronically, verbally or written. This also includes maintaining the 
anonymity of informants, and time and location where an individual was being 
interviewed.  In line with Bryman’s assertion, names and other suggestive materials 
leading to the identification of informants were removed from the transcripts. This, 
however, resulted in the challenge of having to stressfully figure out the context of each 
file at the point of coding. 
Often times, qualitative researchers face difficulties with locating texts to their original 
research context. Since no computer software package was applied in this study, a choice 
regarding the unit of analysis had to be made. This meant inductively deciding whether to 
number each word, line, sentence or paragraph.  In the end, narrative data from respective 
transcribed files were numbered using key phrases and/or paragraphs.  By so doing, each 
unit of text which was to be used during data presentation and analysis was easily traceable 
to their original context.  However, there was an added cost in terms of purchasing extra 
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electric gadgets for safe keeping of processed files. In the end, this procedure proved useful 
in terms of avoiding the loss of data.  
7.4 Data Coding Process 
Why coding in the first place? Qualitative research generates extensive interview data 
(texts) which, although appealing to look at, do not necessarily help the researcher to 
understand the phenomena or context under scrutiny and how informants view it, unless 
such data are systematically analysed to illuminate the prevailing reality (Basit, 2003).  
Coding is helpful because without it, it is difficult for a researcher to condense qualitative 
data into meaningful structures or segments which makes the analysis and interpretation 
not only doable, but worthwhile. There are many ways of coding qualitative data. This 
makes it possible for one to use whichever is suitable or a combination.  
Although the use of computer software packages is on the increase, many researchers still 
rely on the traditional ways of coding. This involves subdividing data and assigning 
categories in form of tags or labels so as to assign units of meaning for the descriptive data 
collected during fieldwork (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). In this study, the rationale for 
coding was to identify relevant phenomena, to gather narrative illustrations about those 
phenomena, and to examine them to see similarities and differences as well as contextual 
patterns.   
A combination of two coding techniques was applied to this study.  To begin with, coding 
was done by ‘cutting and pasting’ transcribed data into preliminary defined themes and 
categories. Given  the secured back-up files, cutting and pasting (sorting) literally involved 
cutting off only those key phrases or expressions (quotes) regarded by Linoln and Guba 
(1985) as “exemplars” and then pasting them onto a new file which was comprised of 
respective codes and themes for particular units of analysis. Colour coding was also 
applied by highlighting, and in some cases underlining, the overarching themes. Note that 
the transcribed data were suitable for relatively straight forward and pragmatic analyses as 
guided by the principles of narrative analysis and grounded theory
36
 (Bernard & Ryan, 
2010). Hence, it was possible to highlight as many codes as possible.  
                                                 
36
  See PP. 247-265 as originally cited from in Glaser & Strauss (1967). 
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But like any other research procedure, coding of this kind is not without its own obstacles. 
The challenge was encountered in instances where a particular junk of text or phrases were 
coded using more than one colour, which was confusing.  The good thing is that there was 
no need of cutting and pasting (re-sorting) the text units since they still remained within the 
same ‘unit text-context’ which worked out advantageously. Based on this experience, it 
was learned that coding is as critical as any aspect of data collection or analysis because it 
made it possible to construct the hierarchical order of conceptual themes, which were 
suitable for data analysis and discussion of finding. 
7.5 Identification of Themes 
“…but unless themes are discovered in the first place, no data analysis can take 
place”  (Bernard & Ryan; 2010:71) 
It is indeed difficult to go very far with data presentation and analysis if the emerging 
issues from the transcribed and coded data are not well categorized into theoretical themes 
(Lacey & Luff, 2001).  In a qualitative case study, such as this, where raw data was 
collected using interviews, the processes described above tend to culminate into a number 
of theoretical ideas – thus the basis on which themes or concepts emerge.  
The fact that there were pre-determined concepts (refer to Section 5.2 of Chapter 5) in line 
with the research questions (see chapter 1), did not in itself negate the process of 
exhaustively exploring the data to search for new themes.  In fact, what is the point of 
collecting data if one does not intend to identity as many themes as possible until the point 
of saturation - where no more new themes emerge? By applying what Bernard and Ryan 
referred to as the “versatile technique of cutting and sorting important phrases”37, coded 
expressions were re-arranged both under main themes and sub-themes, which laid the 
foundation for presentation or displaying of the data 
It has been argued that “no single set of categories (themes) are waiting to be easily 
discovered out there (Dey, 1993:110).  But then again, how would it be possible for anyone 
to be convinced that the themes identified in this study were valid?  In dealing with these 
issues, two things come to the fore. In the first instance, the process of searching for 
repetitions, similarities and differences, transitions and linguistic connectors or metaphors 
that occurred frequently in the texts was critical in the identification of key themes, but 
                                                 
37
 Refer to pages 71-75 from Bernard & Ryan’s (2010) Book on “Analyzing Qualitative Data”. 
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above all helped to secure validity and reliability of the data. It was, for instance, 
interesting to note that certain verbal expressions by respondents at DEBs level were 
similar to those expressed by informants at school and national level. To some extent the 
validation of transcribed texts within and across themes was fostered.  Given on the one 
hand, that I took both the narrative analysis and ‘grounded theory’ approaches38, it became 
critical on the other, to ensure that all the emerging themes were generated from the 
transcribed data themselves. These themes, as mentioned earlier, were incorporated with 
the pre-determined theoretical ideas and concepts which were discussed in the literature 
review and theoretical framework. 
7.6 Data Presentation and Display 
If there is a point where one would feel almost stranded with qualitative data, it is at the 
stage of data presentation. The task of putting different pieces of data together is such a 
mammoth. Without total commitment and encouragement, completion of the project can 
take longer than expected. Unlike statistical analysis, there are regrettably few analytical 
tools available to facilitate this process in qualitative research. Rather, much depends on 
the researcher’s own style of rigorous empirical thinking, along with creative presentation 
of evidence and careful consideration of alternative interpretations (Yin, 1984; Bryman, 
2008).   
Being a novice, I enjoyed the flexibility of having to tease out different data presentation 
recipes hoping to find a suitable tool for producing sound analytical results.  In the end, the 
decision to apply the technique of “mind maps”39 coined by Tony Bussan in his book 
entitled “The Mind Map Book” of 1995, turned out worthwhile.  Mind maps, it has been 
argued, are one of the versatile analytical tools for semantic presentation of research 
findings - which entail the graphic presentation of ‘data branches’ between main concepts 
and ideas which are related to the central theme (Jonassen et al. 1993).  In fact,  
                                                 
38
 Ibid, PP. 247-270 
39
  In the same way concept mapping techniques such as conceptual maps, visual metaphors and causal loop 
diagrams (Eppler, 2006; Millen, 1997), are used as complementary tools for knowledge generation and 
sharing in social sciences, Tony Bussan’s mind maps are a potential analytical tool which can be applied 
extensively in qualitative research. Being a powerful analytical tool, mind maps unlock  a researcher’s   mind 
in the sense that they among other things help to “crystalise research data” of a given social phenomena by 
radiating those key theme/data categories of the main subject from the central theme in form of branches 
thereby making it easy to visualize, analyse and interpret qualitative research data. For more information, 
refer to the 2006 online article by Martin Eppler, which can be accessed on www.palgrave-journals.com/ivs.  
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“It is in those shimmering and incessant embraces that the infinite patterns, the 
infinite Maps of the Mind, are created, nurtured and grown. Radiant Thinking 
reflects your internal structure and processes. The Mind Map (Concept Map) is your 
external mirror of your own radiant thinking and allows you to access this vast 
thinking powerhouse . . .”40 (Buzan, 1993). 
If used effectively, mind maps can aid researchers in presenting data in a much more 
summarized way thereby making data analysis easier. However, the process of data 
presentation is not in isolation from what the researcher already knows or thinks about the 
research topic. It seems, therefore, that what a researcher “knows” about a given research 
theme is merely brain (mind) memory, meaning that when one comes across a new concept 
during data collection,  the understanding of that concept may have a bearing on other 
memories already in one’s mind. Arguably, how memories are interlinked in an individual 
mind is that individual’s scope of knowledge (Jonassen et al., 1993).  Nevertheless, 
semantic presentation approaches such as mind maps, are critical in relaying a researcher’s 
scope of knowledge on a given research theme to the wider audience. 
Guided by the principles of mind maps, data was graphically presented in a such a way that 
the main ‘research theme’ was placed at the center of the map and connected around it 
were ‘main concepts’(or data categories) which, through the use of lines, linked to 
fragmented data ideas. Differentiating these lines or branches by colours showed the 
relationship between the main categories and specific ideas of data from the field.  The 
process of making those ‘branches of ideas’ entailed fragmenting the data which de-
contextualised the different data sets that were indicative of informants’ experiences and 
views. At the expense of losing the original meaning, the objective of this technique was to 
present data in a way that made the research data comprehensible. 
Real research is never entirely inductive or entirely deductive. Hence in most qualitative 
research designs, “a mix of inductive and deductive approach is applied” (Bernard & Ryan, 
2010: 265). In this study, different branches of data were crystalised around each 
concept/category which in itself meant an inductive-deductive process. At this point, it was 
possible to delineate the wider branches (i.e. accountability, institutional capacity and local 
autonomy) from “educational decentralization”, which was the central theme under 
investigation. In their controversial debate, Glaser and Strauss (1967), referred to these 
                                                 
40
  Cited from a journal article by Ray McAleese (1998:251): The Knowledge Arena as an Extension to the 
Concept Map: Reflection in Action, Interactive Learning Environments, 6:3, and 251-272. Article can be 
accessed online  from  http://dx.doi.org/10.1076/iee.6.3.251.3602 
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‘wider branches’ as phenomena/context, in that they broadly emerge from concepts and 
data categories.  In this study, these phenomenon were seen as thicker branches (concepts) 
to which thinner ones (data categories) were linked.  
The use of case study designs is often characterised by a high degree of internal cohesion 
of data categories (Bernard & Ryan, 2010; Yin, 2009). Hence it was practical to find 
certain branches of data around more than one main (concept) branch. In the final analysis, 
this resulted in unique data patterns inductively put together, leaving those new branches of 
data integrated in their original form, thereby ending up with a broader map. The map 
below does not explicitly delineate the relationship between these branches and data 
categories – an aspect to be dealt with in the analysis and discussion chapter. What is clear 
is that certain data branches repeatedly emerge (marked with the symbol +) because of 
their tendency to behave in a more “coherent” way. The reason being that organization of 
data, coding, including the process of making themes, was inductively induced adding that 
the theme “educational decentralization” at the center constituted branches which extended 
across all the key concepts of the map.  
Presenting data in this way provides an explicit framework for certain data branches 
(categories) to emerge separately from grouped ones, which in a way challenge the 
rationale for the use of mind maps. Yet, going by other sources of literature regarding the 
design of such maps, the dichotomy between grouped data categories and those that stand 
alone within the map appear less important (Wheeldon & Faubert, 2009). 
The figure below is therefore a ‘mind map’ in which “educational decentralization” is the 
‘central image’ representing the research topic. Connected to it are its thicker ‘organic 
branches’, i.e. accountability, institutional capacity and local autonomy radiating from the 
center of the research topic distinguished by different colours, ending up with thinner 
branches of data containing detailed information. By and large, the generic presentation of 
the data in this figure below implicitly denotes the raw data from the field representing 
respondents’ views, experiences and opinions regarding educational decentralization in 
general and how institutional capacity, accountability and local autonomy in particular 
affect implementation of the policy in Chongwe and Solwezi districts.  
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Figure 9: A Mind Map Presentation of Summarised Data 
 
 
Source: Author (2011) 
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Chapter 8:  Data Analysis and Findings 
Following the presentation of how data was organized and displayed, effort will now be 
devoted towards data analysis and discussion of key findings.  The presentation unfolds 
with the analysis of the data themselves. Guided by the three themes of the study (i.e. 
institutional capacity, accountability and local autonomy), data analysis goes into detail by 
examining the findings under each sub theme in relation to research questions in chapter 
one.  The chapter ends with the discussion of the findings. The objective here is to try and 
interpret what the findings mean, not only in the narrow sense of answering the research 
questions, but also their implications on the wider assumptions about educational 
decentralization. 
8.1 Institutional Capacity 
The Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) is fully committed towards achieving 
the Education for All Goals. Hence, educational decentralization under MoE is seen as a 
vehicle through which access to and quality of education could be improved. Most critical 
was the need to accelerate access to basic education, given the huge backlog in enrolment 
since the early 1990s. Notwithstanding the limitations in institutional capacity, District 
Education Boards (DEBs) were established in order to implement the policy. In addressing 
this challenge, GRZ made attempts towards enhancing DEBs’s capacity by addressing 
problems pertaining to planning and financial management, including personnel and 
infrastructural related needs (MoE, 2003). Considering insufficient support to the DEBs as 
well as low levels of desirable results so far, how then do we make sense of ‘institutional 
capacity’ in as far as effective implementation of educational decentralization is 
concerned? Below, the theme of institutional capacity and findings pertaining to it are 
analysed under the three sub themes: organizational support, organizational realignment 
and capacity to implement.  
8.1.1 Organizational Support 
Questions pertaining to this sub-theme reviewed a number of issues regarding the 
operations of education boards, not only as discussed at national level, but also as debated 
at the district and school levels. Respondents generally reported that the question of 
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organizational support to education boards was one of the leading concerns at the local 
level. Concerns of personnel capabilities, structural and operations guidelines in particular, 
have increased since implementation commenced.  Over 70% of the 23 respondents at 
national and district level described coordination and information transfer as peripheral 
concerns which nonetheless need attention. The basis of their claims was that since the 
adoption of the policy in 2000, the MoE had put in place a number of policy measures 
aimed at addressing organizational related challenges, but there has been no political will 
to adequately implement these. Three respondents said the following: 
    Respondent (nat. level): “We are not aloof to the organizational challenges facing district education 
boards countrywide. This is why we decided to put in place policy measures to address them but 
whether they are working or not is difficult to tell”41. 
    Interviewer: Why do you have that impression? 
    Respondent:  “there are still gaps in implementation. You don’t need to be told because you will hear for 
yourself when you get to the districts that the organizational capacity of some of these boards is not 
up to scratch. There are a number of factors but the most critical ones in my view are lack of skilled 
manpower, unclear policy guidelines and poor coordination”. 
    Respondent (Chongwe)“….but there are still setbacks concerning the implementation of educational 
decentralization…. and government still has a lot to do when it comes to strengthening institutional 
capacity at the district level.  There are ambiguities surrounding operational guidelines which affect 
decision making and coordination of activities. If MoE does not effectively re-organise these boards 
by streamlining coordination and structural mechanisms, this whole idea of district education boards 
will end up a white elephant”42. 
    Respondent (Solwezi): “This district is so large but unfortunately we are not well organised as a board- 
which makes it difficult to plan and coordinate.  Education is very important therefore a policy such 
as decentralization ought to facilitate for continued management and administrative support. 
Moreover, most of these people in our board have no experience about how things should be done. 
They are used to the old system were central government did everything. You don’t just establish 
boards and expect that everything will be fine”43.  
         As much as educational decentralization may have stimulated tremendous enthusiasm among 
local level stakeholders, the above sentiments reflect an array of deep seated discontents 
regarding the operations of education boards. Given that certain aspects of organizational 
support, such as reporting systems, appeared to receive relatively low attention, how do we 
then explain the divergent views between those concerns that dominate popular discussions, 
such as weak organizational linkages, and those that were voiced out by respondents? Partly, 
it may be due to the fact that some of these concerns lend themselves more readily to 
popular stakeholder debate at the local level, than others.   Nonetheless,   issues such as 
coordination and manpower needs, which seemingly receive maximum attention, are 
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 MoE1/05.09.10/Edu/dec  (for details  on this quote, refer to the interview reference guide on Appendix xx) 
42
 DEB#1/20-30.09.10/Edu/dec 
43
 DEB#4/20-30.09.10/Edu/dec 
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primarily of greater concern in peri-urban based education boards than in urban ones like 
Solwezi. Interestingly, certain aspects of organizational support, like communication and 
information exchange, despite being relatively of low concern, are not so much of a 
challenge to Chongwe, which is close to the capital – an indication that proximity to the 
capital might be a factor which affects implementation. But on the other hand, boards in 
peri-urban areas like Chongwe seem to have more acute concerns than their counterparts in 
the urban location. However, the data collected shows that structural and operational 
impediments are perceived to be universal.   
         Many studies confirm the pivotal role which organizational support mechanisms play in 
facilitating the achievement of positive results by intermediate institutions in a decentralized 
education system (McGinn & Welsh, 1999). Since their inception, education boards in 
Zambia have undergone major changes – a key feature which has necessitated 
reorganization towards a more devolved but specialized system of well-functioning boards. 
Therefore, what level of organizational support do education boards need in order to be 
more effective? This question seeks for answers to the concerns raised by respondents. 
While transferring responsibilities and power to the districts has positive implications, this 
practice can be counterproductive where devolved responsibilities are not accompanied by 
appropriate organizational support mechanisms such as personnel and financial resources 
(First Global Report, 2007). Therefore, concerns by respondents are legitimate. Indeed, the 
need for organizational support for Chongwe and Solwezi DEBs is one of the most rational 
ways of making these boards work more effective in implementing the policy.  
8.1.2 Organizational Realignment 
         The question of organizational realignment has attracted significant attention since 
implementation commenced.  The term organization realignment is here used in the broader 
sense of necessary institutional capacities and frameworks which support effective 
functioning of the boards. Findings under this sub theme provide evidence of the status of 
the operational frameworks under which education decentralization is being implemented. 
The majority of the respondents
44
 were generally of the view that as much as transparency 
and accountability in decision making have somewhat improved, it would be naive to 
                                                 
44
  Specifically, this general view refers to the 23 respondents from national and district level since they are 
     the one who deals with policy matters of such nature as organisational realignments. 
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conclude that things get done the way they are officially expected. Despite mixed responses, 
over 80% of the 23 informants were quite familiar with the challenges associated with non-
organizational realignment of the boards. Talk of a weak administrative system and the 
absence of legal framework surfaced many times during interviews. For example, one of the 
respondents from Chongwe DEB lamented that: 
“We have the administrative framework but it is weak……besides where is the legal framework to 
support implementation of the policy in districts? Though with good intentions, you cannot establish 
boards like we have done in this country without strengthening the administrative framework. 
Remember also that no matter well-articulated your policy objectives can be, implementation can be 
hampered if there is no legal framework - this is one of the biggest problems we are experience. If 
education is a right, why not develop stronger regulatory framework to facilitate its provision?” 45 
Similar sentiments were also echoed by another respondent in Solwezi who vehemently 
stated that: 
“No one can boast about transparency or administrative efficiency in our board…at least not in 
absolute terms. Many times decisions are made haphazardly. Senior officials from Lusaka often flock 
here to query us why this and that is not being done. If at all there are laid down administrative 
procedures, then they are not adhered to. I wonder why? At times those of us from the governance side 
voice out certain concerns but mostly these are not taken up by management.  Unfortunately we can’t 
do anything because we have no leeway to do that…..we may have teeth but we can’t bite. Maybe if we 
brought on board sufficient funding that would be different? But in my view the challenge is beyond 
what we experience: it’s a question of a regulatory framework which if it is there then it is not working 
at all”46 
Interestingly, one respondent at national level drew sharp contrasting views by saying that: 
“Yes, there is need to realign institutions at district level to promote efficiency but government is very 
cautious in its approach. Educational decentralization as you know is by stages which are a building 
process. Most of these districts and communities like Mufumbwe are highly poverty stricken.  
Therefore, it may not be beneficial to put in place a regulatory framework which completely supplants 
government’s role in education provision. Though education is a right …government is cautious about 
putting in place a strong legal framework  as that may create stress on the system given limited 
resources”47. 
The above quotes encapsulate something of an opportunity as well as a blurred dilemma 
faced by Chongwe and Solwezi boards. Does realignment of these boards imply moving 
into a dangerous territory?  Considering the sentiments raised, the need to realign the 
administrative framework, as well as to formulate a legal framework, seems hard to resist. 
In fact, who could be in opposition to prospects for greater administrative efficiency, 
transparency and loosening of bureaucratic controls at the district level? One can argue 
that, for both management and governance team members in these two boards, including 
PTA members and policy makers at national level, the rationale of organizational 
                                                 
45
 DEB#1/20-30.09.10/Edu/dec ( refer to the interview reference  guide) 
46
 DEB#3/20-30.09.10/Edu/dec 
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 NLI2/10.09.10/Edu/dec 
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realignment is an attractive prospect. But what about organizational realignment in a 
decentralized education system is problematic? There are many contentious issues, but the 
main concern might be the complexity of regulatory frameworks and challenges associated 
with the degree of the transferred responsibilities and the scope of organizational 
realignment desirable when authority is genuinely devolved. Findings on this sub theme 
point to the manner in which duties and functions of board members are constituted in the 
Zambian Education Act - the source of the problem. As stipulated in the current act, for 
example, functions of the Provincial Education Officer (PEO) are clearly outlined in 
relations to those of the DEB secretary while the same is not done for the education board 
chairperson. Hence, conflict in performance of responsibilities does occur. Florestal and 
Cooper (1997), argue that:  
“It is important that any given legislation does not create conflict between 
administrators or conflict with the constitution or with other existing laws. In most 
cases educational reforms may not only require re-alignment or enactment of 
legislation specific to basic education but may also affect other laws. To determine 
what type of legislative framework must be formulated in a decentralized education 
system, one has to be aware of conflicts that may arise at different levels” (p.15)  
Understandably, these views are primarily based on two sources of conflict. Individual 
rights and freedoms on the one hand, and the specific organizational arrangements 
regarding the provision of basic education on the other, are enshrined in constitutional acts 
and international human rights charters (Florestal & Cooper, 1997). By implication, policy 
inconsistencies or conflict between the objectives of educational decentralization and other 
laws of the land could potentially emerge. Looking at the respondents’ concerns, it worries 
then to imagine that such perceived conflict could become a major puzzle against 
realigning the organizational and regulatory framework for Chongwe and Solwezi boards. 
Yet, if such sources of conflict are questionable, are there alternatives?  
Policy rhetoric seems to portray attempts towards strengthening administrative and 
formulating legal framework in a decentralized educational system as a complex endeavor. 
However, reality points to interesting experiences where such measures have been 
implemented without serious implications (Ghai & Regan, 1993). There are many other 
cases to cite. In New Zealand, for example, educational decentralization brought about 
legal changes which involved a review of the Public Finance Act, and also the education 
provision guidelines, including the provision of new legal authority to the Education 
Review Office (Florestal & Cooper, 1997).   Similarly, the transformation of the political 
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system which was experienced in Eastern Europe, necessitated radical changes in which 
educational decentralization involved the enactment of education Acts as well as 
amendments to laws governing local government, taxes, elections and so on (Florestal & 
Cooper,1997). With regard to this study, the key message is that weak organizational 
alignment may be one of the main obstacles which can hinder effective implementation in 
these districts, if not dealt with. 
8.1.3 Capacity to Implement 
“Scholars of policy implementation repeatedly argue that implementation problems 
should be considered when policies are being made. Better policies would result, we 
are told, if policy makers think about ahead of time whether and how their policies 
would be implemented before they settle on particular course of action” (Elmore, 
1980:601). 
Elmore seems to be spot on in highlighting how thoughts of forward mapping provide 
useful insights on policy and practice.  The research questions pertaining to the board’s 
capacity to implement, received more overwhelming responses than any other. Almost all 
respondents confirmed that education boards faced serious challenges in implementing the 
educational decentralization policy. Although less than 10 % of the 23 respondents cited 
certain positive outcomes, more than 80% of them stated that DEBs have limited capacity. 
This explains why the implementation has not yielded good results. A myriad of problems 
were pinpointed, but those of greatest concern are the lack of adequate funding and 
inadequate skilled personnel to live up to the new demands in planning (decision making), 
monitoring, evaluation and reporting.  Though respondents considered lack of funding the 
most critical, the ideal scenario is to have all needs effectively addressed. Given the 
meager resources, it is critical to rationally prioritise how to deal with such challenges. But 
that does not in any way imply neglecting those perceived as less crucial since it is possible 
that they may be equally culminated into an insurmountable problem against 
implementation.  
These findings show that the Chongwe and Solwezi boards’ capacity to implement is 
questionable. As expected, respondents gave mixed views about what they thought was the 
root cause of the problems. Opposing views ranged from lack of political will on the part 
of government, to poor leadership in the boards, and generally low level of desire by 
communities to meaningfully participate in the provision of basic education. The question 
of the capacity to implement was, however, perceived differently by participants at school 
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level. While the majority of the discussants in the 4 focus group discussions (FGDs) saw 
the establishment of boards as a positive mechanism aimed at promoting community 
participation, a few lamented on the failure by boards to tackle problems in schools,  such 
as delays in teacher recruitment, low learning achievement and poor supply of educational 
materials. A participant in one of the group discussions had this to say: 
“We know what the board here in Chongwe is supposed to do to support our schools but do they? The 
Board is expected to address most of the problems we face because they are close to us but they have 
challenges. We also know that board members are expected to fundraise in order to raise additional 
income for educational activities in the district but in a poor community like ours, how much can they 
raise? Besides, the caliber of certain board members leaves much to be desired. Some of them either 
do not know what they are supposed to do or don’t understand operational guidelines at all. How do 
you for example, get a teacher of English from a basic school and appoint him to be a district planner 
surely?  In all this, much of the blame is on MoE headquarters because that is where most of the 
decisions are made.
48” 
If there are board members with inadequate or no professional experience, then it is 
obvious they would lack the necessary expertise to execute their duties. Therefore, the 
objective for improved education service delivery can be expected to be centered on 
building the professional capacity just as much as on financial needs.   Considering the far-
reaching implications globalization has had in limiting central government’s involvement 
in education provision (Stewart, 1996; Carnoy, 1999), is it not absurd that government 
should be blamed for non-performance of these two boards? Is it also reasonable for boards 
and communities to seize the opportunity, having been given the powers to manage 
education affairs at the local level as they see fit?  One possible explanation to these 
questions and findings in general, might be that the implementation of the educational 
decentralization policy requires incremental changes to meet different circumstances. 
Therefore, it might be experiences in the districts studied which prompted the respondents 
to perceive that the boards were given too great responsibility too suddenly and that they 
could have coped better with more incremental change. 
8.2 Accountability: To Who, Why, and How? 
Arising from a key research question concerning accountability, follow up questions 
emerged during the interview. Informants further commented upon how, and to whom, they 
thought the district education boards (DEBs) were accountable. 
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In theory, DEBs must be accountable to their constituencies for (a) the improvement of 
educational access, equity, relevance and quality and (b) the improvement of the 
performance of the education system in service delivery (MoE & SNV, 2008). Nonetheless, 
the picture painted by respondents at national and district level including participants in the 
FGDs, was generally that the board does not have discretion over such decisions. In practice, 
Chongwe and Solwezi boards report to MoE headquarters through the PEO’s office on 
almost all issues pertaining to the provision of basic education except on peripheral matters, 
such as monitoring of education standards in schools.  
Nearly all the 23 respondents at national and district level sounded optimistic about the 
benefits of educational decentralization. Close to 50% of them remained skeptical about the 
perceived successes achieved. Their shared views were on the basis that decentralization 
entails strengthening accountability mechanisms for transparency and inclusiveness in 
decision making and performance of responsibilities. About 70% of the 23 informants 
reported that through decentralization, accountability in decision making has often been 
accompanied by other actions that have contributed towards increased access to education. 
The ideas of shared responsibility, improved administrative functioning and efficiency in the 
use of resources might be seen as the contributing factors. This is an indication of the 
compatibility between the ‘voice/client power’ and ‘management relationships’ explained in 
the conceptual framework of this study.  
8.2.1 Shared Responsibility  
Insights offered under this sub theme are rich and plentiful.  Some of the follow up questions 
brought to the fore the notion of ‘shared responsibility’, which respondents felt had a 
bearing in shaping the nature of accountability relationships at the local level. Further,  the 
data collected generally revealed a strong sense of ‘collective action’ and ‘ownership’, 
which was underpinned by the value of local knowledge and answerability for results which 
were characterized by apparent structural and administrative disconnects within the setup of 
the board. Respondents across the two districts unanimously regarded the board as a venue 
for collective responsibility through which they had been able to influence certain decisions, 
but most importantly accelerate the constructing of teacher houses and additional classrooms 
which led to increased pupil enrollments. During one of the interview sessions, a board 
member in Solwezi put it this way:  
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           “..We know what is required of us all in this board. All schools in this district are ours but if we don’t 
tackle their problems who will do it? It is not like before when somebody from Lusaka came and told 
you what to do.  Since we know the problems our children face in these schools, we meet as a team to 
discuss ways of addressing them. This is why when it comes to constructing classroom blocks and 
teacher’s houses for instance we are all united as a board including parents who contribute upfront 
materials. The main challenge however, is that we are still answerable to Headquarters and our 
decisions often questioned even though communities are expected to be judges our works
49” 
These sentiments are in line with the figure below which provides evidence on how 
education boards operate as a team – i.e. participatory planning approach. This approach 
demonstrates a perceived sense of shared responsibility for both management and 
governance members of the board.  
Figure 10: Demonstration of Shared Responsibility through Participatory Planning
50
 
 
Source: (MOE & SNV, 2008: 8) 
Contrary to the views and evidence presented above, about 25% of the 23 participants 
expressed reservations on the viability of collective action. They felt that although their 
unity of purpose contributed in enhancing awareness and transparency towards what they 
termed as “representative decision making”, it did not wholesomely reflect the full extent of 
the reality. Some were quick in citing formally established controls as the limiting factor for 
collective freedom to deliver success. These sentiments were also highlighted by discussants 
across the four group discussions held in Chongwe and Solwezi.  In reference to the puzzle 
surrounding the perceived sense of shared responsibility, one discussant lamented: 
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          “Even if we are represented in the board as PTA members, there is not so much to show for it at our 
level. Participation in board meetings is one thing but seeing to it that necessary resources are in place 
to undertake agreed upon activities is another. Some of these board members are just there for 
allowances in the name of working together, not that there is anything meaningful they are doing. Of 
course there may be minutes showing that they share ideas but then what else? If you look at the reports 
and statistics you will notice poor pupil performance and stagnating quality of education. If government 
is always to blame, then why are these boards there in the first place? Personally, I don’t understand 
why it is like that may be you people who are so educated have answers”51. 
However elaborate these views may be, they are complex to interpret. But one key thing can 
be made clear out of them. Although the accountability relationships in a decentralized 
education system are by and large interdependent (Florestal & Cooper, 1997), collective 
actions within the board are generally compromised since the government, the giver of 
authority, takes it away from the boards at the same time. The lack of accountability to 
primary beneficiaries (teachers, parents, pupils) may also entail that boards operate in an 
uneven playing field so that management team members override suggestions put across by 
those appointed to the board on the governance side. The rationale for collective action 
might also be compromised by the fact that although the DEB Secretary and PEO are 
professionals, they still operate under intense political pressure from above, which in itself 
negates downward accountability.  
8.2.2 Administrative Control 
In line with the national policy, educational decentralization in Zambia has implied 
increasing “local control” through deregulation of government duties. This has been done 
through granting administrative, legal and financial powers to DEBs to enable them to make 
decisions concerning educational matters (MoE, 1996).  Surprisingly, this study revealed 
that top officials still exert supervisory control over boards. Driving the decentralization 
objective is the view that increased flexibility at the local level allows decisions to be made 
much quicker  in response to local needs than those made at the top (Hanson, 1997).  
Interestingly, data from the two districts where this study was conducted indicate that both 
Chongwe and Solwezi struggle in executing their responsibilities due to excessive 
administrative control from the center. On paper, boards have been entrusted with 
administrative responsibilities and discretion to administer education delivery as they see it 
fit. It emerged, however, during interviews that the boards do not in practice, possess the 
ultimate authority on planning and implementing. In theory, however, authority can be 
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divided.  Arguably, the exercise of authority by DEBs may be limited by constraints on what 
they can do, and also by constraints on resource flows from the center. Again, views that 
different actors have of such constraints may be influenced by their interest in evading 
responsibility for their own shortcomings.  One way to defend themselves can be to point 
the blame elsewhere (e.g., interference from above), rather than to accept their own limited 
capacity or effort.   
One of the questions in the interview sessions helped to discover the extent to which DEBs 
are able to administer basic education under minimum or no supervision. Nearly all 
respondents at national and district level echoed similar sentiments that while it was not 
entirely a bad idea for MoE headquarters to administratively monitor the operations of the 
board, monitoring could become excessive. The result of this is that members of the board 
are left with little or no room to maneuver administratively. The following sentiments were 
captured from one of the planners at MoE headquarters in Lusaka. 
Respondent: “My dear, I have nothing to hide! We have had challenges but so far so good. Much of the 
successes so far, relate to the fact that there are laid down rules and regulations which education 
boards follow. You see…..all these documents on my table are reports showing that boards are 
accountable and answerable on what they do.  We monitor them regularly which helps to control and 
guide them in areas where they face administrative challenges”.  
Interviewer: You sound as if Boards don’t have the power to decide what to do without your 
involvement, do they? 
Respondent: “I do not mean control in the negative sense but remember that decentralization is a 
gradual process. There is no way therefore, central government would have established these boards 
without having a say on how they are administering education. The fact that government is a source of 
funding even justifies its direct involvement”52.      
Meanwhile, the district education board chairperson for Solwezi had this to say; 
“For what I know supervision or control measures need to have a limit but if they go beyond that, it 
defeats the whole essence of having created education boards because you cannot promote 
accountability and transparency in that way. It’s same as in the past when central government ran the 
show at all levels. I have served this board for over 3 years now and it’s difficult to appreciate the 
working relationship between our board and people from headquarters. If they have the final say in all 
administrative matters in this board, then why are we here?”53 
These expressions point to a significant concern which demands deeper reflection.  From my 
vantage point, the degree of administrative control over local units influences the level of 
success or failure in a decentralized system. It also underlines the classical challenge where 
administrative responsibilities are transferred but devoid of necessary power and authority to 
execute them. The question to ponder on, therefore, is can central government totally 
                                                 
52
 MoE1/05.09.10/Edu/dec 
53
 DEB#4/10/10/Edu/dec 
113 
 
disengage itself from education provision at the local level?  This question is mind boggling 
yet there is no clear cut answer because educational decentralization by definition and more 
so in practice, does not necessarily mean that boards can be absolutely independent. In other 
words, central government which established them can at any given point decide to do away 
with them if the objectives for which they were created for are unachievable. 
8.2.3 The Rationale for Efficiency 
Other than the rationale for community involvement and enhancement of accountability, one 
of the objectives for educational decentralization in Zambia was on financial grounds - i.e. 
efficiency promotion (MoE, 1996). The basis was that decisions would be made quicker and 
closer to the point of delivery, or at the community level where actions are taken. This 
objective is backed by the argument that where micro educational issues are handled by 
geographically and culturally distant technocrats in an education system, operational costs 
are often high (Winkler, 1994; Winkler &Yeo, 2007). 
Findings from the field, however, revealed otherwise, as all respondents reacted differently. 
Generally, lack of tangible positive results seemingly outweighed perceived successes. 
During interview sessions with selected policy makers, it came to my attention that in 
certain instances there were exaggerations of facts concerning efficiency related successes. 
For example, more than 70% of the 23 respondents referred to a number of efficiency related 
factors perceived to be widening the gap between policy and practice. In an interview 
session at MoE headquarters, one senior policy maker had this to say: 
“If decisions are made by the people themselves who know their problems efficiency increases. This is 
the case now. So we have ample time to concentrate on policy matters. Because of the Boards, issues of 
operational nature such as management of teachers’ payroll are exclusively done at the district level.  
That is just one of the good lessons. Previously you would have to go to provinces, districts and even 
right up to the schools to collect information for planning purposes….Imagine how high the budget line 
for operational costs was?”54  
Contrary to the above sentiments, one of the members of the education board in Chongwe 
district plainly remarked: 
“The problem in this country is that you have policies which are well written but when it comes to 
implementation, it’s something else. Even if we are not technocrats, we are able to point out some of the 
weaknesses.  Many responsibilities have been transferred to us as Boards but unfortunately issues like 
districts annual budgets and work plans are still approved from Lusaka and often its takes too long.You 
can imagine! Even simple decision such as purchasing of educational materials is also suctioned from 
there. Besides, there is never a month passing without officials from Lusaka coming here to monitor as 
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if we can’t do that. Sometimes, our colleagues from the management team are called on short notice 
even on minor issues such taking information on how any books are needed for the district. Surely? 
Now tell me Amos, how can you lower administrative costs or improve efficiency for that matter?”55 
Clearly, the views expressed above contradict each other, making objective analysis of the 
reality difficult. Interestingly, however, one female teacher in Chongwe was fully supported 
by other members during the group discussion when she explained that: 
           “As much as the PEO and other officers from Lusaka are fond of making frequency visits to districts and 
schools, so too are DEB officials who often travel to Lusaka, and as we understand, for meetings which 
never end. Just think about it, the money which they use to burn fuel could be used to buy books and 
chalk for the poor school children. Please come to my office after this meeting so that you can see for 
yourselves the boxes of chalk procured from Lusaka without consulting us. Up to now, none of us has 
ever used that chalk because it can’t right on the blackboard no matter how hard you press it. We had 
to use money from our pockets to buy what we are using now. Imagine!”56 
If decentralization is meant to improve efficiency by bringing decision making closer to 
primary beneficiaries, then these sentiments point to the contrary.  Obviously, there are 
many factors at play. One of them being that the objective for central control over local 
agencies overrides the efficiency rationale, although popular local interests do not 
necessarily hinder efficiency as such. These findings are consistent with the implied view of 
decentralization as discussed under the literature review chapter. Except in weak or failed 
state formations (federations, confederations), the government retains the ultimate authority 
to intervene, either by legislative or budgetary means, and sometimes by more direct ad hoc 
measures. What matters is the clarity of administrative responsibilities – an issue which has 
been highlighted under the analysis of organizational realignment. 
8.3 Local Autonomy: Freedom or striking a balance? 
Having analysed the data and findings under the theme of accountability, the focus will now 
be on local autonomy. The establishment of education boards in Zambia was a highly 
attractive venture. It is almost inconceivable that anyone could have opposed the rationale 
for greater autonomy of the boards and the flexibility for independent decision making at the 
local level, given the inefficiencies which characterized the centralized system of education 
in the late 1980s. But history is full of highly and effective centralized education systems in 
the greater majority of developing countries (Naidoo, 2002; UNESCO, 2005). For example, 
Kaunda’s strong socialist ideals demonstrate the pivotal role played by the state in education 
provision.  Mcinerney (2003) argues that “for officials at the district and PTA level, the 
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opportunity for greater community participation, empowerment and local control is a 
fascinating possibility” (p.58). Is it, therefore, a matter of freedom, or striking a balance in 
authority relationships between the center and local units? This question is important 
because it relates to one of the key questions which sort to find out how the transferred 
responsibilities and authority have influenced the autonomy of DEBs.  
Data indicates that members of the boards, including PTAs, are enthusiastic about the 
authority and responsibilities received from headquarters which have stimulated flexibility 
in decision making in the implementation of the policy. Nonetheless, it emerged during 
interviews that regardless of the low level of balance between local autonomy and 
accountability, boards have little or no control over most of the responsibilities transferred to 
them. In the following section, data  shows how DEBs enjoy full support from top 
politicians and senior education policy makers in the MoE (in certain cases), yet junior 
officers are often less enthusiastic to let go of certain responsibilities due to perceived loss of 
power and other pecuniary privileges at their disposal. This supports the argument that since 
decentralization strategies are often formulated and adopted in the political arena, passive 
resistance from the center usually becomes a major obstacle (Mcinerney, 2010; Hanson, 
1998).  General findings presented here are backed by the evidence presented below. 
8.3.1 Self-Management 
Self-management through education boards is one manifestation of the implementation of 
the educational decentralization policy in Zambia.  Nearly 80% of the 23 respondents (i.e. 
national & district level) reported that while much can be improved, the transfer of 
responsibilities and authority to DEBs has led to a remarkable transformation in the way 
basic education is delivered at the local level compared to the past. The logic behind their 
claims is based on the devolution of educational functions which has made the provision of 
basic education more effective. This is because DEBs, in collaboration with communities, 
are now the decision makers. However, they are still under minimum supervision though 
with intense control from the center.  The board chairperson for Chongwe referred to this 
problem in the following way: 
“No one needs to be told about how central government influences the affairs of education board. I 
think it is not necessarily about intervening but interference. The problem many people do not seem to 
understand is the conflicting roles between board officials and certain officers at HQ. If the adoption of 
a given policy strips you of your responsibilities and power, won’t you feel threatened for the fact that 
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the authority you once possessed is now exercised by your subordinate? Naturally you would. In my 
opinion, that is precisely where problems affecting implementation of the policy lie”57.  
Over 70 % of the 23 respondents said that barely less than a half of the decisions made by 
education boards are taken under full autonomy of the DEB, and mainly within the 
framework of the management guidelines set up and overseen by a MoE HQ. However, in 
an apparent expression of the enthusiasm for self-management, a junior board member from 
the management team in Solwezi disclosed that: 
“I wonder if there is anyone who wants to return to the old system where only top officials from MoE in 
Lusaka managed things – and were regarded as the only one with power and authority to manage what 
went on in districts and schools even when they did not understand problems there.  In line with this 
policy, we should be seen working together by upholding the principles of self-governing. It is not good 
to have a few big individuals in the board as well as those from Lusaka running the show while the rest 
of us watch and rubber stamp what they decide upon. We do experience that….and it is very frustrating 
especially for junior officers like me”58 
Based on these findings (data), self-management can be a viable option for promoting and 
safeguarding the autonomy of DEBs and can lead to effective and efficient delivery of 
education at the lower level.  Nonetheless, criticism of those in management positions must 
be tolerated when discussing issues of education (Caldwell, 2008).  This means, members of 
the board, PTA members and central government all have a say on how well basic education 
should be provided. Sadly, the quest for power by the local units often becomes what 
Caldwell refers to as the autonomy “tail that wags the education dog” (Ibid: 34).  
8.3.2 Legitimate Control 
Data under this sub-theme were analysed in terms of the “balance of power” between the 
management and governance team members and how their relationship affects the autonomy 
of the board as a whole.  The research questions here sought to locate the loci for power in 
the board and the implications associated with that. Views from members of the two boards 
suggest that although governance team members are in accordance to the policy guidelines 
the policy making body, it was rather management team members who exerted more 
influence on almost all policy decisions. Ideally, it should have been the other way round if 
not a win-win scenario. Here is what the DEB secretary for Chongwe said: 
“I don’t mean to sound egoistic but in reality, it would be an understament to suggest that the board 
chairperson or indeed the governance team as whole wields more power than the office I am occupying 
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together with my team here. It might be due to a lack of a legal framework….but I also think it would 
have been a different ball game if governance team members did not come on board empty handed”59. 
These sentiments were largely confirmed by the Board chairperson in Solwezi who reported 
that: 
“This is the second term I am serving in this board having worked for the MoE for 27 years before.  
There are few instances where you table an idea as governance body and it is well taken up by the 
entire Board. But many are the times we are not listened to no matter how excellent the ideas we 
propose during board meetings may be. Unfortunately, there is nothing we can do about that because 
we have no power to sanction our colleagues - the management, who feel superior over us. Based on my 
experiences, it is this challenge which has contributed to luck of tangible success in the implementation 
of decentralization”60. 
It is, however, based on the data from policy documents and on my own work experience 
that Boards are currently enjoying a considerable degree of autonomy, more so than before. 
The fact that both Chongwe and Solwezi boards exercise legitimate control over certain 
decisions such as teacher payroll management, recruitment and redeployment, is in itself a 
testimony that the implementation of the educational decentralization policy is slowly but 
surely yielding success. Even more encouraging as noted by key informants, is that boards 
are gradually becoming proactive in their own limited capacities. They no longer passively 
wait for orders from Lusaka but are actively involved in administering basic education, 
although not yet to the extent expected of them. 
The views cited above however, point to a crucial challenge which concerns the Board’s 
legitimate control and local autonomy over the delivery of education at the local level. 
Theoretically, governance and management team members are expected to work 
harmoniously together but there are power imbalances triggered by conflict of interest.  In 
the end, it is the management team which as explained by one teacher at Chalimbana basic 
school in Chongwe which “illegitimately” bulldozes its way out of most decisions made. For 
instance, issues of budgets, procurements plans and reporting are monthly presided over by 
management and often without the knowledge of governance team members. 
Consider that the management team constitutes MoE employees subject to the ministry’s 
“chain of command” through the formal line of authority, communication, and 
responsibility. How tenable is it therefore that education boards have the legitimate power 
let alone autonomy to make decisions over education delivery at the grassroots level?  One 
would argue that, the authority which Chongwe and Solwezi boards are perceived to have is 
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merely symbolic in nature. The fact that there is little consensus or no checks and balances 
between the two camps demonstrates something questionable about whether or not authority 
was meaningfully transferred. This situation appears to hamper local accountability in 
decision-making as well as transparency which can only be served when these two groups 
keep an eye on each other’s actions.    
8.3.3 School Based Management (SBM)  
SBM (through PTAs) is one of the concepts central in the implementation of 
decentralization in Zambia. Thus, the  question of DEBs’ autonomy and how that relates to 
responsibilities and power from the top has a direct bearing on the operations of schools 
since that is where policies are translated into actions. It is in fact, perceived in the policy 
that “by entrusting greater power and authority to education and school managers at district 
and school levels respectively, in addition to promoting community participation lead to a 
strong sense of ownership and responsibility for these units” (MoE,1996:127).  Hence it was 
logical for this study to explore the experiences by PTA members in as far as the 
implementation of the policy in concerned.   
Based on the 4 group discussions conducted with PTA members, it generally emerged that 
despite lack of technical capacity and inadequate funding, PTAs have a strong sense of 
ownership and responsibility towards education. A female parent in one of the two group 
discussions in Solwezi described the involvement of community members in managing the 
affairs of school as having led to improvements in education delivery. She cited among other 
things, increased dialogue and transparency as some of the contributing factors adding that 
everyone feels “it is their own school”. She added that since parents through the PTA make 
contributions in terms of upfront materials, they have the right to ‘voice out’ if something 
goes wrong.  These views were repeatedly echoed by the school Head teacher who had this 
to say: 
“I have been the head for this school for over 10 years and looking at the way we are work as 
PTA members now there is a big difference compared to the past. Before it was difficult to tell 
communities to contribute something even if it is for a noble course and nobody cared so much 
about the condition of the school and plight of pupils. Everybody knew it was the duty of 
government to [……] and no wonder vandalism was rampant.  But things have changed. All 
these new classroom blocks you can see here are simply because PTA members worked hand 
in hand with the community to build them including making some of the desks pupils sit on. So 
even if this school belongs to government, we are the owners because we have contributed so 
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much to making it what it is today. I can tell you one thing! If you have put an effort into making 
something, you will mostly likely take care of it and mostly protect it against vandalism”61. 
If PTAs and the community can effectively sustain their involvement in education as seen 
above, then it is probable that they can make good contributions towards the achievement of 
the goals of decentralization in Zambia. However, most of the discussants felt that this 
perceived sense of responsibility and ownership was unfortunately not backed by necessary 
school based discretion in decision making since even minor issues such procurement of 
school requisites needed approval from the DEB’s office, a process which was time 
consuming. Decisions taken by school managers in consultation with other members of the 
PTA were found to be relatively rare.  Seemingly out of frustration of this challenge, 
Mumena Basic School PTA Chairperson lamented as follows: 
“The school records show that enrollment numbers are increasing year by year but we do not have 
adequate classroom places to accommodate every child from these surrounding villages. We have done 
all we can with the community to try and build two additional classroom blocks…see those molded 
blocks outside! They have been there for over 5 months and the rains will soon start. It is so annoying 
that we have to wait for officials from the PEO and DEBs’ offices just to come and survey where the 
building should be built on”62.  
These findings point to one key message that although SBM is appealing in decentralized 
education system, as observed by Mcinerney (2010), school managers and communities may 
not, in all circumstances possess the authority, technical ‘know-how’ and resources to 
efficiently deal with challenges faced by the school. A Venezuelan minister of education 
illustrated this point when he spoke to a gathering of educators about his frustrations in 
trying to decentralize the educational system in the 1970s: 
“Let us say that the decisions that are taken at the level of the minister are worth 100 
points, but when they are implemented at the next lower level [director-general] they 
are reduced to 80 points, and at the level of area directors, 60 points. They leave the 
Ministry of Education and when implemented at the regional level are worth 50 
points, at the zonal level are worth 25 points, and by the time they get to the schools 
not enough is left of the decisions to change what has been going on for the past 15 
or 20 years” (Peñalver, 1976:23 cited from Hanson, 1989:117). 
Certainly, even if devolution of responsibilities and authority as well as autonomy at school 
level seem logical in a decentralized system, “there may be risks involved with driving 
schools into unknown territories” (Mcinerney, 2003:70).  Such perceived risks are however 
not generalizable since contexts differ. Besides there are many avenues which can help to 
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map out fairly decentralized pathways through which SBM can complements policy efforts 
at district or regional level. 
8.4 Major Differences and Similarities. 
This study compared the implementation of educational decentralization between 
Chongwe and Solwezi education boards. Doing research in settings with slightly different 
contexts has its own strengths and limitations not least of which is that data can be 
distorted by comparable differences and similarities between the cases under examination 
(Bray, et.,al, 2007). Of course, this is a standard argument against generalizing from micro 
qualitative case studies. But, on the other hand, one has an opportunity to get closer to how 
people reason and perceive particular social phenomena.  
Other than the distinction about the contextual settings, the major difference pertaining to 
the findings from the two districts had to do with the leadership styles which had a major 
influence in the effectiveness of the board. Judging from the views by members of the 
boards as well as minutes of the full board meetings, it was clear that Solwezi board was 
well organized than Chongwe.  Compared to Chongwe where the “full board” was almost 
nonexistent, the leadership style in Solwezi was encouraging. Besides claims by 
respondents, the official minutes in Solwezi were proof that both the DEB Secretary and 
the Chairperson were working hand in hand in organizing and coordinating full board 
meetings as well as making follow ups on agreed upon activities.  To a large extent, this 
was not the case in Chongwe where one of the board members expressed his frustration as 
follows: 
“Imagine that since the beginning of this year (2010), we have never held a full board 
meeting…God now what is going on! ...and if you call the Board chairperson, he will have 
no idea about what is going on. Now tell me, how can you deliver as a board like that?”  
At whatever level in an education system, leadership is undoubtedly critical. A study on 
education boards in Papua New Guinea concluded that the success of any education board 
largely depends on three factors: “the leadership of the principal, the leadership of the 
chairperson, and of course the quality of members of the Board” (Maha, 1997:190).  
Elsewhere, the leadership role of the managers and that of the Chairperson were equally 
considered critical for the smooth functioning of the education boards (Peterson et al. 
1995; Deller, 1995). Thus, the leadership role of the DEB Secretary and the Board 
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Chairperson (in both Chongwe and Solwezi) in making decisions that foster a sense of 
direction for all members, is pivotal not only for the well-functioning of the board but also 
towards effective implementation of the policy.  
However significant the above distinction may be, this study revealed striking similarities 
regarding implementation and its outcomes. Often, research does not turn out that way but 
given the “isomorphic nature” of the boards under study, the findings presented here are 
thus justified. It is of course possible to unearth differences between two comparable cases 
such as these.   But the fact that Chongwe and Solwezi districts are at the same level in the 
system and facing similar challenges; that they operate under the same policy guidelines 
and its officials are influenced by the same environment; that they are saving similar 
clientele may among other factors justify the similarities in this study. Therefore, the table 
below is a comparative summary of key findings presented within the framework of the 
key research themes and concepts as informed by the research questions in chapter 1. 
Table 2:  A Comparative Summary of Main Findings 
Main theme Data Category Chongwe DEB (Site 1)   Solwezi DEB (Site2) 
 
Local Autonomy 
   
 Legitimate control 
 
Insufficient decision making- powers. 
Top officials from MoE Headquarters 
still interfere with the management 
affairs at district level, to the contrary.  
Low level balance between 
autonomy and accountability 
because board members have 
little leeway in decision 
making and use of resources. 
Board members do not have 
the ultimate power and 
authority to make certain key 
decisions especially on 
finance. 
    
 Self-management   Considerable degree of devolved 
functions and power to support 
implementation of the policy. Board 
members seem to know what to do but 
lack of authority to be able to do things 
effectively is a thorny challenge.   
Highly ensusiastic board members when 
it comes to participatory planning but 
this is hampered by excessive control by 
central government reflecting 
insignificant devolution of functions.  
Despite this considerable 
degree of devolved functions, 
it was found out that real 
power and authority in the 
board is exercised by only few 
strong individuals thus 
compromising transparency 
and accountability in decision 
making. 
  
122 
 
    
    
 School based 
management 
Strong sense of responsibility, 
commitment, and transparency in 
running the affairs of schools by PTA 
members, reflecting sufficient degree of 
devolved functions and authority. But 
this not backed by adequate capacity and 
resources. 
Strong sense of responsibility, 
commitment and transparency 
by PTA members. 
Diminishing sense of apathy 
in participation by some 
stakeholders at school level 
who still feel it is the 
responsibility of government 
to provide  basic education  
 
 
Accountability Shared 
responsibility 
Perceived collective actions on matters 
of basic education by board members 
and other external stakeholders  
enhanced by representative decision 
making, transparency and sense of 
ownership for outcomes 
Just as in Chongwe, this 
perceived collective 
responsibility mirrors a 
serious puzzle of how board 
members are squarely 
answerable for their 
actions/decisions not only as 
full board but on their 
individual capacities as well.  
    
 Administrative 
control 
Excessive control from the top resulting 
into lapses in internal control 
mechanisms within the board.  As such, 
education board officials follow 
administrative procedures, rules and 
regulations ambiguously and often in an 
adhoc manner. 
Undesirable administrative 
pressures from the top 
resulting into inconsistencies 
in the manner officials in the 
board apply admin control 
measures. This underlies  deep 
seated misconceptions about 
decentralisation policy by 
board members 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional capacity 
Efficiency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisational 
support 
 
 
Contrary to the policy, the objective to 
increase administrative efficiency in the 
delivery of education services is still 
rhetoric.  Their lack of knowledge about 
the level of aggregation on how the 
available resources are allocated and 
more so utilized  in the board but also 
generally within decentralized system 
 
 
More often than not, education board 
experiences many challenges such as 
inadequate funding, weak institutional 
linkages, and manpower needs and other 
No comparable differences 
between the two education 
boards.  The replication of this 
educational decentralisation 
model by MOE is proving 
extremely inefficient. 
 
 
 
 No significant differences 
although it emerged that 
Chongwe DEB which in a 
peri-urban area has more 
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Organisational 
realignment 
structural impediments but the support 
rendered does not much up. 
 
Policy under implementation without 
full assessment of resource needs. 
Weak administrative framework.  
 
No legal framework to re-align 
operations of board members in 
executing decisions for delivering basic 
education services. 
Lack of a legal framework is a source of 
frustration among governance members 
who have no option to seek recourse on 
arbitrary decisions by management 
which they are not happy with. 
teething problems than 
Solwezi. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Weak administrative 
framework and lack of legal 
framework hamper 
accountability and 
transparency. This scenario 
makes it difficult for board 
members in these boards to 
execute devolved functions 
and responsibilities in an 
efficient and effective way.  
 
  
Capacity to 
implement 
 
Although education boards possess a 
great potential to achieve success in 
making educational decentralisation 
policy an alternate for centralisation, 
there is a gap in implementation and that 
gap is lack of capacity of the board.  
Operational manuals have been have 
made available for board members, but 
there is   lack of a sustained mechanism 
to put them into effective use. 
 
No comparable differences 
    Source: Author    
Note:  For additional details of these findings please refer to the sections for data analysis and findings above.   
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8.5 Discussion of Findings 
Following the analysis, the interpretation of findings then follows.  The discussion is 
guided by the three analytical questions on the basis of which the summary, the 
conclusions and the recommendations are drawn from. 
8.5.1 How does institutional capacity affect the implementation of 
educational decentralization? 
Studies have also shown that where institutional capacity is weak, chances of 
implementation failures are higher than in settings with relatively stronger institutional 
capacity. This is because in the latter decentralisation policies and practice can be more 
easily implemented (Hanson, 1989).  Hanson’s study produced results which highlighted 
institutional capacity as one of the influential factors affecting the operations of district 
education boards.  Understandably, Chongwe and Solwezi education boards have not been 
able to function as expected or produce desirable policy outcomes due to their weak 
institutional capacities.  
The challenges pertaining to organisational support, manpower and funding inadequacies, 
poor coordination, unclear rules and regulations, lack of strong regulatory framework 
among others explain the low level of success of decentralization policies in these two 
districts. Although these factors seem to be interlinked, they are independent of each other 
making them hard to interpret although they do to a large extent, influence policy 
implementation. While a good policy does not necessarily guarantee success, experiences 
from Chongwe and Solwezi suggest that good practice cannot as well be guaranteed amid 
organisational weaknesses or the absence of necessary institutional mechanisms that are 
required for effective implementation. 
Most educational decentralization policy initiatives have not been achieved due to 
inadequate institutional arrangements. By and large, the depth and density of 
organisational capabilities determines the extent to which devolved units can be far away 
from the centre (McGinn & Welsh, 1999). Therefore, compared to New Zealand and 
Norway (two interesting cases reviewed in chapter 4), it is clear that the gap between 
“policy and practice” in terms of institutional capacities in both Chongwe and Solwezi 
districts is wide. Besides the educational decentralization policy making process which 
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appears faulty in Zambia, lessons from these two districts point to lack of sufficient 
political commitment to be able to anticipate beforehand, the challenges of 
implementation. Besides, problems pertaining to weak institutional capacity such as 
manpower and funding requirements, poor coordination and lack of a strong regulatory 
framework are not new. In fact, they existed in Zambia way before decentralisation was 
conceived.  For instance, inadequate skilled personnel and funding for regional units were   
challenges previously just as they have resurfaced under decentralisation. Why should we 
then be surprised by the low performance of these two boards when the “known” problems 
pertaining to institutional capacity were not adequately dealt with from the onset?  The 
answer is simple. As Hanson (1998) pointed out, sub-national structures inherited from 
central government in much of the SSA region are administratively weak, highly 
politicized and mostly characterised by corrupt practices - obstacles which are hard to deal 
with in a devolved system. 
Further, there is a strong view by multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and IMF 
that greater decentralization leads to the mobilization of resources to support 
implementation which otherwise might not be generated under centralization (Weiler 1990; 
Gershberg & Winkler, 2003). A question can be asked: if DEBs are to be made responsible 
for mobilising their own funds to finance basic education, what sources are made available 
to them? Suppose they are accorded powers to tax? That may not be a magic bullet besides 
it is unlikely that the tax base in each district could yield sufficient revenues for 
implementation decentralisation activities. Interestingly, a case against the World Bank and 
IMF’s high profile argument about resource mobilisation was made by the Solwezi Board 
Chairperson who had this to air: 
“Imagine! If Solwezi Board which is right in the Provincial Capital where economic activities are 
booming is unable to raise additional funds, what more Chavuma  Board which is right in outskirts 
with higher level of poverty?  You won’t believe it if I tell you that from the time this Board was 
established, no single coin has ever been raised despite attempts to fundraise. I wonder what would 
have happened if it was not for funding from central government. But it is not just funding alone. 
Highly qualified people mostly prefer to work in Lusaka and other big cities, so we end up with half-
baked and non performing personnel here. Basically, our capacity to implement is simply weak!”63 
Indeed, some regions in a decentralised system may be small and wealthy while others 
large and poor- a variation which can affect resource mobilisation for implementation.  
Thus, the sheer geographical size as well as the degree of poverty between Chongwe and 
Solwezi explains why implementation is in jeopardy.  Apart from debunking the World 
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Bank and IMF’s position, the expression by the Solwezi Board Chairperson is a prediction 
of a simplistic decentralized educational system with distinctly weak institutional capacity. 
Even though ‘weak institutional capacity’ is not the only factor pointing to lack of 
meaningful results, we can speculate that meaningful improvement may take very long for 
in both districts since what is arguably at stake are trials and errors – that is the attempts to 
make new structures work adequately. 
8.5.2 How does accountability influence success or constrain the 
implementation of the educational decentralization policy? 
Notwithstanding seriousness exhibited at national level in 2002 towards decentralising the 
education system, crippling barriers to implementation soon became apparent. Although 
good lessons are not well documented, this study revealed that the mechanisms put in place 
through the decentralisation policy, have without doubt transformed accountability in the 
district level. Clarity and awareness of ‘roles and responsibilities’ of board members has 
fairly improved and positively contributed towards effective planning, monitoring and 
evaluation and reporting (MoE & SNV, 2009). But on their own, clarity and awareness of 
policy guidelines do not mean much especially when one considers the incompatible 
accountability relationships which characterises Chongwe and Solwezi DEBs- thus internal 
and external.  
The evidential basis for discussing the question at hand is based on the key finding that 
although theoretically an ideal, the issue of accountability for both Chongwe and Solwezi 
Boards still remains a difficult puzzle to solve. From the policy perceptive, educational 
decentralisation is seen as a way of strengthening accountability relationships for 
enhancing transparency and inclusiveness in decision making, including actual execution 
of educational responsibilities. However the overwhelming discontent by participants 
indicates that the perceived accountability successes are questionable if not far-fetched. In 
fact, most actions aimed at promoting shared responsibility and instituting administrative 
control and efficiency at the district and school level, are practically lacking- thus stifling 
good policy intentions. Besides, the questionable experiences about accountability in these 
two districts have far-reaching implications on the idea of shared responsibility just as well 
on administrative control and efficiency in a decentralised education system.  
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Paradoxically, the transfer of decision making authority to lower units in a decentralised 
education system does not however lead improved accountability at all times in every 
setting. You can have great devolution of control all the way down to the grass root level, 
but only to entrench local corruption. The US provides a historical case of a sharp reaction 
during the 1900 against local political control of schools in New York City on the grounds 
that it served and entrenched corrupt practices (Katz, 1975). But granted on the other hand 
that “the centre improves the process of decentralisation or if local structures have 
inadequate capacity to implement, then shared responsibility may enhance efficiency and 
consistency” (Florestad & Cooper, 1997:7).  
Note however, that “accountability mechanisms are not just limited to a collective 
relationship towards a particular course of action, but rather, stakeholders’ voice 
relationships are as much, critical in influencing policies and decisions at various levels in 
a decentralised education system”64 (Di Gropello, 2004).  Hence, be it weak or strong 
sense of collective action, as long as there  exists  a lopsided relationship such as in 
Chongwe and Solwezi where the only significant aspect of shared responsibility is about 
the construction of classroom blocks and teachers’ houses, then accountability is 
questionable. But on the other hand, accountability may be a precondition for transparency 
which is crucial where financial resources have been mobilised for a particular course of 
action. In this case, school infrastructure and anything that involves procurement of some 
kind, may be considered a key issue of transparency. A female board member is Chongwe 
was spot on when she disclosed that: 
“One of the challenges in this Board is lack of transparency and consultation when making decisions. 
Many are the times you are invited to participate in activities you never had a say upon […..] It is the 
same problem affecting PTAs in Basic schools. Parents are only involved when it is time to contribute 
upfront materials for constructing school buildings. You just get a feeling that you are being side-
lined!  You wonder why? So why should everybody be squarely answerable for things not presided 
over as a team?”65  
In cases like this, it is hard to imagine how accountability through shared responsibility can 
be enhanced. If educational decentralisation is a process, so are accountability and its 
associated elements. Granted on the one hand that accountability entails answerability, it is 
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 Refer to Di Gropello, (Ibid:1-8) where he elaborated in detail that through the “long route", clients as 
citizens (or community) influence policy-makers and policy-makers, in turn, influence providers (i.e. both the 
“compact” and “voice” relationships are part of the “long route”). Through the “short route”, citizens, acting 
as final users/clients of the service, influence more directly the providers (this is the “client power” 
relationship). 
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logical that “shared responsibility” be it at the district or school level equally is perceived 
as a process where inclusion of all stakeholders as opposed to their exclusion, should be 
upheld. Linked to the issue of administrative control is the efficiency rationale both of 
which, as findings show constrain the operations of Chongwe and Solwezi boards. 
Questions can be asked: Why is it that even after decentralisation, administrative controls 
over devolved structures are still imposed from the centre?  Doesn’t that defeat the policy 
objective of improving efficiency by bringing decisions closer to the people?   
While these questions are mind boggling, an argument in favour of a balanced system (i.e. 
centralisation + decentralisation) can be advanced. Obviously, in a highly centralised 
education system such as Zambia was prior to educational decentralisation, loosening 
controls meant disentangling the centre from heavy administrative responsibilities which in 
the end improves efficiency in the delivery of education services. But as findings in this 
study have shown, things don’t easily turn out that way because of perceived challenges. If 
indeed, as often the case in SSA region that “decentralisation offloads challenges and 
hardships to local units – i.e. a win-lose case scenario, as opposed to transferring positive 
opportunities” (Hanson, 1998; Weiler, 1993), it is therefore justifiable for MoE HQ to put 
in place considerable “control measures” which can be considered as a win-win situation – 
since chances of successful implementation may then be higher.   
It has also been argued that where sub-regional units are inexperienced or appear to be 
failing to execute newly allotted responsibilities which seems to be the case for Chongwe 
and Solwezi DEBs, then it is according to Florestad and Cooper (1997) understandable for 
central authority to override their powers. However, there are other practices of 
decentralization policies particularly in the Scandinavia where decentralisation has been 
seen more and more of a governance strategy for achieving rationalisation and efficiency 
(Karlsen, 2010:527). The argument there has been that the reins of bureaucratic controls 
could be replaced since local authorities and individual schools had the necessary 
competences to utilise provided resources in a more flexible and efficient way. But of 
course, there may be critics who see weaknesses of this.  
 
 
 
129 
 
8.5.3 In which way does the transfer of responsibilities and power 
influence local autonomy of education boards?  
If in theory the answer towards effective implementation of educational decentralisation in 
Zambia lies in the autonomy of education boards, then what is the question? The 
discussion about local autonomy is as old as the notion of decentralisation itself.  Some 
scholars are of the view that autonomy, and not the absence of it, is what is most ideal in a 
decentralised system (Mcinerney, 2010). In fact, the dichotomy between these two 
perspectives features prominently in the debate about educational decentralisation. Other 
than laying emphasis on the transfer of responsibilities and power to the established 
boards, educational decentralisation in Zambia equally entailed according these entities 
with a certain degree of autonomy in order to enable them to make independent decisions 
in the best interest of the communities (MoE, 1996). Of course, this is advantageous in 
many ways such as enhancement of self-management by the board. Further, there is also a 
link between local autonomy and increased effectiveness and efficiency in the delivery of 
education services which in the long run widens the platform for community participation 
and good governance (Cheema & Rondinelli, 1983; Ellerman, 2004). This assertion goes 
well with the remarks by one Board member in Solwezi who said: 
“Even if we don’t have powers to make final decisions, our presence during board meetings matters a 
lot as it gives us an opportunity to influence such the process of decision making. For instance, we do, 
in our limited capacity, have a say on the budget, we participate in joint monitoring activities to 
schools which helps us to understand problems faced better[….]It is easy and less costly to monitor 
schools since we are closer to them than people from headquarters  in Lusaka”66 
These views paint a ‘somewhat’ impressive picture about the freedom being enjoyed by 
members of the board.  But to greater extent findings of this study suggest that education 
boards as well as PTAs have little or no room to manoeuvre when it comes to making key 
decisions over most of the responsibilities transferred to them. This problem is also 
compounded by the conflictual relationship at the district level between the management 
and governance members in the boards. This conflict of interest as the study revealed, is 
based on the reality that the management team members’ exert more influence in the 
affairs of the board than their counterparts. Under such circumstances, you end up with a 
lopsided accountability system with no checks and balances - merely symbolic of a 
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decentralised system but in practice devoid of balanced legitimate control and autonomy to 
stimulate innovativeness.   
But then again, regardless of how much responsibilities and authority can be transferred 
DEBs, local autonomy alone is not enough. Smyth (1993) questioned the hype surrounding 
the idea of autonomy of local units in a decentralised system.  He argued that “contrary to 
policy rhetoric on participatory democracy and autonomy, the reality or practice is that 
power and authority are retained at the centre” (p.4).  Linked to this claim was what 
appeared as a stern warning by a Planner at the MoE headquarters who had this to say: 
            “You don’t have to decentralise anyhow just for the sake of it. Do you really think educational 
decentralisation is risk free? I totally disagree because giving too many powers to DEBs can have 
serious consequences in future. Don’t ask me about a concrete example because I have none but one 
of the potential dangers about decentralizing a national educational system like we have done in this 
country is the likelihood that certain local entities may attempt to subvert the system by going their 
own way”.67 
Clearly, the transfer of educational responsibilities and authority from the top has far-
reaching implications for the autonomy of the boards just as much as it compromises the 
flexibility for decision making freedom by PTA members. Findings in this study are 
intriguing. Just how much authority is required to ensure that education boards or PTAs for 
that matter have the necessary flexibility for participatory decision making? This question 
is hard because there is no well-known perfect model decentralisation. Angus (1994) 
argued that “it is difficult to make a case that regional education officials have greater 
freedom and authority to make decisions which are truly responsive to their own setting” 
(p.16). Angus’ raises counter argument against those who advocate for decentralization on 
the basis of the liberal and populist localism traditions, in which, the idea public choice, 
individual’s freedoms and popular power are paramount in ensuring effective and efficient 
education service delivery at the local level. For this reason, both Chongwe and Solwezi 
boards might well be seen as agents of central government which are accountable for their 
actions in implementing the mandated policies and as such, expected to comply with 
MoE’s externally-driven reforms and regulations. 
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Chapter 9:  Summary, Conclusion and 
Recommendations  
 
“Educational decentralization is a popular reform theme of governments around the 
world, but with its goals, strategies and outcomes that are as different as the 
countries themselves” (Hanson, 1998:111). 
In view of the above assertion, this chapter sums up the main issues discussed in this 
thesis. It is divided into three parts. The first provides a summary of issues discussed under 
chapter 1 to 7. The second part presents conclusions based on data analysis and discussion 
of main findings in chapter 8. The last part outlines recommendations and the way forward. 
9.1 Summing up  
The overall goal of this study was to analyse educational decentralisation policy in Zambia 
in terms of the perceived gap between policy and practice or implementation.  In particular, 
three factors thus; institutional capacity, accountability and local autonomy were examined 
in order to see how they affect implementation of the policy. The study took a comparative 
approach in which two cases thus Chongwe and Solwezi District Education Boards (DEBs) 
were explored in detail. By focusing on institutional capacity, accountability relationships 
and local autonomy, the objective was to assess how these factors influence successes of 
these boards and on the other hand the extent to which they constrain the implementation 
of the policy. Guided by the aim of the study in chapter one, this thesis sought to answer 
three key research questions namely:  
1. How does institutional capacity influence success or constrain effective 
implementation of educational decentralization? 
2. How does accountability in a devolved education system affect the implementation 
of decentralization? 
3. In which way does the transfer of power and/or authority or lack of these aspects 
affect local autonomy of education boards? 
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The initial build up to these questions is chapter 2, which provides a contextual 
background on the development of Zambia’s education system and the genesis of 
decentralisation reforms - on which the educational decentralisation policy is anchored. 
The chapter highlights a number of issues of which the key ones are the policy objectives 
including the new district governance structure and related fiscal measures designed to 
support implementation. 
The third chapter explores the nature and scope of decentralisation. It highlights on the 
historical trends of decentralisation. The chapter shades more light on the different forms 
of decentralisation. But more importantly, it presents the arguments for decentralisation 
coupled with an analysis of mechanisms under which is it often applied such as school 
based management. The substantial limitations of educational decentralisation were 
highlighted: thus its lack of a strong theoretical tradition. This critique was explored further 
in chapter 4 where the empirical inconsistencies of decentralisation as espoused at 
international, national and regional levels were discussed. 
Essentially, the literature review in chapter four identified and discussed different models 
adopted in selected parts of the world. Based on the evidence assessed, success related 
factors were highlighted. The key message arising from the literature reviewed is that one 
of the most critical determinants of success or failure of educational decentralisation in a 
given context is the manner in which accountability relationships and institutional 
arrangements for autonomy are established.  However, effective functioning of devolved 
structures can as demonstrated in this study be a difficult and time consuming endeavour.  
It is no wonder Hanson’s (1995) assertion that:  
“Decentralization does not just come with the formulation and adoption of policies. 
Like most types of reform, it is built rather than created. It happens slowly because the 
accountability systems as well as the institutional culture (e.g., "the way we've always 
done things around here") must be transformed, new roles and skills learned, 
leadership styles altered (e.g., shifting from controlling to supporting behaviours), 
communication patterns reversed, planning and decision making procedures revised 
(e.g., bottom up and top down), and regional policies and programs developed” (p. 9).  
Certainly, there are equally no pure versions of educational decentralization strategies in 
which sub national units have absolute administrative authority over their responsibilities. 
Hanson (1998:113) added that “almost all administrative decisions be they finance or 
personnel, in practical terms manifest degrees of centralisation and decentralisation – 
hence finding the suitable nexus is what matters most”.  Chapter 5 consolidates on the 
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design of the study by formulating the theoretical and conceptual frameworks. 
Theoretically, decentralisation is rooted in a theoretical tradition which may have a bearing 
on implementation. However, it is also more about conceptual definitions themselves 
which as discussed in this chapter informs the methodology in chapter 6 including data 
analysis and discussion of findings.  
This study employed a comparative qualitative case study design involving Chongwe and 
Solwezi DEBs. The aim was to analyse implications of the comparable differences and 
similarities with regard to implementation.  In terms of the targeted sample, these two 
boards were the focal point for the selection of respondents. However, other participants 
were also conveniently drawn from national and school level where Focus Group 
Discussions (FGD) were held
68
. In this way, it was possible to triangulate data from semi-
structured interviews, FGDs and use of official policy documents and reports. The data 
collected were organised and presented in Chapter 7 in form of a mind map under which 
three wider organic branches (themes) namely institutional capacity, accountability and 
local autonomy emerged from the central theme of the map, leading to thinner branches of 
data on which the analysis and discussion of findings were based.  
9.2 Conclusions of key Findings 
“If properly conducted, decentralisation is the best means of managing education 
efficiently. But it requires many sacrifices; it requires transparency, accountability, 
better training of implementers, good dissemination of information, etc.” (A school 
principal in Guinea: in Lugaz & De Grauwe, 2010: 139). 
Although this was a comparative study of two districts, no significant differences in terms 
of implementation were noted. The reason might be that despite differences in proximity to 
the centre, geographical size and context, it is mainly the administrative systems; the 
constraints within which these boards operate; and social relationships at the local level 
whose impact on implementation is similar in both districts.  This argument adds to the 
credibility of the findings as probably being more broadly representative than merely being 
unique to these two research sites. Therefore, the remarks below are meant to reflect on the 
findings and if possible to raise some new questions and possibly point to new insights on 
                                                 
68
  Note as indicated in the methodology and data analysis chapters,  23 (representing 76.6%) out of the 
targeted 30 participated were interviewed at the district level, while out of the targeted 10 key informants 
who were targeted at national level, 8 (representing 80%) were interviewed.  Four FGD were conducted- 2 in 
Chongwe and two in Solwezi with attendance ranging between 7 to 10 participants in each of the four 
sessions. Close to 40 % of those who participated in the study were women. 
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the topic studied. The findings are however, mixed and may therefore appear to be a bit 
perplexing.  In both research locations on the one hand, they give some grounds for 
optimism but on the other, they point to serious challenges in implementation of 
educational decentralisation policy in the two districts.  
On the ‘optimistic side’-  As stated in the analysis chapter, governance board members, 
PTA and community members  appear to be highly enthusiastic and committed in playing 
their role as manifested by their contribution to basic education. Some of the board 
members even go as far as meeting certain running costs and spending their time for 
monitoring works in schools. Some teachers even use their own money to meet school 
requirements like chalk, duster boards etc.  Obviously, this enthusiasm and commitment is 
indispensable for effective operations of schools and the DEBs. But how sustainable are 
such initiatives?  Perhaps not in a long term but regardless…if some board and PTA 
members including the community show firm determination towards basic education 
provision, an enabling environment should be created to allow them play more important 
roles.  
Yet, the balance of findings is such that grounds for pessimism outweigh the positive 
prospects in implementation. Findings confirm the principle argument in the introduction 
that institutional capacity, accountability and autonomy are critical success factors since 
both Chongwe and Solwezi generally showed major weaknesses on these aspects. Further, 
findings   underscored the challenges associated with weak institutional capacity, weak 
accountability and weak autonomy in as far as the working of Chongwe and Solwezi DEBs 
is concerned. 
Weak institutional capacity: Findings revealed inadequate skilled personnel and financial 
resources including the absence of a strong administrative and legal framework. These 
factors lend themselves as crucial challenges in Chongwe just as much as they do in 
Solwezi. Not only do these problems manifest at the district level, they also frustrate actors 
at the school level were teachers and parents complain that decentralisation may worsen 
inequalities since not all communities can be able to mobilise local resources for education. 
Clearly, these hardships have made it difficult for DEBs to implement the policy. If 
anything, they are serving as are a call for action. Note however, that manpower and 
financial needs as well as regulatory frameworks are not static problems. They can be 
mitigated by the action of national policy makers. Therefore, manpower capacity 
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enhancement, wider community involvement and indeed, enactment of a stronger and 
balanced regulatory framework are possible steps in that direction. It might also be useful 
to review institutional coordination mechanisms not only within the board but also between 
boards and MoE headquarters including PTAs in order to narrow the gap between national 
and lower level actors. But most important as well is the need to clarify their expected 
roles and responsibilities. 
Puzzling accountability system:  The issue of accountability in this study also gives cause 
for great concern especially in light of the experiences pertaining to problems regarding 
shared responsibility, administrative control and efficiency. The poor internal and external 
compact relationships at the district level and the fragile nature of collective actions as well 
as irrational administrative controls towards the provision of basic education hamper the 
effective implementation of decentralization policy. As findings show, decisions 
concerning   approval of budgets, allocation and use of funds are mostly made at MoE 
headquarters in Lusaka an indication that DEBs have little or no control of economic 
resources allocated by central government through MoE.  
The persistence of such central control seems contrary to what was anticipated in the 
policy. Therefore, such tendencies compromise the very thing the establishment of DEBs 
in particular and educational decentralization in general is supposed to promote—increased 
accountability and transparency in decision making. The reason why local accountability in 
a decentralised education system often faces serious resistance from within the state 
apparatus may be due to the fact that it threatens existing power relations. Why this is so is 
indeed, a topic for further investigation. However, the weak accountability relationships 
characterised by both Chongwe and Solwezi may be mainly due to the absence of a strong 
regulatory framework. The absence of such a framework breeds and replicates the type of 
inefficiencies and sluggishness which existed during early 1990s when the government 
was highly centralised – thus confirming the principle argument raised in the introduction 
of this thesis.   
Inadequate autonomy: The main problem revealed under this category was lack of 
meaningful authority for decision-making towards implementation. This manifested in 
terms of excessive control over matters that were under the jurisdiction of the DEBs. 
Substantial responsibilities and power have quite well been formally transferred to the 
lower units but sadly, most key decisions are still made centrally. This situation has 
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perpetuated inefficiencies in decision-making just as they were under centralisation.  Lack 
of autonomy by the DEBs may not necessarily be a negative factor given that certain 
decisions still have to be made centrally. However, expanded local autonomy is central to 
the very rationale of decentralisation.  As the theory goes, “those who are close to the point 
of delivery are best able to make decisions and direct resources for the benefit of learners” 
(De Grauwe & Lugaz, 2010; 142). 
The challenges highlighted above hing on the debate by multilateral agencies such as the 
World Bank as to whether or not local autonomy can be combined with greater 
transparency. The argument often goes for authority adequately located locally, in order 
that those directly affected by these decisions can influence them which minimises abuse 
of authority- an important ingredient for of autonomy in a decentralised system.  Budget 
tracking in Solwezi is a good case where delegated authority was jointly exercised by the 
board and external partners Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV) which in a way 
is minimising the abuse of power over the allocated funds. 
9.3 Recommendations  
Educational decentralisation is generally perceived as if it is an answer to problems of high 
centralisation when in actual fact, it is merely a management strategy which may be 
adopted when and where a highly centralised education system is ineffective and 
inefficient. In light of the challenges associated with institutional capacity, accountability 
and autonomy, the need for flexibility during implementation becomes paramount.   On 
that basis, the following policy measures are hereby recommended; 
 Strengthening institutional capacity in a decentralised education system is not a 
“quick fix” given limited financial resources in developing countries such as Zambia 
but that does not mean it is totally unachievable. But finances alone cannot achieve 
success. Therefore, there is need for political commitment as well for setting up a 
clear and strong regulatory framework to support implementation. Such a framework 
should clearly outline coordination arrangements. It should provide clear operational 
guidelines that specify power relations between and among members of the Board by 
clarifying their different roles and responsibilities. 
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 Setting up a strong regulatory (institutional) framework is one thing but ensuring that 
there are competent personnel to operationalize it is another.  Given the circumstances 
in Chongwe and Solwezi, it could be useful to review the recruitment criteria and 
procedures in order to close the gap between actors’ expected roles and their 
professional profiles. This measure can also be backed up by in-service training 
particularly among management team members in order to re-orient them with new 
knowledge and skills that match new demands since they may be too used to the old 
ways of doing things.  
 
 Upward accountability may be commendable but in the absence of an effectively 
operating mechanism for downward accountability that provides for the voice of the 
people to be heard, implementation of educational decentralisation can suffocate.  In 
light of the findings, management accountability relationships should be 
counterbalanced with downwards accountability of the ‘governance group’. This can 
help to ensure stronger community voice and strengthen the spirit of shared 
responsibility which is an ingredient for increased efficiency. This could be achieved 
by assessing other existing structures at the Sub-district level in order to incorporate 
them into the governance body of the board. 
 
 Granting sub-national structures full autonomy is said to have far-reaching 
implications but lack of meaningful autonomy may deprive them of the necessary 
flexibility which can be an effective strategy for encouraging innovation and change 
in educational practice. In view of the findings, it might perhaps be useful to give 
priority towards developing a management system which fosters complementarity in 
roles and authority between MoE HQ and the DEB including PTAs and possibly the 
community at large. Such a mechanism can serve as a hedge against the risks 
associated with abuse of authority within the DEB or excessive control from the 
centre.  
9.4 The Way Forward 
Since this study was only conducted in two districts, widening   the geographical scope by 
covering more districts and schools may in future provide in-depth insights which would 
add to the existing body of knowledge on experiences regarding DEBs in Zambia. On the 
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other hand, since this study employed comparative case study design involving smaller 
sample of respondents, further investigation with mixed method with relatively larger 
sample may be necessary for achieving a much firmer basis for making policy 
recommendations.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Interview Guides 
 
I: National Level Interview Guide:  
Background information and general questions  
1. Male/female; Academic qualifications; current and previous designation? 
2. Duration of service and work experience related to educational decentralization policy?  
3. What precisely does the policy say about educational decentralization? 
4. What main challenges does the policy seek to address in the sector? 
5.  According to the policy, what are the district education boards supposed to do? 
6. What institutional capacity measures have been put in place to ensure good 
implementation of the policy? 
7. Do you think district education boards have the necessary freedom to implement the 
educational decentralization policy? What are the reasons behind your views? 
8.  How do the existing accountability mechanisms affect the implementation of the 
educational decentralization at the district level? 
9.  How conducive is the relationship between MoE headquarters and district education 
boards officials in as far as the implementation of educational decentralization policy is 
concerned? What are the reasons for your answer? 
150 
 
10. Who do you think has most influence in decisions about different issues between the 
management team members and the governance body within the board? Why do you 
think so? 
11. How has the establishment of district education boards influenced the delivery of basic 
education services at the district and school level? 
12. What impact [expected or unexpected] have the district education boards had so far? 
13. What practical lessons do you draw for bridging the gap between policy and practice in 
as far as the educational decentralization policy visa-vis establishment of district 
education boards is concerned?  
14. Do you have any other comments on how to bridge the gap between policy and 
practice in as far as educational decentralization policy is concerned?  
  
II: District Level Interview Guide: 
Background information 
1. Male/female; current and previous designation or position in the board? 
2. Duration of service in the position and work experience related to working of the board 
in the district? 
3. How knowledgeable are you about decentralization policy in the Zambian education 
sector? 
4. What has educational decentralization come to mean for education officials like you at 
the district level? 
5.  According to the policy, what are the district education boards supposed to do? 
 
General questions 
1. What is the composition of your board? 
2. How are resolutions made and executed in board meetings? 
3. What sort of feedback mechanisms are put in place to ensure effective flow of 
information across all members of the board? 
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4. Who do the DEB secretary and board chairperson report to on issues of governance and 
management? 
5. What institutional capacity measures have been put in place to ensure good 
implementation of the policy? 
6. What, based on your experience, do you think is/are the critical institutional capacities 
related challenges? How can these be addressed? 
7. Do you think your board has the necessary flexibility to implement the educational 
decentralization policy? Why do you have that impression? 
8. What are your views/concerns in as far as accountability mechanisms are concerning in 
the implementation of the educational decentralization policy? 
9. Whose voice counts between management and governance members when it comes to 
issues of planning and decision making proper? 
10. How does your board show people in the district that it is a legitimate body of the 
government responsible for basic education service delivery? 
11. Is the participation of governance members in your board felt by people in the district? 
If not why? 
12. How are school PTAs represented in the boards? To what extent are PTA’s concerns 
heard?  
13. Is it possible to say that your board has had an impact on desired policy outcomes or 
changes at the school level?  Why do you have this impression? 
14. What are the main challenges affecting the operations of your board? 
15. What lessons do you draw for bridging the gap between policy and practice in as far as 
educational decentralization policy visa-vis the establishment of education boards is 
concerned?  
 
III: School Level; Focus Group Discussion Guide 
1. How has educational decentralization influenced your responsibilities as PTA members 
at the school level?  
2. Do you think the education board in your district performs its functions according to 
your expectations as PTA members or executes its mandate in accordance with the 
stipulated policy guidelines? If not, why? 
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3. In which way has the adoption of the educational decentralization policy influenced the 
performance of your responsibilities as PTAs? Do you think your roles in the provision 
of basic education are now difference from the past? 
4. What changes (good results) at the school level are attributed to the implementation of 
the educational decentralization policy in general or establishment of the district 
education boards in particular?  
5. Do you think your concerns as PTA members are adequately addressed by your board? 
If not, why? 
6. What are the main challenges that affect your working relationship with the board? 
7. Suggest ways you think both your education board and PTA you belong can enhance 
effective and efficient delivery of basic education services? 
8. What lessons do you draw for bridging the gap between policy and practice in as far as 
educational decentralization policy visa-vis the establishment of education boards is 
concerned?  
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Appendix C: Fieldwork Introductory Letter (UIO) 
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Appendix D: Fieldwork Clearance Letter (MoE Lusaka) 
 
